Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

whether we fhali place this all important department, in the liands of a Tingle individual, or in a board of co^nniflioners. I prefume the gentleman, who has brought forvard this firing of propolitions, means, that this oJliter fiiail have pow- er to examine into the itate of the public debt and expeij. ces, to receive and diiburl'e therevenue, to de\'ile plans lor Its improvement and expanhon, and in ihort, to fupermtend and direct the receipts and expenditure, and govern the fi- nances of the United States; having under hnn officers to do the fubordinace bufmefs of, regillering and rccordi;>g his tranfacVions, and a comptroller 10 conrroul his opera- tions with reipecl to the accounts and .vouchers. Before this committee proceed one (Icp farther in this bulineis, they ought ferioully to confider the iifjation of this country, and what will be the conlequence of appoint- ing luch an officer confider how ic wui affect the j:ubl:c ; in general, the revenue, and even the government iiieif. tie is declared, in the lift of duties afligned him in the  DEBATES paper read yf^fterJay by the gentleman from New-York A. 1789.. (Mr. Benibn) to have the power to form and digelt the acconnts, and 16 controul all the officers of the department. It is evident, that we put his integrity to the trial, by fuclx an arrangement if he is diCpofed to cmbezzel the public ; money, it will be oat of the power of the executive itfelf, to check or controul him in his nefarious practices the ex- ; tention of his hiilinefs to the cblledors of at leait hftv fea ports, (over whom, the naval officer can have no con- troul, with refpecl to the money received) will furnilii abundant opportunities for peculation. In addition to the monies arifing from the impofl:, he may have to do with iaro-e fums, derived from other quarters Irom the fale of ; the vacant lands; the money of defaulters now due to the United States, and the revenue ariung from taxes and ex- ciles. Ad'uit thel'e innumerable opportunities for defraud. lug the revejiue, without check or controid. and it is next to imjjoilible he ihould remain unl'nilied in his reputation, or innoxious with reipedl to mifapplying his truft. Other great opportunities may arife in cafe of an anticipation of the public revenue, or, if it is necelFary to prevent the injury which a rapid depreciation of the fecu- fities occahon to public credit, he n)ay be employed in pur- chafing them, in order to advance the credit of the union ; but what is to prevent the greatelr impofition in this bufi- nefs? charninrr them to the public at their nominal valuej it is not in the power of the government to check this fjje- cies of Ipeculation.' what then is the fituation of your offi- cer? he muit fuojecl himfelf to fufpicion indeed it is : as much as his reputation is worth to come into a place of this kind he can hardly preferve his integrity, 6ut his ho- ; nor, credit and charaiter, mull inevitably be mjured. He cannot prove himfelf innocent of the fufpicion, becaufe it is •the negative hde of the quellion, he can offer nothing more in his defence than a mere denial of the crime. There is another point which ought to be well confider- ed : This officer is to digell and form the accounts, he can conlequentlv give the bufinefs fuch complexity, as to ren- der it impoihbie to tletevl: his impofitior.s ; but the inferior officers, who might difcover the fraud, are to be appointed by the principal, will they not couie(]uent!y be n:en after Jlis own heart. T^iking thcle circumfiances together, it mud: be very diracrreeable to the perfon appointed, provided he is an i^hoiiell: uprij^ht rmn; it will bedilagrecable alfo to the people  A. 1789. Of C O N G R E S S. 365) of the union, who will always have reafon to rufpejSl:, that a partiality is ihewn to the colleftors, and ether ofiicers, of the ftate to which he belonged : This has abfolutely beea the cale, and was produftive of very great diilatisfadiion. I would be glad to know ol' the gentlemen, who are for vefl- ing thefe )owers in a lingle perfon, where they will find the man who is capable of performing tiie duties of a finan- cier ? for it is not the mere calling him a financier, and giving a large I'alary, that will enable him to perform his fundions in inch a manner as to give fatisfaftion. V/e had once a gentleman who lilled fuch.a department, and 1 be- lieve the only one in the United States who had knowledge and abilities by any means competent to the bulinels, buc that gentleman is now employed in another branch of the government, and cannot be called to this tru(l. Durino- the late war congreis thinking it ueccfTary to employ a tinancier, were led 10 enquire for a proper character to fill fuch an office ; but not being able to difcover Inch an one in this country, in whole abilities they had fuificient confi- dence, they wrote to Do<^or Price a letter, to induce him to come to America, and accept of an appointment under* them, for the fuperintendance of their finances. He wrote in anJwer, that he felt with gratitude the honor which they had done him by their application, and fignilicd, thac he wasdefirous of rendering every iervice in his power to aid the <>lorious caufe in which America was embarked 5 but, from his advanced fituation in life, and infirmities of body, vv'asunder the necelhcy of declining. This circum- Itance i'erves to Ihew how difficult it is to get a proper perfon for fo arduous an undertaking. But it appears to me, that if we could t\:<. upon a perfon ecpal to the office, in- volving him in forming accounts, and iuch trifiinp^ bu'Inef^, would divert his attention from the more important duties he is called upon to perform. The proper bulinefs of finance, I take it, ought to be to conlider of the means to improve the revenue, and introducing ceconomy into the expenditures; to recon)mend general fyllems of finariCe, without having any thing to do with the actual adminUtra- tion oi' them, becauie, if he engages in the executive buli- nefs, we ihall be deprived of his talents m more iinponant. concerns. If it ihould be granted, that there is a perfon of abilities to be found, adequate to the duticb of the office, I want to knov/ where the advantage aril-^is of appointing him alone in preference of n board > If j'OU have comuiif- iioners, you have an opportunity of taking one from eadi A aa  370 DEBATES A. 1789, grand divilloii cf the United States, namely, the eaftern, the middle, mid fouthern diftrifts : If this perfons is a nieinbcr of the board, is it not evident you will have every advanrage from his abilities in fuch a fitiiation, as you would if he was placed in office v.ithout cotitroui? If he Wcis polTeiTed of fiich genus, he could employ ir more ufe- fuliy as a conimiilioiier of the board of trea("ury,'than when Itf^ to perform all the druggery of the executive part ; becaufe while his hne imagination was bufied ;n reducing a chaos to a beautiful fylteni, his colleagues iniaht perform tnoie parts which required lefs elevation of thought, by dividing the burthen, the bufmefs would be done with more regularity and facility. Surely no advantage to the public would ari'e from giving hiin the fole nvanagenjent ol the buliuels, but much inconvenience might bolide it ; molt unavo d.ibly, as 1 f.jid before, fubjcct him to ful'picions U!lla^cl•able to his reputation, 'i his nas abfolutely been real.'zcd, it is not a inere chimera, a matter of fpeculation. We hvivehadaboard of treafury, ai.d we have had a finan- cier ;iiave not exprefs charges, as well as vague rumours, been hi-ought ag.iiiiii: him at the bar of the pubiic, they may be ujitounJcd it is true, but it ihev\s' that a man cannot . Icrve in fuch a Nation without exciting popular clamour. It is very well known, 1 dare fay, to many gei.tleinen in this hijuie, that the noiie aiid commotion \\as luch as obli. gee! coogrels once more to alter their treafury department^ and [vlace it under the management of a board oi commif- lioners. We have leen fpeculations excited from this qnarrer agaiiul the government itfelf, and painful infinua- tions of delign by his appointment to the fenate. I mention tiiele circu'.nirances to exhibit to your view the inconve- niencies to which an officer is fubjecled by conitituting an oifice of this nature. If the gentleman I have alluded to had [)efn a member of a board of treafm-y, he would not have been fubjeded to the charges which were brought againfi hiin. In fuch a iiruatibn he could have rendered the fervices his great abhlities enabled him to do, wiHiout expoiimg hrs chdracler to be tore to pieces by malevolence or detraction. We are to Yis-y forne attention to t'le prejudices and wiHiiesofour conltituents, efpecially when their fentiments have been firongly declared tor or agaiiiit this or that mode of ajminiitration. We find fuch an officer unprecedented in the leveral ftaces ; and 1 believe it would not be agree- able to have a iingle officer, and his aiiiitauts, cotleiiling  ; A. 1789. Of congress. 371 the money, or controuling the revenue arifing mthofe frates yet you ina'.e ic one of his powers, that money fliall noi be drawn without a warrant from the financier. Here is no perfon of this kind mentionetl in the conftirution, not even the prefident, nor veicprclident and i'enate, have a cor.iroul over the trcaCury ; yet we put all this power inro the hands of one great man, who is to be the head of the de- partment. It appears to me, that, by fo doing, we iliail, edabliih an office giving one perfon a greater influence tiu.n the pre(idei;t of the United States has, and more than is proper for any perfon to have in a republican govern- ment. Pf rhaps it may be objecled that we fnould ftudy ceco- nomy if we employ three perfons to condu6l this bufuiefs, ; we liial! have to pay tijem more than would be required for a falary for an individual. But this I take to be a very lii*ht com. deration, compared with fecurinsr the i)ub}ic treafury. A lingle officer to have the command of three or fcjur millions of money, poflefl'es a posNer very u;;fcite in a republic ; but, I apprehend, we may employ three com- niiHioners for the fame fum as we fliall be obliged to pay for one financier — if we have great officers we mufl allow large falaries. I; am delirous of fupporting the prefident ; but the fe- r.atc requires to be fupported alfo in their conilitutional rights: i'o this body belongs the confidence of the Itates, while the prefident reils his Itipport upon them he will b<5 fecure ; they, with this houfe, can give him proper infor- mation of what is for the public interefl, and by purfuing. their advice he will continue to himfelf that good opinion which is juftly entertained of him. If we are to ebablifh a number of fuch grand officers as thefe, the confequences appear to me pretty plain : Thefe officers bearing the title of ininiller at war, minifter of Tiate, minilier loi' the finan- ces,