READ ALONGSIDE THE SOURCE
Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text
Part 82 of 141. These parts divide the reading text for browsing; they are not the source document's page numbers.
Machine-extracted text — congressional-register-volume1-1789.pdf
Machine-extracted OCR text · Review label: Machine produced / unreviewed
Compare this copy with the preserved source. Review labels describe the recorded status of this file; they do not guarantee that the text is error-free. Spacing and line breaks are retained, with long lines wrapped to fit the screen.
Ke had no idea, that it could ever enter into,
ihe heart of any man living, that all officers appointed un^
der the conftitution were to have a i>erpetuity in office :
The judges themfelves would not have had thib right, if
it had not been expref?ly given by the cor.ftitution, bi:E
would be romoveablc in hke manner with ambafiadorr.,
o'her public miniucrs, and coiifnls. Fe took it, therefore,
in theprefeni caff', that the prelident and the fei-ate vv'ould
ba^'e thepower of removing thefecretary of foreign affairs.
1 he only qucllion therefore which appears to be before
the committee is, v.herher we Ihail give tins power to the
prefident alone ? and with that he thought they had no-
thing to do. He fuippofed, if the claufe was left out, the
prefidmt and the fenate would proceed, as directed by the
co'.iflitution, to ap;_.oint the officer and hereafter, if they
;
judged it neccffary, v/ould remove him ; but if they ne-
glecfed to do i'o when it was necelTary by realbn of his mif-
demeanors, this houfe would impeach him, and fo get rid of
him on coavidlion.
Mr. Bland.
It feemsto be agreed on all hands, that there docs exift
a poucr of removal the contrary dodi-tue would be a ftj-
;
licifm in government. If an officer embczccls the public
money, or neglecls or refufes to do the duties of his ap-
pointment, can it be fuppofed there is no way of getting
rid of fuch a perfon ? he was certain it was efientially ne-
ceffary fuch a power fliould be lodged fomewhere, or it
v^ould be impoffible to carry the government into execu-
tion. IhcfT enquiries were therefore reduced to this
point, does it rcGde, agreeable to the conllitution, in the
preiident, or in the prefident and the fenate ? The conliL-
tution declares, that the prefident and the fenate Ihall ap-
power which ap-
point, and it naturally follows, that the
j>oints fliall remove alfo.
VVhat would be the confequence
of the removal by the prefident alone, he had already
mentioned, and need not again repeat: A new prelideijt
might, by turning out the great officers, bring about a
change of the miniiiry, and throw the affairs of lie union
t
into diforder : Would not this, in faft, make the prefident
a monarch, and give him abfolute power over all the grea?^
364 DEBATES
departments oi' government i
A. 1789,
It fignifies nothing that the
fenate have a check over the appohitmeni, becaule he can
remove, and tire out the good dilpclJtion of the lenate.
His colleague had objettcd to the removal in this way^
becaule the lenate would be kept conltantly luting. Hq
did not think this objedtion of any weight, becaufe the
conllitution made Ibme other thir;gs their duty, which
would require rhem to be j^retty cor.lfantly fitting, he allu-
ed to tiie part they were called upon to perform jn makino-
treaties ; this therefore.would be a trifling objecftion.
Mr. Benson
Tiiought it was not abfolutely necell'ary to make any
proviiion on this head^ becaule the power was given to the
prefident by the conltitution, but as the argument had
been pretty well gone into, he would add no more at pre-
fent,. than juft to remark an error the gentleman lalt up had
fallen into j he had I'uppoied the ])relident to have the
powers of a monarch, that he could introduce and keep a
favorite in office in defpite of every oiher branch of the 00-
vernment the fenate was an eftedlual check to a fyltem of
:
favoritifm, and it lay in the })ower of the houl'e to corred
any abufe arifing from fuch a lyltem if it unhappily was fallen
into.
Mr. Bland
Infifted that the check of the fenatewas not fufficient, if
the power of removal was taken frou) them, indeed, he
wasfatisfied from the privilege the prefident had of nomi-
iiating and filling up vacancies pro ten.pcre ; he wcl^M be-
come ablblute il he alone had the power of removal ; he
was therefore againll this part of the motion, both on
principle, and pi.licy ; he therefore movtd to add to the
words cf the motion, " by and with the advice and confent
of the fenate,'' fo that the power of removal might be de,
dared to be in the fame body as the conltitution placed the
appointn:ent.
Mr. Clym-er
Said, the power of rem.oval was an executive power,
and as inch belonged to the preiident alone, by the exprefs
words of the corititution, " the excutive power fliail be
vested in a prelident of the United Scates of An-erica."
"XHe- fenate were nut an executive body, -they v\ere aie-
giUative or,e It was due, in iome infiances, they \}€lii a
:
qualified check over the executive power, but that ,<\as in
confeqience of an exprefs declaration in the conliiiution,
wiihout lu:h c'eJnration^ they would not have been called
;
A. 17S9. Of C O N G a E S S. 365
upon for advice and confent in the cafe of appointment
why then Ihall we extend their power to controul the re-
moval which is naturally in the executive, unlefs it is
likewife exprefsly declared in the conftitution.
The quclhon on adding the words '* by and with the ad-
vice and confent of the fenate" as moved by Mr. Bland,
was put and loft.
Mr. White.
It has been faidj that the fenate are not an cxecutlx-e bo-
dy. I grant that they are not an executive body when
they are fitting for legiflative purpofes ; but they are an
executive body when performing their executive fundions
as required in tlie conftitution.
Every queftion rcfpeCting treaties or public officers,
muftgo through their hands ; why Ihall we make the pre-
iident refponfibie for what goes through other hands he
i'
is not folely refponfibie agreeably to the conftitution, for
the conduct of tjie oflicers he nominates, and the fenate ap-
points, w by then talk of obtaining a greater degree of ref-
ponfibility than is known to the conftitution.
We are told, that we ought to keep the legiflative and
executive departments dift'.ncl: if we were forming a con-
;
Ihtution, the obfervation would be worthy of due conlide-
ration, and he would agree to the principles, but the con-
ftitution is formed, <ind the powers blended, ; ihevvilhed
for reparation, was therefore impra(5ticable.
Mr. VfNiNG
Ren)arked, that the argument of the gentleman from
Pennfylvania, (Mr. Clymer) was too well founded to b<*
overturned by the critical diftinetioii made by the gentle-
man laft: up, and was fufficient to convince gentlemen if
they would confider it well, thac the conftitution vefted
the power of removal in the prefident alone :he begged
the conmiittee to confider the monftrcus efled: it would
produce if the legillature went on to mingle the legiflative
and executive powers : he would place it in one other
point of view, and then have done with the fubject. It is
well known, tliat the lenate are to decide upon an impeach-
anent made by this houfe. Now, can they be impartial j(jd.
ges when they have already given judgment in the cafe?
Suppofe, theprelident communicates hi sfufpicions. \o \\u fe-
nate refpectijig the rnalfeafance of a public olk-er, a< d they
from fadion or party views, or, indeed, for want ci full
information, refule their confent to the rcn;oval, can they
be the equal and unbiaffed judicature which the confti.
366
turion
DEBATES
contemplates them to be he thought
A. 1789.
they could
;
iiot.
Mr. Page
RequeHed the committee to delay the decifion of this
queftiofi, btcaufe he did not wifli gentlemen to commit
thv^^mlelvcs, without having fully refieftedupon the fubjedl.
It hati prefc^itttd itfeif to his mind, as one of the moil mo-
mentuou.s quedions that could arife, in which the rights of
the people, the energy of government, and the liberty of
po'.lerity were {iakecT, He begged ihem not to call the
die, on which the fate of millions was hazarded, until they
h'.'.d maturely conHdered the fubjedl. He felt a degree of
ftcuriry in the check, the fenate had over the prefident, in
appointing to office, but he Ihould not think himfelf fafe,
if the pov. er of removal, was in the prefident alone.
The queilion was now taken, and carried by a confider-*
able majority, in favor of declaring the power of removal,
to be in the prefident.
The committee then proceeded to the confideration of
the ireafury department.
Mr. Gerry
Knew nothing of the fyllem, v hich gentlemen propofe
to adopt, in arranging the treafury department ; he thought
they were hurrying on bufinefs too "-apidly. Gentltnien
had already connnitted ihemfelves on one very impor-
tant pomt ; he hcped the honorable mover of this pro-
pofirion, would explain his intentions, before the commit-
lee decided the queilion^ he could not fee where it might
lead.
1 he late cpngrefs, had, on long experience, thought
proper to organize the treafury department, in a mode dif.
ferent from that propofed by the relblution, he would be
gk'd to know what the reafons were that fliould induce the
commirtre to adopt a different fyftem, frcm that which had
been found moii beneficial to the United States. He hoped
gentlemen would give time for ronfidering the fubjeft ma.
turely ; v.herefcre, he would move to poftpone it, for the
prefent, and proceed to the war departoient.
Mr. BoL'DiNOT.
Rofe, to exprefs his furprize, that gentlemen fhould faj'
they were not prepared, when the fubjeft had been often
mentioned to the houfe, and its neceflity was felf evident ;
he had a week ago, propofed to refer it to a feledt commit-
tee, but had been over-ru!ed ; he was told then, that the
prop{fr mode of doing the bufinefs was, to go into a corrv-
A. i;89. Of CONGRESS. 35;
miftee of the whole, he had taken that mode, in ccni'c-
quence, and hoped the bulinefs would not be unneccllariif
dtbyed.
Mr. GooDHus
AdTiitted the neceffity of having a treafury department^
as laid by the gentleman lall up, was I'elf evident, but it
was not obvious whether the department fhould be placed
under one man, or a board of couiiniirioners. In order to
have time for confidenng the queltion, he would lecond
the motion for poflponing.
Mr. Benson
Said, the motion of poftponeuient, was contrary to the
rules of the houfe ; the gentleman might move the com.
niittee to rife, and the eifed: would be the fame. While
he was up, he would declare his fentiment to be in favor of
a hngle head to this department, rather than three but he
;
would have the principal officer, well checked in the cxecu«
tion of his trull.
The motion being changed for the rifmg of the commit-
tee, it was agreed to. Adjourned.
May 26.
The houfe, according to the order of the day, refolved
itfelf into a committee of the whole houfe on the ftate
of the
union, and relumed the confideration of the refuii:tion fur
eilablifiiiiig the treafury department.
Mr. Gerry
We are now called upon, Mr. Speaker, to deliberate,
