Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

G II E S S. 359 limit the duration of the office ; \vh:it is aiithorulng the removal by the prefident but limiting it, and if we con- ceive this the belt method of limiting it, why /liaU it be objected as unconliitutional if it encreafes the refponfibi-- : hty of the prefident, and certainly it does tliis, why fhonld the legiflature hefuate in obtaining the highelt fecurity for the pubhc intereit and fafety. Mr. SVLYESTKR Thought the confHtution nught to have a hberal ccn- and therefore was of opinion that the claufe rela- flru'flion, tive to the removal by impeachment, ^^•as intended as a check upon the prefident, as already mentioned by fome gentlemen, and to fecure to the people, by means of their reprefenta fives, a confiitntional mode of obtaining jullice againd peculators and defaulters in office, who might be protected by the perfons appointing them. He appi"e» hended the doftrine held out by the gentlemen from Siuth- Caroiina, would involve the government in great diflicul- ties, if not in ruin, and he did not fee it was 2 necefTary con- iiruction of the conititution ; why then ihould the houfa fearcli for a meanijig, to make the conftitution inconfiftent with icfelf, when.a more rational one was at hand ; he how- ever inclined at prefent, to the fentiment ol" the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Bland) who thought the fenate ought to be joined with the prefident in the removal, as they were joined by the conftitution in the appointment to ofHce. Mr. GooDHUK Was decidedly againif combining the fenate in this bufl- J^efs, he widied to make the prefident as refponfible as pofn- '^le, for the ccr.dud of the officers who were to execute the duties of his own branch of the government. If the re- moval and appoint: aent were placed in the hands of a nume- rous body, the refponfibility would be leflened. He ad- mitted, thei-e was a propriety in allowing the fenate to ad- confti- vife the prefident in the choice of officers ; this, the tution had ordained for wife purpofes ; but there could arifing from the concurrence of the be no real advantage it might ^fenate to the removal, butjgreat difadvantages ; fenate beget faaion and party, which would prevent the from paying proper attention to the public budncls ; upon be ferved the whoIe,1ie concluded the community would concurred with the pre. fey the beft men, when the fenate lident in the appointment ; but if any cveriight was eoinv 360 ftiittedj DEBATES A. 17S9. could bed be correcled by the fuperintending it ngent. It was the peculiar duty of the prefident, to watch over the executive officers, but of what avail, would be his iiifpecliui!, unlefs he had a power to correct the abufes he nii"-Iit dilcover. Mr. Madison I look upon every conftitutional queflion, whatever its nature ;nay be, of great importance ; 1 look upon the prefent to be doubly fo, becaule its nature is of the higheit mo- inent to the well being of the government. 1 have liiten- ed with attention to the objetlions which have been liated, and to the replies that have been made and I think the in- ; veiligation of the meaning of the confbiturion, has fupport- cd the doftrine 1 brought forward. If you confult the expediency, it will be greatly againlt the doctrine advan- c'.-d by gentlemen on the other iide of the qiieftion. See to what incontiiiency gentlemen drive themfeives, by their con(tru»:ilion of the coniiitution. The gentleman from South-Carolina, (Mr- Smith) in order to bring to convic- tion and punifhment an oftander in any of the principal biHces, mnft have recourfe to a breach of the coinmon law, and yet he may there be found guilty, and maintain his of- fice, becaufe he is fixed by the conllitution. It has been faid, we may guard againfh the inconveniency of that con- liruftion, by limiting the duration of the office, to a term of years, but during that term, there is no way of getting rid of a batf officer, but by impeachment, during the time this is dejxrnding, the perfon may continue to commit thofe crimes for which he is impeached, becaufe if his con- ftruclion of the conftitution is right, the prehdent can have no more power to iufpend than he has to remove. Vv'hat fed fro)h one of my colleagues (Mr, Bland) appears to have more weight, than any tiling hitherto fuggeJled^ The conllitution at the firlt view, may feem to favor his opinion ; but that mull be the cafe only at the firft view, for if we examine it, v.e Ihall find his conltruftion incom- patiable with the fpirit and principles, contained in that in- ilrumcnt. It is faid, that it comports with the nature of things, that thofe ^\ho appoint, Ihould have the power of removal, but I cannot conceive that this fentiment is warranted b}'" the conllitution ; I believe it would be found very incon- venient in praftice. It is one of the molt prominent fea- tures of the conftitution, a principle that pervades the whole fyitem, that there Ihoukl be the highell poilible degree of A. 1789. Of congress. 3(^1 refponiibility in all the executive officers thereof, any thing therefore which tends to lelTen this refponiibility is contra- ry to its fpirit and intention, and unlefs it is Taddled upon us exprei'sly by the letter of that work, I fhall oppofe the admiliion of it into any aft of the legiflature. Now, if the heads of the executive departments are fubjefted to re- moval by the prefident alone, we have in him fecurity for the good behaviour of the officer : If he does not conform to the judginenc of the prelident, in doing the executive duties oi' his olfice, he can be dil'placed ; this makes hiia refponlible to tlie great executive power, and makes the prelident refponlible to the public for the conduct of the perfon he has nominated and appointed to aid him in the adininillration of his departmeu': ; buc if the prelident fhall join in a coUulion with this olxicer, and continue a bad mart m office, the cafe of impeachment vvill reach the culprit, and drag him forth to punilhineui:. But if you take the other conilruclion, and fay, he fliall not be difplaced, but by and with the advice and confent of the fenatc, the prefi- dent is no longer anfwerable for the conduct of the officer, all will depend upon the fenate. You here deftroy a real refponiibility w-ithout obtaining even the Ihawdow ; for no gentleman will pretend to lay, the refponiibility of the lenate can be ot fuch a nature as to afford fubitantiai fecu- rity. But why, it may be alked, was the fenate joined with the prefKleii!; in appointing to office, if they have no relponlibility ? I anfwer, merely for the fake of advifing, being fuppoied, from their nature, better acquainted v/ith the characters of tlie candidates than an individual ; yet even here the prelident is held to the refponiibility he nominates, and with their conlent appoints ; no perfon can be forced upon him as an alFiitant by any other branch of the government. There is another objection to this conn:rucT;ion, which I confider of Ibme weight, and (hall therefore mention to the committee. Perhaps there was no argument urged with more fuccefs, or more planfibly grounded, agaii;>it the conftitution, under which we are now deliberating, than that founded on the mingling of the executive and legiila- tive branches of thegovernment in one body, it has been objeded, that the fenate have to much of the executive power even, by having a controul over the prefidcnc in the appointment to office. Now, fliall we extend this connexion betv/cen the legiilative and executive tjep;""" jnents, which will Itrcnn-then the objection, and diminilh ° Z 3 362 DEBATES A. 1789, tne rcfpoiifibility we have in the head of the executive ? I cannot bat believe, if gentlemen weigh well thefe confi- derations, they will think it fafe and expedient 10 adopt th« ciaule'. Mr. Gerry. The conditution provides for the appointment of the plibiic officers in this manner The preiident fhall nomi. : Date, and by and with the advice and confcnt ot the lenate, Ihall appoint ambafTadors other public miniiters and con- fals, judges of the fup/eme court, and all bther officers of the United States, whofe appointments are not heiein otherwife provided for, and v.'hich fliall be eflabliftied by law. Now, if there be no ocher claufe refpeding the ap- pointment, 1 ihail be glad to fee how the heads ot dcpart- H)cnts are to be remava'd by the preiident alone, what clauie is it that gives ih\s po^ver in exprefs terms ? I be- lieve there is none f'jch. If there is a pov/er of removal, beiide that by impeachment, it muil vefl: fojnev. here ; it rauil veil in the preudent, or in the preiident and lenate, or in the preiident, fenate, and houie o) reprtlentaiives. Now, there is no clauie which expreisly veils it in the pi-efi ient ; 1 believe no gentleman contends it is in this houH', betaule that woaltl be that mingling of the executive and ici'-illative powers gentlemen deprecate. 1 prefume, ' then, crenilemen will grant, that if there is fuch power, it veiiS with the preiident, by and with the advice and cop.fent of the fenate, who are the body that apj-omrs. I tliitk -A e ought to be cautious hov/ we ftep in between the preiident and the fenate, to abridge the power of the one, or encreafe the other If the power of removal ve(h : .vhere I fuppoie, we, by this declaration, undertake 10 transfer it to the preiident alone. It lias been mentioned, that it is proper to give this pov/er to the prefidenr, in order to make him mure fully refpoifible for this officer. I am for fnppcrting the preii- dent to the utmolt of my power, and making inm as re- fponlib'.e as pofiible 1 svould therefore veit every gift of : of^.ce, in the p.ower of the legiilature, in the preiident alone ;but I cannot think v/e ougiic to attempt to give him authority to remove from office, in caies w here the ccndituiion lias placed it in other hands. Mr. LlVEilMOKE Confidered this wa? ot as a conihtutional qnclfion, and opinion, fame power which appointed an officer, that the had thii right of removal alio, unleis ic was reitraintd by A. 1780. Of C O N G R E S S. 363 an fxprefs declaration to the contrary. A-s the prefident, by aid with the advice and confent of the fenate, is em- powered to appoint arnbafliidors, certainly they have a right to remove them and appoint others ? In the cafe of the j'idges, they nuiif he appointed for life, or during good btha\iour.