Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

the m. From the fe confiderations he faid there was A. 1789. BO doubt but the aft would require the re-conilderation of the Icgiflature in a very Ihort time ; there may be applica- tioris from thej)eople of all quarters to repeal a part oi it: But what are their immediate reprefentaiives to do in cale you make the bill perpetual they luay be cpnvinced that ? a repeal is jull, is necelT'ary, but it will not be in their power to remedy the grievances of their cpnfiituents how- ever defu-ous they iiK.y be of doing lo for although this ; houfe may originate and carry a bill unanimouily thiouo-h for the repeal, yet it lay in the power of the PreiJdent, and the minority of the other branch pf Congrels, to prevent a repeal. The arguments of gentlemeUj relative to the fupport of public credit, appeai-ed to him to be ill tounded. 'j he re- venue iiitended by this bill was not jpecially appropriated ; if it was appropriated to the payment ol the public credi- tors, they would expect they had a lecurity herein which ought not to be withdrawn but would not Congrefs, ; from the peculiarity of our Situation, if from no other caule, liave a right to change the fecurity for an eafier and more :!grec-able one to their conitituents ? to be lure they would, 'i'hcn what advantage can reiult from declaring a fyftenv perpetual, which, coijflitutionally, nay^ can, and will be f hanged whenever the pniblic good requires it. Viewing the buHnefs in every point oi view^ it appeared to him the beft policy, and molt likely to give latistaftioUj, to limit the duration of the bill to one or two years and ', therefore he hoped the motion would be agreed to. Mr. HtJNTINGTCJN T'hnught it eafy to fee the danger of making this bill perpetual : belide { arting with the power which the Con- ititution gave to the houfe of Reprelentatives, in authori- fing them folely to originate inonty bills, there would be another inconvenience, \\ hich was, extending the revenue beyovid what the nature <'i' the public debt required. The ioreign debt was payable by ivjlialments, it was faying nothing to alltdge, tiiat the debt N\ou]d accumulate, be- caufe the United States mult make provifion for the annual extinguidifiient c;f a jart if the revenue, ariling from the ; impolt, is infufficient lor thispurpofe, recourfe muit be had to lome other fund, w hicji \\}]\ tn;^ble us to perform the er^ (Tagtnentsof the Ir.tc Conpiefs. Jt was true, the debt was large, ai:d would take tiu'e in paying off^ but he had no ^ciibt but it would be done according to coniraft, aijd with  ' A. 1789. Of C O N G R E S S. S2| honor to the union. How then can gentlemen fuppofe the revenue ought to be perpetual in order to be coninienfu- ' rate with the objed: f If they contemplated the contrac- tion of more debts in future, the iuppolition might be true, but he faw no reafon why gentlemen fhould extend their views fo hr. He thought if a future wsr, or feme otiier untoward circumftance, fiiould ericreaie the natioral debt, it ought to be provided for by the government who were acquainted with the neteflity. He thought the iu-ule ought to confider lerioufly before they parted with their powers: it was eal'y for them to pafs a bill to give power, but it was difficult to recall it. He had feen many inflances pf this kind, one in in the Hate from which he particular came, where the Itgiflature had given the appointment of iheriffs, and foipe other liule nuitters, out ot their hands, and had been along time endeavouring to get it back, but they have not yet been able to obtain it. He had no fuipicions of any character in the Senate, but the ConlHtu- tion had made that body in fome decree perpetual, to ob- tain a permanency in the law s if thereicre this revenue ; bill had once their approbation, they might be inclined to continue it, even againll the I'entinicnts of the people and pf the houfe. Though he was not agairft trufting the gentlemen who now com.pofed the Senate, he was agair.ll trufting their fuccefiors. He thought the faith of the United States, fufficintly pledged to the public creditors, not only by the late Con- grefs, but by the coi flitution, which Jljewed a particular attention to their intertft. it only then remained by effi- cient meai^ures, to perform the liipulations, and this ever would be a duty on the reprtientatives of the people, un- til it was fully complied with. In confidence that it n.ight be done within a reafonable time, he was tor a period nei- ther lo fhort nor lb long as had been mentioned; about jeven or ten years, he thought would tff'ed the cbjcd: the gentlemen had in view, and he would join the^i in voting ior that lime. Mr. Smith (of South-Carolina) Was alio in favor of the clatife he conceived the only ; reafon of weight, urged againfl it, related to the reftorati- on of public credit, but he thought every perfon poflelTed of the ftock or debt of the United States, w ould have the iame feelings and reafoning as the houle, they would know- that their demands depended upon a higher fource than Congrels, and migh: be fure that we would do our duty in 326 DEBATE ,_S A. i;8.;. If Congrefs iiegleded this^ ujaklu^- particular provilion. one part of the creditors would compel them. If it was found that tlie United States v\ere notdifpofed to pay their debts, foreigners wonid find the means to make them. Takuig it therefore for granted, that. Congrefs v^ould al- wayj: i>royide for thefe objefts, he would proceed to confi- der what effeft ufight arile from a permanent or tempora- ry provii.ion. If the latter was made the creditors would iionor us for our exertions, and confide in our continuing to provide for them in the manner weihouldfind upon ex- perience mo(i convenient to the community. If the fyficiij was declared to be a perpetual provilion tor the payment of their inter^ft, it would give no hope in the firit place, for the redemption of vhecapital, and m the fccond, it Con- grefs were to alter it, and which Ju all probability they ihortly mult, the lecurity would be impaired, and an efien- lial injury done to the public credit whicli v,e are fo defi- rous to,revi\e. How can gentlemen contend laid he tiiat the bill is not commenfurate to the object? Do they know what the ob- ject is? lie fuppofed it would be appropriated as mention- ed to the fupport of government and the payment of the interefl and principal of the national debt, but fuch appro- priation had not taken place, and it was uncertain v^he- ther it ever would, bethought it would be better to bring in a bill, fpecially appropnathig thisfund to the pay- ment of the foreign debt and then it might be declared it; ihouki continue, and be applied to this ule until the fo- reign debt was cleared : He conceived it would be uncon- ititutional to make the law perpetual, and therefore he yvas in favour of the claufe. Mr. Ames .Cdnfulered this as a very important queflion, and in or-. iler:thatliis own mind might be fully enlightened, he had liiltened y/ith the moil unwearied attention to the argu- ijicnts urged on both fides, but he was far from being latisiied that the motion was neceflary or proper for the houle to adopt : The principal j eafon offered in its Inp- porx vMas, that the. revenue is not fpecially appropriated, but he, qould not perceive that this furniOied a reaion why the claijfe ihould be introduced; either gentleipen are at- fraici.that the i'enate will not agree to their appropriation on they will agree : If they will agree ,there is no reafon for diftrutf , if they will not agree with the houfe then wc wiight not to truft ihcai with this" bill unii.\ wc bring for», A. 1789. Of C O N G R E S S. 327' ward a claufe foi5the purpofe of appropriating the fund it is intended to raife. Gentlemen tell us the a6t is imperfedl and therefore ought to be limited, if this is the cale it may be a good reafon for recominittino; the bill but can be none for adopting the claule : If we have not taken up time enough in adjufting and confide ping the feveral parts of this law, let it be readjufted and reconfidcred in a commit- tee of the whole, until gentlemen are fatisiied as to its per* fetlion. Gentlemen tell us they are \\'iHing to make the revenue commenfurate with the debt, if they do this all the incon- veniences refulting from the imperfection of the fylteni will be entailed upon us for a number of years. Other gentlemen mention a year or two for its limitation, can the houfe lilten fcM-ioufly to fuch a propofition : If we were to tell our creditors that we are making provifion for them for one year, would it tend to infpire them with confi- dence in our wifdom cr juilice, would our foreign credi- tors believe we were fcrupuloufly fulfilling our engage- ments with them. No nothing lefs than a fixed perma- nent fyltem can beget confidence or give fecurity, he faid an illnfory fyitem of one or two years duration, would en- gender diltruil, its very vifage would make the public fuf- peft deception :If we do not mean to deceive why not make the provifion commenfurate to the occafion, his idea of a temporary act was pro hac vice by way of expe- riment, but he thought the houfe could not make the ex- periment with this bill becaufe the public credit will not admit of it. if this ad is made for one year, will it not be a coafiderable expence to the public by going over all the ground again, which had taken the houfe fuch a length of time to diicuf?. Gentlemen have infuled upon the ncccfiity ot keeping the purfe itrings in their hands ; what do they mean by this? What power have the houfe over the money that comes into the treafury ? Are they at liberty to apply it to their own ufe ? Does not Congrefs declare the revenue to be the property of the public creditors, when they appropriate it to their nle f Shall we fay the people then keep the purfe firings in their hands? For what honed purpofe iliall they keep them ? Why ihall we the houfe of reprefentatives de- tain the money of foreigners ? Does it not feem to carry fraud on the f;ice of it ? One crentleman fays, that he is unwilling to truff a future Senate ; but if they are of equal integrity with the prefent, why (hould he hefuate? the  ^iS DEBATES A. 1799. {late will be ecjually careful of obtaining a good reprefenratiori for their own lakes ; butluppofe the reverfe iliould happen, do we nor do wifely in making a provifiou for the lecunty of our honor and the public welfare, which cannot be de- ftroyed by one mifgiTided branch of the legillature. Now, fuppofe this la\i/ to eKpire, and the fenate unwilling to provide for the objecls v/e have in conteiitplation, does this h(ic prevent the reprefentatit'es of the people from carrj''- iniT their wilhes into execution ? But if the fenate are will- mg toco operate with the houfe, for whait honeft reafondo we endeavour to retain this power ? Belide if the a<5t is imperfefi:,