Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

and upright policy : it will nut; depend upon paper promifes, it nmit be true and fub- Itantial payments that will re(lore to ijs our loft honor : If governmciu do this, our credit will be re-eftabliihe^ let the funds be obtained in what manner they will. He though the foundation of public credit ought to be laid at hoiiiv-' before the lliperlhudure was raifed : To do this, the- contiiience of the people was to be gained, they muft |:?e fatished of the juitice of our meaiures, this cannot be ynltfs it impartially affects every part of the union. Now, ibme parts of the prefent bill are very exceptionable to |}je fputjiern ituf-cs, even the northern gentlemen are faf A. 1789. Of C O N G R E S S. 333 from unanimoufiy approving them, he believed there was not a member who liked every part of the bill. Under thefe circumftances, what was to be expected but com- plaints from the people, and a confequent repeal of the bill. He did not wifh to infmuate, that the Senate would be fo depraved as to oppofe the public voice, but they might mifunderftand it ; they were a permanent body, and might be more inclined to fupport what they confidered the honor of the government, than the convenience of the people. The houfe of reprefentatives appeared to him to be the body beft calculated to know and feel the interefts of their hnmediate conlVituents, they ought therefore to prelerve the power of redreiling grievances, and not give too much into the hands of the fenate. He acknowledged the claims which thofe thai fought and bled for their country, had upon the jultice of Congrefs ; but he did not believe that clafs of citizens would complain or murmur at this houfe tor keeping the purfe firings in their hands, when it was con- fidered necelfary to the fecurity and happinefs of the peo- ple. Mr, White Did not lee the necelhty of calling the yeas and nays : he thought the meafure was intended to have one of thefe two objett, either to fhew one part of the houfe had miltaken the intereft of their country, and ought to be held up to pof- terity, in order that their memories may be charged with their want of knowledge ; or oiherwife there is one part of this houfe who think themfelves more wife ^nd patriotic than the majority. He never called the yeas and nays in his life, nor believed he ever fhould ; but he was willing for his own part to have his vote appear, in all cafes, when gentlemen thought proper to perpetuate the decifion of the houfe in that way. On this occafion he would vote in favor of the anjendment, and would endeavour to anfwer the objedtions, which, if well founded, would be a fubjed: of great uneafmefs in his mind, confidering how he intend- ed to give his vote. It was faid, that a temporary law would have a tendency to injure the credit of the United States ; he believed the credit of the United States was eftablifhed on as folid principles as the moft lolemn ?d could recognize, he meant that part of the public credit which refpecled the debt contrafted, and the engagements entered into, before the adoption of the Conftitution. If gentlemen would refieft; they wpuld find it making part of 334 our foclal DEBATES compacl. A.T789, He believed no other country haci made an ad of this nattn-e, to fecure the juft claims of their 'creditors. From this view of the bufinefs, what more is necefiary to be done than to carry the Conftitution into effed ? He would alk gentlemen, if they believed that fo- reip^ners would fcrutinize into our revenue fyilem ? would they examine our ways and means, in order to determine the degree of confidence they ought to have in us as a na- tion ? would the public creditors fcrutuiize in this manner the modes by which government meant to accomplilh their ends i he thought it hardly probable, the people would take the pains of examining the minute details of a reve- nue fyfiiem, they would rather infped our adions, and if they fee our condud direded by wifdom and prudence, they would be confirmed in the belief of that juftice in go- vernnient which the Conftitution has allured them of. If our payments are in future pundually made, and the full amount of the interelt regularly diicharged, the national credit will be re-eftabliihed. He would now proceed to examine, whether rendering this law perpetual, would be a wife and prudent meafure. It had been well obferved by the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. Jackfon) that every part of the law would bear hard- er on I'ome (tates than on others ; perhaps there was no llate in the union, but what would be infome degree dilla- tisfied ; he could perceive by the fentiments of gentlemen jn this houfe, thgt the burthens would be peculiarly felt; un- der thefe impreiijons gentlemen have exprefled themlelves more warmly than perhaps they ought. There had been predidions of the moft dangerous confequences of high duties, v/high he would not repeat ; if thefe dangers were not imaginary, would it be prudent in the hoqie, to rifk thefe confequences, and make thefe dangers unavoidable by ren iering the law perpetual. Much pains had been taken to impofe the burthens as e- qually as poifible. If the duty on mobiles bears hard up- on one llate, the tonnage duty would bear equally fo upon others 5 but ftill it is probable, that there are unequal preflures laid by the bill, vv'hich experience alone could en- able the legiflature to alter to the fatisfadion of all parries. The fyrtem he faid, was great, complex, and comprehen- five, it embraces commerce, manufadures, agriculture, fi» nance, and in Ihort every thing, in which a nation, can be concerned. Will it be prudent then, under our prefent (lifadvantages, and without informaiion, to enid a law^ A. ijZg. Of CONGRESS. 135 efFeding the higheft intereflsof the people, which can never be repealed, but by the confent of three iiidependant bodies. Gentlemen have told us, that no valuable purpole can be anfwered by making the law temporary, now, he thought a valuable purpofe could be anfwered by it. The two houfes of Congrefs, with the qualined negative of the Pre- lident, formed the legiflative power of the United-States; there are diitinft powers, to be exercifeil by both branches of the legiflature the houfe had been told, on a former ; occalTon, that the fenate pofTeffed greater powers than the reprefentatives ; he admitted that in feme inftances, they had greater powers, but with refpedl to revenue matters, they certainly had lefs, and very properly fo. Shall we then, faid he, give up to a body, who has already a fuperi- ority over uis, thofe fuperior powers which we poHefs re- lative to revenue ? A perpetual fyftem would give the fe- nate greater advantages than conftitutionally they ought to enjoy, he thought it of little confequence for the houfe to polTefs the right of originating money bills, if thofe money bills were made perpetual, the exercife of this right would be loft, and he thought it necelTary that every part of govern- ment (hould feel itfelf dependent upon the people. We have been told, with truth, that the fenate are a virtuous body, they are fo, and he hoped would remain fo, for ages yet to, come, nay for ever and in his Icgifiative capacity, he would ; 2cl upon no' other fuppofition, but ftill it ought to be re- metnbered, that they would always be men, and liable to all the errors, frailties, and infirmities, as the reft of their fellow mortals ;befide, they were conftituted in fome mea- fufe, for purpofes to which the other branch was incompe- tent, while this houfe, was conl'ciiuted for purpofes for which the ferate was unequal. It is a well grounded re- publican maxim, that taxation and reprefentation, fliould depend each on the other. The people fliould be taxed only by repi'efentatives chofen for that purpofe ; this prin- ciple was written in the hearts of our Britifti anceftors, it had been maintained by the bed blood of our citizens, and hoped it would defcend with the fulled energy to our poiie- rity. What, faid he, are weabout to do? a great branch of re- venue, indeed the only branch, to w hich an application is iiow proper, or expefted by the people, is agoing to be put out of oiTf hands for ever ; for it would not be in the power of this houfe, nor any future houfe, to annihilate thofe funds without the confent of the Senate, and the con- currence of the Prefident. Now the Senate are n<3t an ''--^"rion of the people ; ia that body the ftates 336 DEBATES A. 1789, have equal numbers, while in this houfe the reprefentation is proportioned to the taxation. Delaware fends one^ Georgia three, and Virginia ten. Is it polfible in the na- ture of things, that two fenators can be as well acquainted with the feelings and interefts of the people of Virginia as tea men felefted from among them, and taken from the feveral parts of the {tate ? Will the people be fatisfied to have that body able to continue a revenue fyftem which their innnediate reprefentatives think opprefTive, or per- ' haps unneceflary ? certainly they would not; whatever the" wifdom and virtue of the Senate might be, he was convin- ced they were not competent to thofe peculiar objects for which a juft reprefentation was abfolutely necelTary. The Senate, it was true, was not a houfe of Lords, they did not poflefs any properties materially diflinguifliing them from the members of the houfe of Reprefentatives ; but though the diltinftion was not fo flriking in the one cafe as in the other, yet it was neverthelels real. The houfe of Lords was created by the King, and became a permanent body ; the Senate were chofen by the State Legiflatures, and tho' the individuals had not a permanency in office yet the body never ccafed to exift. Thefe circumftances> in the confti- tuiion of the Senate, afforded a powerful objedlion to the new fyftenj of government, and the people wotild never have adopted it had they fuppoled that the powers of this body were unlimited in continuing a fytfem of taxcstion, which had at any time met the approbation of their particu- lar reprefentatives. He fuppofed if an excife was laid, or direft taxes were found neceflary, the people would ever be opprelfed by them, becaufe the fame principle that made an import law perpetual, would apply m all other cafes : What then would become of the beaded privilege of the people, the right of taxing themfelves ? He expreffed a willingneis to pafs a revenue law commenfurate with the occalion, to operate until the public debts were paid; this was all the creditors could demand or expedl:, and all the houfe could with fafety do. He might be told, that the Senate ^ould be as re^-jdy to repeal the law as the houfe of Reprefenta- tives ; but, perhaps, the Senate could not be as well in- formed of the fituaiion of the people, although they might be wife men ; becaufe it is not in the nature of things that two men /hould pollefs as much information of the circum- ftances and wilhes of the people as ten men could : belide, there is fomething in the nature of man which would not A. 1789. Of CONGRESS; ^j;* fufFer them eafily to part with power. He could cite fon;^ ftrikuig inllances of this fpirit ; — he could refer to a re- markable one which took place in the ftate from which he came. About the year 1670, an