Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

infnrreclion was raiied in Virginia ; after its luppreflion the airembl)'', to manifeft their loyalty, palled An zt\ giving the fame privilege to the governor and council, with relpeft to fcandalous words fpoken of them, as the flatute, De Scandalis Magna turn, gives to the peers of Great Britain. The afi'cmbly were foon after imprelled with an opinion, that thefe privileges were iricautioufly transferred, and endeavoured to recover them It was an uniform practice of the houfe of reprefen- : tatives to fend up a bill for that purpofe every li^ffion but ; although the council always proved themfelves the friends of liberty, and joined the aflenibly, both in their legiilative and individual capacities^ in a warsn and fpirited oppofuicn to Britifli tyranny ; yet they would never confent to repeal that act to the very Jaft moment of their exiftence. Mr. Tucker Did not think it necellary to give his opinion other wife than by his vote, becaufe gentlemen, who had yefterday delivered their fentiments in favor of the claufe, had anti- cipated what he had to fay ; but as he found himfelf influ- enced by the call for the ayes and noes on this queUion, he Ihould be induced to ftate fome of his reafons in favor of the amendment. He faid he was glad that the ayes and noes had been called, and if it had not been done by any ^ther gentleman, he Ihould have conceived himfelf to be bound to do it • becaufe he did not think himfelf to be at liberty, but on very particular occahons, to make a law perpetual. He wilhed to fee adoftrine eftabliflied, never to pnfs a law without limitation, unlefs juftifted by fome ex- traordinary circumdances. Nothing he thought could ever juftify fuch an aft but the immutability of the objet'l, and the abfolute ncceflity and fimplicity of every thing relating to it. If the houfe palTed a perpetual revenue law, which had not an immutable object, they would abridge their own power, and deftroy one of the great privileges of the peo- ple. Every bill of this nature more or lefs narrows ths powers of this houfe, and throws it into the hands of the executive and a minority of the Senate ; for it is to be con- fidered, that whenever we pafs a bill on any fubjeft, evervi' matter in that bill contained is given up to the executive, and one-third of the fenators, fo much that it is out of the power of this houfe, even with an unanimous vote, to" re-* IJ U' 338 toverany part of it. DEBATES At this rate A. 1789, we may go on, from time to time, in palfing laws transferring our powers, and at length become mere cyphers in the governo^ent. The Senate would be able, with thefe advantages, to retain every privilege that was transferred, and it is natural to fuppofe they would have the inclination, or if they did furrender up thefe powers, they might do it in commutation for other privileges. A change of circumltances, he faid, might render a change of the law necefl'ary a revolution in com- ; merce and nianufa6>ures might make fome alterations pro- per, even if this bill was now perfect ; for what was equal and jull to d.\y, might be oiherwife two years hence. Now, fuppofnig thefe circumfiaiKes to occur in two years, and a new houfe of Reprefencatives to have met, defirous of making thofe alterations which experience had deiiion- lirated to be necefiary, what would they fay, when they found we had parted with the power which the Conflitu- tion intetided for the immediate reprefentatives of the people ? would they not jullly charge us with betraying the privileges we are fworn to maintain, by transferring the po\ser of railing revenue to the executive and fenate f He did not fuppofe they would neglect the public good, but he contended the houfe had no right to transfer any part of their power to be exercifed by any body whatfoever. Mr, Sylvester. Was in favor of the limitation claufe. A good deal had been faid houfe relpedting the jarring interelts of in the the feveral Itates. It had been coniefleJ 0!i all hands, that, this was an experimental law ; he viewed it as fuch, and expe.^ed, in the cotirfe of a few years, the legiflature would be able to difcover the errors of this day But what : jid'v^antage can refult from their knowledge, if they have not power tomake the necelTary alteraticns, or to bnild up He had examined a nev>' fyfcem more perfect than the old ? the annals of hiliory, but was unable to difcover, that any nation had ever eltabliihed a perpetual revenue law. He imagined gentlemen would admit thefe reafons to be fuffi- eient to warraiu the vote he was about to give. Mr. Clymer Was of opinion, that if the bill was fufFered to ftand as it was, without the addition of the limiting claufe, it uDuld not be perpetual, as gentlemen feemed to imagine ; he did not tinnk it could be coniidered as a lavy in perpe- tuitv, unlefs there was an exprefs declaration to that effect. He had no doubt but a few years experience, would A, i;89. Of C O N G R E S S. 139 enable Congrefs to correft this bill ; but if it was limited to ten or twelve years, it could not be done within that pe- riod without a violation of the public faith. He thought this aft, like the a61;s of Parliament, fhould be commenfurate with its objefl. The public credit could be fupported only by providing funds to anfwer the demand. The defign of this claufe, he fuppoied, was to prevent a mifapplication of the revenue, but this could be fecured by attending to the appropriation ; the houfe would have in this cafe an efFedual check over the executive power, as well as over the other branch of the legiflature. He thought this was as much as they ought to have confilten: with the diftribution of the powers made by the conftitution. Mr. SiNNICKSON Did not expeft this wa? to be a perpetual law, incapable of alteration, but he wiilied however to fee it a permanent fyftem. The idea of a temporary fylfeni was long ago faid to be out of the contemplation of the houfe. He Ihouid only obferve, in addition to this, that our credit depended cffentially upon what {hoidd be done at this time. Ke thought if the revenue exifted merely upon the breath of the legillature, for one or two years at a time, we fijould never attain that objeft. He thought that the public good required fomeching fubltantial ihould be done in tavor ot thofc who had lent the public money in the hour of diflrels. Mr. BouDiNoT Thought himfelf obliged to fay a few v^'ords more, in order to judify the part he ihould take in the diviiion of the houfe on this queftion. He conceived the manner in which the motion was brought before the houfe, after the bill was fuppofed to be gone through, did not give fuch op- portunity for the members to conlidcr the fubjeft as its im- portance feemed to require ; and which might have been had if it had been brought forward at an earlier period. He was confident the iubject was not thoroughly under- ftood; the difculfion which has taken place has not been as full, but that greater light niay be thrown upon it he was ; confident that all the advantages expefted froai this law^ would be deranged or defeated by this claufe. If, faid he, we are to ha\e the mealures of the parlia- ment of Great Britain hung about our necks in all our jiub- lie proceedings, and obftrvations from their ,pra(::tice perpetually founding in our ears, thatpradice ought to be defined and eilabUfhed. He believed^ that in the whole 340 DEBATES yokiiiies of the Itatute law, there was not one fingle reve- A. i7§9. nue ad tobe found with a hmitation. He beheved, that the Revenue laws palled tilty, (ixty, eighty and near a hundred years ago in that kinirdoai, exillcd at tlieprelent moment. We have long feen and been convinced of the infirmities of the former confederation, and fliall we now rivet thofe infirmities upon the prefent conilitution ? Are we never to ifand ujjon a certain and folid foundation ? Is not our pub- lic credit totally gone ? Has not experience convinced us, that the lofs of it would have been our total deltruftion, if the generous exertions we have lately m.ade, had not re- vived feme degree of confidence in our future meafures ? are we not i'o deeply in debt as to give us reafon to believe that it V.' ill require many years to emancipate ourfelves? if this is tiie cafe, will a reventte law for one or two years bring that relief which is expected ? Will this prevent an mcreaie of the public debt? Will it reftore value to the (evidences of that debt held by our creditors P He would aflv 4iiiy man, whether if the United States were in the lituation they were hUl: war, he would be induced co lend money jjpon a temporary and inadequate fund provided for two years? He believed their anfwer would be in the nega- tive. A. gentleman has faid, that foreigners will not examine our acts m detail, to fee whether lufncient fecurity is af- forded for their debt; he was of a difiVreni opinion. NVould gentlemen fay, that they never exannne a fecurity ? Vvould rhey lend money for ten years, tobe repaid by an= nual iru'lahnents, when ihe funds extended no further than five years? He thought they had feen enough of j)ublic huilij and public bodies, to induce them to ufe greater can, tiun. Look at the fituation of the public creditors, fee rheir difappointment;. and dillrefTes, and fay, whether any thing fliort of an actual provifion for the principal and in- rexelt of their debt can give them fluisfaftion. But can this be dore by a temporary revenue law of one or two years? He did not mean that the law fliould be perpetual, becaufe it was not in the power of the legiflature to pafsluch ; he "liieant it Ihoald be adequate to the objedt. He contended it was an impropriety in language to call a law perpetual, which wiiS always in the power ot Congrefs to repeal or .,filrer and faid, a law liuiited to ten or twelve years was -, ijiore cut of their power, than one in which nothing was i^ffiased with refpecl to its perpetuity ; the latter wasal- ways fubicft to the will of the legiCature, the former could A. 1789. Of C O N G R. E S S. 341 not be altered during that period, without a violation o^ the publ.c faith. Some gentlemen lay they never will confent to a perpe- tual h\v ; if this is the cafe, there will be an end to the go- vernment. Do gentlemen mean that the judicial depart- ment (hall not be permanent > Will they pais a bill to eUa- blilh this branch of the government for one or two years ? Certainly they do not mean to ^be guilty of iuch abfur- dity. It was contended, that the houfe were relinquifhing their right to the purfe llrings ; what was their right i They can originate a money bill, but the fenate can alter and amend it; they can negative it altogether; the fyftem of tinance was under the mutual infpedtion and diredion of both houfes. Then why Ihould this branch attempt, uncon- ftitutionally, to check the co-operating powers of the fe- nate ? It had been well obferved by gentlemen in the early part of the debate, that the houfe had prejudged the qucllicn of