Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

;r-r;errd pi-ineipie, that the body who appointed ought to ;'ive the power of removal, as the body which enacits la'.vs a, repeal iLem ; but if the power was t:-: depolited in any particular department by the conflitut!on, it was out oi the ' . "\e iio.ufe to alter it. : ?vlr. Madison . jn^eonceive it \yasa proper confirLtclion of the con-; ri]t'.d nituiir.n to fav, that there wasno other mode of removing  A. 1789- ^^ CONGRESS. 3^- from office than that byjmpcachment be believed il-,is, a'^ ; applied to the judges, might be the calc, but he tcuici litvc-r imagine it extended in the manner which gti';ikn:en cor.- tended for. Pe believed they would not ailerc, tl.ai ahy part of the conftiiution declared, that the only way to re- , move Ihoiild be by impeachment, the contrary nioh^be inferred, becanfe ccngrels iiiay eflabhih offices by^ law ; therefore, moft certaiijly, it is in the difcreiion of ihe le« giflature to fay upon v.liat terni:= the cijice Ihali be held, either during good behaviour, or during plcalurc. Und^r this conftrmirion the principles of tjje conftiititicn v. ould • be reconcileable in every part ; but under that ui' the gen- tleman from South-Carolina, it would be inccngrucus and faulty. He wondered how the gentleuian frcns-Georgia (Mr. Jacklbn) would reconcile his principles fo iar as 10 permit the prefident to fuipcnd the cfficer. Ke beoc,{d his colleague (Mr. Bland) to conbder the inconvenience his doctrine would occafion, by keeping the fenate con. flantly litting, in order to give their alFent to the removal of an officer ;they might fee tliere would be a contlant probability of the fenate being called upon to excrcife tiiis power, confequently they could not be a n;0ment abfeiit ; now, he did not believe, tl)e coniiitution isrpoicd any fucij duty upon them ; why then, faid he, f]:all we enjoin n, efpecially at I'uch an expenceof the public trcaiure. Mr, BoUDiKoT Would by no means infringe the conflitution by any rcl of his, or if he thought this moticn would lead the com- mittee beyond the powers afTigned to the legiflature, he would give It a decided negative ; but, on an iiDpartial exa- mition of that inifi'ument, he could not lee thelealf joun- dation for fuch an objection however he was glad the ; q'leftion had come forward, becaufe he wilhcd to gi\ e a !e- giflative contlruftion of this part of the ccnltitution. The gentlemen who denied the power of the prttident to remove from office, founded their opinion upon the fourth feftion of the iecond article of the coniiitution, where it is declared, that all officers ihall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, trealon or bribery. If their conlfrudion is admiilable, and no officer ' whate\-er is to be removed in any other way ilian by im- peachment, we ffiall be in a deplorable fituaticn indeed » Confider the extent of the United States, and thedifficuliy of conducting a profecution againft an* officci-, who, wiili the wltnefles, refides a thoufrnd ir/iles from the feat of go- 356 DEBATES A. 1789. vernment. Eat fuppofe ihe ofii^,:r Ihould be by ficknefs, or foiue other accident, rendered incapable of performing the funclions of the office, mull: he be continued? and yec it is to be apprehended, that fuch a dil'abihty would not jurnifli any good ground for impeachment ; it could not be laid as treafon or bribery, nor perhaps as a high crime or mifdemeaiwr. Would gentleuicn narrow ihe operation of the contlitution in this manner, and render it impolhble to be executed ? When the committee come toconfider the claufe refpecT:- jng "the removal by impeachment, they will find it is in- tended as p. punilhment for a crime, and not intended as the ordinary mean of rearranging the departments. We find in the claufe in the conftitution, fubfequent to the one juft jiientioned, that the judges are declared to hold their offi- ces during good behaviour but if this is the tenure by ; which ail where is the necefiity of offices are to be held, this explicit declaration in favor of the judges? K'ow, if any thing is to be drawn by conftrudion from this part of the conltitution it is, that the judges alpne are to hold their officers during good behaviour, but all other officers during pkafure, unlefs otherwife provided in the conftitu- tion. He was certain, from the nature of things, that it M'as not the intention of the conftitution to prevent the prefident from removing an officer, who was found to be v/hol'y unht or incapable of doing his duty. Mr, WhTte Tiiought no offite luider the government was to be held during ple::fure, except thofe Vvhlch are to be coniiituted by law but all the heads of departments are to be ap- ; pointed by the prefident, by and with the advice aijd con- lent of the fenate. He conceived, that in all cafes the party who appointed ought to judge of the removal, ex- cept in thofe cafes which by the confiitution are excepted, and in thofe "cafes impeachment and conviclion were the only mode by which they can be removed. Although this conn-nittee nsay confider of the expediency of the prtfent "ineafure, yet the fenate would check, or correff, an impro- per dt'cifion ; and he would all: the fuppcrters of this part of the refolution, whether they expected the fenate would part with a power which they miyht think the conftitution veiled in them ? He had doubts refpefting the authority of the houfe to decide this qucftion, and was very tenacious pf doing any thing t'lat would look like an encroachmenc ^n the privUeges of the ether branch of the Itgillature. A. 1789. Of congress. 357 Mr. Thatcher. Aflced, why the juJges were particularly mentioned in the conftitution as holding their offices during good beha- viour, if it was not fuppuled that, without this exprels de- claration in their favor, they, in comnson with £.11 other officers, not immediately chofen by the ftate legiflatures and the people, would hold them during pleafure i The claufe refpefting impeachments was particularly calculated for removing unworthy officers of the other deftription. Holding this conftruftion of the conftitution to be right, he was in favor of the claufe as it flood. Mr. Jackson Acknowledged the judges held their offices during good behaviour, and he believed the legiflature had the power of determining the time an office fliould continue, but did not think they could give to the prefident alone the power of removing thofe who were appointed with the concur- rence of the lenate. Mr. Smith Admitted that congrefs had a right to fay that an office fliould be held a limited lime, or for one year but if no ; precife period was fixed, he conceived the officers appoijit- ment to be during good behaviour, and that the j;erfou could not be removed by the prelident, 1 he conilitution exprefles the precife lime for which the prelident of the United States Ihall be chofen ; if no precife time had been fixed, he ihculd conceive the tenure to be during good be- haviour ; now, on the faiv.e principle, he apprehended, if the legiflaiure did not fix a precife time for ihe fecretary of foreign affairs, to hold his office, he would keep it during good behaviour ; all that could be done in cafe of mifoehavl- our, would be to fufpend the officer until after trial and conviction, when he would be removed: a gentleman has aflced what muft be done if an incunibent is found unfit for his office ? he would anfwer, the perfon muft remain there ? what limit be done if a ifiember of this houfc is found unfit to perform the bulinefs of his conftituents ? certainly he nmlt and will continue on this floor : you cannot remove him unlets guilty of fome crime. He did not hold the opi- nion mentioned by fome gentlemen, that the power who appoints can remove, becaufe, there were ieveral cafes where thofe who appoint have not the power of removal ; in fome of the ftate governments, the chief executive ma- giftrate appoints to office but cannot remove, fo under This conftitution; the people nor the legiflatures cannot rc«  358 DEBATES A. 17B9. move tiie members of the fenate or houfe of reprefentatives nor the elcdors cannot remove the prefident or vice-pre- i'uleut, both of whom they appoint to thofe offices. He iipprehended the power which the conftitution gave to congrels of ellabliihing certain offices by law, would enable them to limit the tenure of tlie office, but if congrefs de- clitied the exercife of this pov/er, the officers appointed would continue in theii* flation during good behaviour. Mr. Laavrance Apprehended the words of the refolution limited the te- nure of the office in the manner which the honorable gen- tleman lail up feemed to admit to be proper, to be fure it did not denominate the period by years or days ; but it ne- venhelcls fixed a precile period for its exiftence, viz. du- ring the pleafure of the prefident, the conftitution had cer- tainly intended that congrefs fhould define the tenure of office, or it would never have declared the judges ihould cominue during good behaviour this conftitutional provi- ; lion in their favor, was to render them independent of the legiflature, which was not fuppofed would be the cafe if nothing on this head had been declared. It is the only thing which prevents us from making them dependant up- on the will of the prefident for their continuance in office, or, from ordaining that their commiffion Ihall expire at the e nd of a certain term of years. He conceived as the conftitution was filent with refped; to the time the fecretary of foreign affairs Ihould remain in of- fice, that therfore depended upon the will of the legif- ir lature, to lay how the department ffiould be conftituted and eftablifiied by law, the conditions upon which he ihall enjoy the office ; we can fay he Ihall hold it for three years from his appointment or during good behaviour, and we may daclare unntnefs and incapacity, caufes of removal and njake the prefident alone judge of thiscafe ; we may autho- rife the prefident to remove him for any caufc he thinks })roper ; it is in our power to make fuch declaration, but at the fame time the conftitution provides, that the preli- dent Ihall not have it in his power to hold a perion in office who has been gi^ilty of crimes or mifdemeauors againft t!ic governinent the power of removal in fuch cafes is in the ; icgillature by impeachment. The only queftion which re- mained, he conlidered to be, could the legiflature fafcly truii the prefident with this power ? the queftion of right lie conceived to be indifputablc, it was merely a queftion of expediency. Gentlemen adnut, that we have a right to A. 1789. Of C O N