Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

cers of government in appointments, as compared with the confidence in the prefident in removals. Wh.y, if the pow- ers of enquiry, judgment, impartiality and diicernmerit, fii- pulated by the conltitution, in the prefident and ferale to leleft good men, and the firft characlers into office, will you place more confidence \n the prefident alone, more than in the fenate and heads of departments together? This is inconfiftcnt with the confidence v.hich the conltitution re- pofes in the executive. We have expended cur treafi^re, our blood ^nd our • time to very little purpofe, if we do not think that liberty and fafety exalt the human fpecies. From the m.eaneft to the highefl rank in life, the propriety of condud arifes from the fecurity and independence of fituation. I u ill not purfue the argument further, than to obferve, th.it from thefe principles it is, that there is more liberty and noble- nefs of foul in a common man in America, than in a minifler pf ftate in Turkey j but if the principles for which ihc ad- ^9© DEBATES vocates of this claufe contend is adopted, it will give this A. 1789. influence. If a man is a candidate for an office, held by ihe tenure of will and pieafure, he mult examine his foul, and fee if there are qualiiies in him to enable him to cringe, and lubmit to the arbitrary mandate of the prtfident ; if he finds thefe qaalines in his dilpolkion, he is fuited for the burmcfs Buc if the conititutionis to be jultly adininilter- : ed, and he finds himfeif difpofed to facrifice to the pleafnre of the chief magiitrate, although he poiltircs qualities winch, I laid before, luited him for his employment, yet he is untie for the office. Mr. ViNiNG. I am imprefFed with the importance and magnitude of the prefent fubjeit, equally with other gentlemen. In the body politic, mr. chairman, the executive autho- rity is a marked feature ; and the queftion in my mind is, ihall we deform it by difplacing it — or give it that fixture which the conitiiution intended, and which a due regard to fymmetry and proportion requires. Jt has been well de- monllrated that the various powers of government ought to be exerciled by diltinct bodies, in order to provide a happy adminiftration, and fecure to the nation the bleifings of/reedom ; or if they are any way blended, it ought not to exceed that degree neceffary to execute good govern- ment. But gentlen^en tell us, that thi« is not the language of the conititution. My honorable friend from Georgia (tVlr. jackion) has gone la lar as to alk us for an inRance in anj government, where this principle obtains. To invelfigate this queiiicn fully, would lead us imo an txtenlive Held of hiitc/rical refearch. I will therefore, in order to lave time, admit that in mort countries this divilion of power is faintly defined. Yet, in Great-Britain, . where this doctrine is itrongly advocated, the lines of diftinclion are deeply mark- t'd; it is true the executive authority is blended with ihe ktriflative. But how far does this extend ? JNo farther than to allure a falutary adminiltratiun of that forii5 of go- vernment. But, lay gentlemen, the power which Great- Britain leaves in her executive magiifrate, would in this country be an alarming fubjtcl. I am pleafed with the great concern manifelled oy honorable gentlemen fi;r the prrfervation of liberty ; and admit with them, that it is in- volved in our decition. But fufFer me to explain v/hy I ' think {o. Thfre have been few governments overthrown by the A. 1789. Of congress. 591 independence of the executive. What are the confequen- ces of clipping its wings i Anarchy and confuiion, and a flruggle between the legiflative aed executive, in which the latter is generally facnticed on the altar of defpotifm. Thus, I conceive, the libtrty of the people to be involved in ciir decilion. If by legiflative encroachment we weaken the executive arm, we render it incaj)able of performing the it by the conftituiion, and fubjecl it to funftions afTi^'ned become an eafy prey to the other branch of the govern- ment Gentlemen may tell us, that the executive, with the com- mand of the military, may acquire uncontrolled power. Perhaps fome experience rtjay authorile the inference. But, letme alk, what has been the caufe ? I take it that ade- quate powers have been denied the executive, or taken from it. In either cafe, the executive mull: have exercifed aurhority nor legally veiled, in order to continue the ope- ranoiis of government. And being once acculhomed to af- fume power, the habit is ealily confirmed ; fo that fliort- ly the aggregate of power alTenibles on the ground where yon refuted a jult panicipation. Now, if you allow a jult d:ltribution of the powers of government, you leave the executive no pretext tojultify an unconftitutional feizureon its part. 1 he king of Great Britain has the command of the army and navy ; but have thofe engines of defpotifm been called into adtion to wrell from the other branches of government, or from the people, powers not legally veiled m the crown ? The anfwer nualt be in the negative. And why has this not been done ? Becaufe the conllicutional powers of the Britiih monarch are fulHcieut to aniwer the purpofes of the government. Let us turn to Sweden and Poland for an iliuflration of this doiifrine — for examples to convince us of the dangerous tendency of denying the executive a due proportion of power. l\\ Sweden the limited power of the kino- was nearly annihilated by an ariitocracy. And what has re- fuited from that circu;i:ibnc<' i Why, at this moment, you lind the monarch compelled, for the fecurity of his nation, to alfu-iic all the povvers of defpotilm ; and you behold the nation fubmitting chearfully to the event, nay, joining the throne in eiiabliiiiing an arbitrary government by which ; all their rights as men, and privileges as citizens arc im- molaied at tiie Ihrine of prerogative. The iegiflarive authority in Poland belongs elTentially, to the diet ; though the fenate is the foul of this body, Ihc 592 r'etftins DEBATES royalty without fearing her kinjis. A. 17S9. The objeit of the Poles hets been 10 guard againft what was called the encroa- hnients of the throne. It is not (faid they, but a century ago) a mailer that we want, it is only a chief; fome went furiher, and aiFerted, that a free people wantecl no chief at all. This republican language became the prevailing flile in all aiTe-iiblies of (late. And to what has it led ? Placed under the abfulutc government of a Tingle perfon, they continually complained of the weight of the yoke. Left to the erjovincnt of liberty, they knew not how to nfe it for their own gn-od ; and by abridging the efficacy of the exe- cutive, they fell into inteltine cominontion, which deliver- ed them up an ealy prey to their ambitious neighbours. Are we to learn nothing from thefe dreadful examples? Will gentlemen perlilt in contracting the couftitutional powers of the executive ? Will they, againlt their own principles^ accjuieice in blending executive and legiflative powers? Far oli may that period be, when the congrefs of the United States fnuM ihorten the arm of her executive : Succefs in fuch a niCodure will fore-run the obfecjuies of freedou). JV^r. chairman, I am confounded with the divcrfity of argil nienfs ufed on this occalion, 1 know not how to reply. Some gentlemen fiiy it is wrong, it is cruel, to rake away the wealth, the reputation, aijd this word is fynonimous in the apprehenfion of others, with life, from your public officers without an impeachment : and yet, gentlemen, on the fame fide of the queition, admit, that an officer may be properly removed by the prefident, by and with the advice and copftnt of the fenace, or, in other words, without im- peachment. VV ill gentlemen view for a moment the effect of their ar- guments > Suppofe the prefident defires to remove a bad officer, and the fenate refufe, what is to become of your imijeachment ? I fay, fir, that the houfe of reprefenta- tives, coiiibined with your executive, will be unable to pro- cure the'difmiffion of an officer who is hourly betraying his truit, ar.d that in the moil open and flagitious manner. If your proofs are clear as a mathematical demonltration, it is all m vain ; your tribunal, which is to decide upon the iii'peachment, has prejudged the queition. I will never- thel. Is, on account of the expefted patriotifm of that body, admit, that tiiere is a poffibility of obtaining juftice But : are ih^ intereits, the rights, and happinel's of this great A. 1789. Of C O N G R E S S. 59^ community to depend upon a bare poffibility alone, wheri our conftiiution has provided fafety and ftability to the public welfare ? We fay that the mode of removing bad or obnoxious officers by impeachment, is tedious and uncer- tain at be/l ; but it is not to be relied on, if the fenate arei connected with the preJ'.dent in the general power of remo- ving ; for it would ever be in the pow er of a faclion, o' a party in the fenate, fo to clog the wheels of our political machine as to render its motions flow and unavailing : And this they could do under an impenetrable veil ; they could do it without being in the lea(t degree refponfible. Let not gentlemen talk cf their refponfibility, and compare it with the prefident's. We do not predicT; fhadowy and chimerical evi-Is :What we feared has a^lually happened ; the mifchief of precedent is already eftablilhed — the fenate declare their concurrence in appointments, by ballot. In this fecret mode, through cabals, through intrigue, they will be able to defeat every falutary agency of the execu- tive, in feeing his inllruments perform their duty. [Mr. Stone. Do I underltand the gentleman? Does he tell us that the fenate decide by ballot ? I ihould be glad to afcertain the faft.] Mr. Vining. They did fo yefterday. I preiume i need not mention the confet]uences of fuch procedure, liuc where is the refponfibility when a man can hide his vote? If they do an obnoxious thing, ihey will fay, 1 did not vote fo, and fliifc the blame from themfelves. W here will yoU go to afcertain the fa^t i Into the dark recefTesofa baliot- ing-box, and there you will feek for tickets, whofe hand- v;riting is to ferve as a clue to this bufinefs of niyitery ' But, behold ! the tickets are torn, and fcattcred to the wind. This government, mr. chairman, let us remember, rofe like Hercules's brawney, from its cradle. Let us avail Qiu'felves of the wildoju and eKperience of former ages. Let us aggregate the knowledge of every nation, to give its nerves their vigor, and each mufcle its due Itrength ; that, like that denn-god, it may ftrangle, even in its infancy, the malignant and venomous efforts of its fubtle invaders. Who, let me all:, is the chief magiftrate under this go- vernment ? The prefident. What are his duties ? To lee the laws faithfully executed ; he does not do this effec- if tually he is refponftble To whom ? To the people.