Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

Have : they the means of calling him to account, and punifhing him for neglect ? They have fecured it in the conil;itutiQ% 4F 594 DEBATES A. by impeachment, to be prefented by their immediate repre- lySt^. fentatives ; if they fail here, they have another check when the time of elcftion comes round. But what are the du- ties, and what is the refpondbility of the fenators? in their legiflative capacity it is not intended that they fliajl afTifl the prelident ; it is an additional executive authority. Is it compatible with the principles of the conrtituiion, that the legillature fhould affume executive power, or is it done in order to make itfelf refponfible? Surely not. But if it was admiilible, what degree of refponfibility is acquired through the fenate ? They are not the reprefentatives of the people ; they are the reprefentatives of the iiate fove- reignties, as was well obferved by the honorable gentleman from Pennfylvauia (Mr. Scott) who are nothing let's than ; accountable to the people. They may have a policy to purfue not altogether confiftent with the falus populi, and are only refponiible to the ftate fovereignties. The gentleiDan from Maryland (Mr. Stone) compares the point in queliion with that of an attorney ; for my part, I do not conceive the application well made. The fenate are combined with the preiident to aid him in the clioice of his oiHcers. The officers are not th-e agents of the fenate ; they do not acT" for the fenate they act for the executive ; m.igiilrate. If you give the fenate a power in the removal, you give them an agency in the executive bufinefs which the conltitucion never contemplated. If, therefore, the honorable gentleman's arguments mean any thing, they mean that the fenate on<r(it to have complete power over the attorney of the prelident, Mr. Stone Said, the gentleman did not fecm to underfland his ge- nera] principle, that the pov;er which appoints, is natural- ]y vefled with power over the agent. He by no means admitted that tiie buiinefs of the fecretary of foreign affairs was to be done esciufively for the prefident ;he concei- ved the fenate -.vas con{i:itut;onally vefted with power over that department. Mr. ViwiNO. If I have n.ifapprehended the gentleman's argument on this point, I will \vave nsy reply, and proceed to what feeUiS to aflum.e a moio ferious appearance. It is conten- ded, that if the CGnllnuticn docs not ve(t the power of removal in the prelident, we have no right to give it. The conflitution anthorlfes a complete government, and ' leaves it to the legiilature to organife it by creating the k. 1789. O F C O N G R E S S. 595 necclFary offices. The power of eftablifliing offices, implies complete power over them ; and gives to congrefs a right to form them on luch principles as fliall appear to be molt conducive to the public good. To edablilh officers immo- vable, is not contemplated by the confiitution but in the cafe of the judges. If they are removable, congrefs have authority to declare by whom, unlefs fome exprefs provifi- on on this head was made in the confiitution : exprefsNo provifion being made, it remains for this houfe to declare their fentiments. I will not recapitulate the arguments which were well urged by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Madifon) to Ihew, that if the conftitution had made exprefs provilion, there can be no impropriety in decla- ring it by law. Upon the whole, appears to me, mr. chairman, that it the objed: of every gentleman on this floor is the fame, however various and diverlified the roads we purfue to at- tain it ; from which opinion, I am led to conclude, that however a mifguided zeal may terrify us with alarms, we fliall coolly and deliberately unite in carrying into complete operation the legillative and executive powers vefted in this government, as the only means, under heaven, of fe- curing to ourfelves and poiterity the blellings of freedom »nd tranquility, Mr. Gerry. If we take this flep, mr. chairman, we fliall have to take another, which may ihake the government itfeif: How judicious this may be at this time, I leave the advocates of the claufe in queltion to determine. The gentleman oppofite to me from Georfria (Mr. Baldwin) has afierted, that we mean to put a conitruftion upon the confiitution ; and that the claufe is only a viola- lion of our conflniclion, and not of the confiitution itfclf. I think he is wholly miibken with refpecl to the opponents of this claufe. 1 can fpeak for inyfelf 1 am decidedly a- : gainft putting any contlrudion whatever on the confiitu- tion, for feveral reafons. Sir, we are not the expofitors of the conftitution ; but if we were the expolitors, we ought to give our expolition by a declaratory adt, and not foifl it in where no one would ever look for it. But if it were done by a declaratory aft, I conceive it would be im- poflible to draw the line at which declaratory atls fhould flop. Hence Vv'e fhould alter the conflitutional mode of amending the fyftem of government. — Another difficulty would alio arife The judges are the $g6 D E B A T E S 'A. 1789. expofitors of tbe conftitution, and the ads of congrefs. Our expofition, therefore, would be fubjeft to their revi- fal 111 this way the confiitutiona] balance would be de- ftroyed ; the legifiature, with the judicial, might remove the head of the execurive branch. But a further reafon, why we are not the expohtors, is, that ihe judiciary may difagree with us, and undo what ail our efforts have labor- ed to accomplhh. A law is a nullity, unlefs it can be car- ried into execution ; in this cafe, our law will be fufpended. Hence all conllruclion of the meaning of the conftitution is dangerous, or unnatural, and therefore ought to be a- voicied. This is our dodrine, that no power of this kind ought to be exercifed by the legillature. But we fay, if we mult give a conifrucHon to the conftitution it is more natural to give the conitrucfion in favor of the power of removal vesting in the prefident, by and with the advice and con- lent of the fenate ; becaule it is in the nature of things, that the jiower which appoints removes alfo : If there are devi.uions from this general rule, the inftaucesare few, and not lufficient to warraiic our departure on this occafion. We lay our conftruclion is fuperior alfo, bccaufe it does not militate againft any claufe of the cenllitution ; whilll their conitruttiou militates againit feveral, ar.d, iu fome refpefts, renders them mere nullities. I'he gesitlemau fi'om Virginia (Mr, Madif'^n) dwells flrongly on the neceffity of keeping the departments of government feparate and diltincl. What does he meant' iJoes he infer, that there is not a natural affinity between i:he power of appointing and removing, and therefore they ought to be kept feparate ? 1 jn'cfume not. He will ad^ mit there is fuch an affinity. 1 hen I would allc, in what chi'racier does the fenate ac^ in cafe of appointments ? They act as an adviiory and executive body : If they are execu- iive in the act of appointing, there is no claihingof powers, conltquently no blending in the cal'e of removal. But if gentlemen fay, that, in appointments, the e:xecutive and legiilative pov.ers are blended, their pofition is contrary 10 wiMit they lay is the true principles of the conititution. We ha\^ the pontr to eflabhlh offices by law ; we can declare the duties of the officer ; thefe duties are what the legillature direfts, and not what the prefident; the officer js oound by law to perform thefe duties. But this claufe lidlitates againll the inltitution itlelf; for the prefident is %o. I'i'XYt the power of preventing the execution ; the c^cCj A. 1789. Of congress. 597 and its duties, are fufpended on the pleafuie of the prefi- dent. officer dii'chaiges his duty as the law Suppole an direfts, yetthe prefident will ren.ovs him ; he will be guided by feme other criterion ; perhaps the officer is not good-natured enough perhaps he makes an ungraceful ; bow, or. does it left leg foremoli this is unbecoming in a : great officer at the prelident's levee. Now, bccaufe he is {0 unfortunate as not to be fo good a dancer, as he is a worthy officer, he niuif be removed. The I'enate, and this houfe, may think it necelTary lO eiiquire, why a good officer is difmill'ed ? i he prtiideut will lay, it is niy pleafure ; I am authoriled by law 10 exercife this prerogative ; I have my realbns for it, but you have no right to require them of me. This language may be proper in a monarchy, but in a republic every action ought to be accounted for. How can you impeach the prefident, as was faid by the honor- able gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Madifon), for exerci- fu)g a power veiled in him by law ? Sir, it is an abfurdity to talk of impeachments on fuch pccafions^ when the officer is fhielded by the law. There is a conllltency under a monarchy of the king's ex- ierciling the power of appointment and removal at pleafure. In Great Britain this the prerogative of the throne; where it is likewife held a maxim, that the king can do no wrong. The chief magiftrate under this conliitution is a difiere nt character': There is a conltitutional tribunal, where he niay be arraigned, condemned and punilhed, if he does wrong. The realbn of this diflindion I take to be this the ; niajelty of the people receives an injury when the prefident commits an injproper a6i: ; for which they are to receive fa- tisfaftion.Kings have a property in government, and when a monarch aCts unwifely he injures his own interell, but is accountable to none ; becaufe fiuisfadion is due to himfelf alone : He is eftabliihed in his office for life ; it is an ellate to him which he is interefted to tranfmit to hi« poflerity unimpaired the good of the people upon principles of in- ; ter eftwiil be his peculiar ftudy ; he ought therefore to have power to aft n fuch a manner as is moft likely to fecure to him^this object then neceffarily he mult have the right ; of choohng or dhplacing his agep.ts. There can he no dif- ficulty on this point ; but in a confederated republic the chief magiftrate has no fuch truft, he is elected but for four years, after which tfie government goes into other hands, he is not ffimulated to improve a patrimony, and therefore Jias no occalion for complete nower over the officers of the lyS D :E B A T E S A. 1789. government : It he has fuch power, it can only be mad^ ufeuil to himfeU by being the means of procuring him a re- -eledioii, but can never be ufeful to the people by indu- cing hiai to appoint good officers or remove bad ones. It appears to me, that inch unbounded power, vitiates the principles of the conllituiion ; and the officers inftead of be- ing the machinery of the government, moving in regular order jjrefcribed by the legifiature, v/ili be the mere pup- pets of the prefident to be employed or thrown afide as