Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

and we are difpleafed, we can dilmifs the agent if we think proi)er. 1 believe an attorney is always ren)ovable at the will of his employer : AUhough there is not a ftatute that has laid down the rule in exprefs terms ; yet it is as much the law of the land as if it had been declared by an abfolute ftatute. It follows then, upon the fame principles, that the government has a right to remove their offiuers in every cafe, but where exprefs limitations are made. It has been faid, that if we have the right to difmifs, the right veils in the prelident ; becaufe he nominates and ap- points. It has alfo been faid, that if the government has the power, it belongs to the prefident and I'enate. Which ever of thefe afi'ertions is true, it is founded on implica- tion, ivlow, the cleared implication, and the one molt ex- actly conformable to the conltitution, is to give it to the prefident and fenate. Who, by the conftitution, is to judge of the qualifications of the man, and his fitnefs for office? The fenate. The prefident only nominates a perfon for their conlideration ; they judge npon the propriety of the nomination. Go through the conftitution from the begin- ning to the end, and you will not find a fingie inllance where the prefident has folely the power of appouiting any man to an office under the United States. This regulaciou may have been wrong ; the convention may have becn'mif- led on this point ; but ftill it is the conftitution. Perhaps he convention conceived, that eltabliihing a power in the executive to chufe and controul the great officers of go- vernment, was a power to dangerous to be veiled in a fingle perfon ; therefore througiiout the whole coullitutioa 4 E 5S6 DEBATES they never once invefted the prefident with this power. A. 1789. Such mult hive been their idea on the fubjecl, or why did they diree^ the leoiflature to veft, as they ihould ihiuk pro« per, the appointment of inferior officers in the preiident alone, heads ot departments, or courts of law ? If it is proper to conllrue the coniVitntion by implication, we ihon'd carry the implication throughout And hence we : ihew the prelident is, ui no initance, eatrulled with the power of appointing to office. But it is laid, that the power of removal is naturally and necelfarily veiled in the prefident as executive magiltrate, and cannot be taken from him. This is a very important queliion ;but the affirmative is founded on implication. I never was fond of implication ; it is but a doubtful way of determining the fenfe of any inlfrument. if the executive maviitrate has the power of difplacing officers, then the claufe is wrong ; for you grant a power which you have no right to grant : If the pj-efident has the power by the conftirution, does not the huufe aifume a power of granting what does not belong to then) ? Is this not declaring that jt is a doubtful point, and therefore we will grant a puuer ; we will place it in the hands of the executive, bccaufe we conceive it partakes of the nature oi that department, not knowing whether the con!titution ever velted us or him with fuch authority ? It has been contended, on fome former occafions, refpedling a bill of rights, that if you did not dellgaate all the rights of human nat'jre, you gave up thofe wTnch were omitted. If you undertake in this bill to grarit a power, you imply that you have that power to grant, or with-hold, at diicretion. Kow, if the poiicion, that all executive power vefts in the prtiideiit, is true and folid, the extenhon of it can never run into abiurdity. If gentlemen determine execu- tive powt-rs by implication, however dangerous the ground mav be,, we muft go through the congrefs mult have all ; iegidacive power ;all the dcpanmentsot government inuil have the powers which implication couflrues to belong to them. Ayain, if The power of removal is not incidental to the power of cliiil: ;j, we mull go through. There are a var-iety of clerks, (.oimuiilioners of commerce, of the mmt, oi^" the army and navy; who is to appoint thcie officers? The coniVitution tells you, ni fome cafes the prelident and ft nate, the fcnate alone ; this houie appoints its own o^ucers ; b'.it in every cale tlie preiide.it has ihe pov.er of removal ; becaufe the power is incident.1l to the executive. A. 1789. Op C O N G R E S. i 587 How are we to get rid of this abfurc '? Befide, if ull executive power .s veiled in the prelident, it right hns this houie to prefcribe him rules, to interfere forming exe- cutive officers? The executive can better term them for itfelf. If implication proves the prefident purely execu- tive, it is inconliltent to modify. I'he gentleman ironi Virginia fays, we n.ay limit the duration of this officer. But why do this ? The executive powers are continual. "Why are we to fufpend their operation ? But whar would fignify this interference of the legifiature, could it produce good ? If the prefent office is wholly executive^ the houie has no right to meddle in the bulinels. 1 belitve we fliall be deprived of the fafe mode of gearing rid of this officer, and have one introduced that will be fubverfive of every authority which the conilltuiion velts with reipjeft to appointments in the fenate and houfe of reprelentativcs. If gentlemen will tell us, that powers, impliedly execu- tive, bf.lungjto the prelident, they ought to go further with the idea, and give us a neat idea of executive power, as ap- plicable to their rule. In an abiolute monarchy there never has been any doubt with refpe<^t to implication ; the mo- narch can do what he pleafes. In a limited monarchy tlie prince has povver incident to kingly prerogative. How far will a federal executive, limited by a conlliiution, ex- tend on implications of this kind Does it go fo far as i* abfolute monarchy i or is it confined to a reitrained mo- narchy ? If gentlemen Vvill lay down their rule, it will ferve us as a criterion to determine all queltions refpecling the executive authority of this government. My conception may be dull ; but telling me that this is an executive, raii'es no complete idea in my mind if you : tell me the nature of executive power, and hov/ for the principle extends, I may be able to judge wheiher this has relation thereto, and how much is due to implication. If I look to the cor.ftitution, or nature of things, I Ihonld be lead to conclude, that the body chuling agents has the power of difimliing them ; becaufe the power naturally lodges in ihofe vilio have the intereft and mar.agement of the concern. The executive bulinefs of this officer is under the fuperintendance and management of the fenate, as vvell as the prefident Treaties with foreign nations muii be : conducted by the advice of the fenate, and concluded with their confent. Hence' reful is a necefiity in that body's ha- ving a concern in the choice and difmilfal of the itcretary 588 DEBATES of foreign affairs. A. 1789. I do not fee any other lure or fafe bot- tom on which the queltion can be determined. I will jult advert to a few arguments which go to prove, that ofncers once appointed, ought not to be removed in the manner contended for — without infiiliug upon iheni at this late period of debate. In the nature of things, in all appointments, there is an imj^lied contract: on the part of the officer, that he will : perforin the fervice ; and on the part of thofe who appoint Lim, that he ihall have an adequate reward. In the en- gagement of the officer, qualities commenfurate with the duties are required ; in the reward, the dignity of the fta- tion and the qualities of the officer ought to be eiliinated. And although in this engagement an officer may difpenfe with certain forms of trial, yet he can never furrender a natural right ; he cannot engage to be puniihed without being guilty, or difmified without being ufelels. It has been well obfervcd, that the appointnient ought to ceafe when the caufes of it no longer exilt ; but it is equally clear that it ought to continue as long as the reafons remain. And althouph in public and private life it may be proper to difcharge an agent without divulging the realbn ; yet clearly a good reafon ought to precede the difmilfion, be- caufe otherwiie you do ah ad of injuftice by a breach of contracl:. And if we have now the power to make the rule, we ought to make it conform to thefe j>rinciples. Let juftlce and reafon operate as profitably, as fecretiy and as quickly as may be ; but let. not their agency be fuperceded by the paffions we difapprove. In the fcale of refpotifibility this power has been weigh- ed, and determined to be lodged vv'ith the prelident on that account. But wherefore ? I conlider the fenate more re- iponlible than the prefident. The fenate mull keep a jour- nal oi their proceedings ; their acfs are manifelted to the power appointing them, who are always in exiflence. The electors of the prelident meet for a moment, to make their choice : But will the conduft of a prefident be inveftigated ? will they have materials to form their Judgment upon ? or will their exiflence bear an extenfion fufficient for any other purpofe than barely to meet in their refpedive Hates, and vou by ballot for two perfons, and to make out a certifi- cate of iheir proceedings ? Is here tho fame degree of re- fponfibility ? .When a f'enate is appointed, the legiflatures of the refpedH'e ftates will keep a watchful eye over their  A. 1789. Of C O N G H E S S. 589 rondu^t ; and if they are dilpleafccl with a fenator, liicy will not hefitare to cum hini out ; they cuu efF'.t this on iufoniiation and dehberaiiou. I'he itaie lej^ifiatures are in the habit of dilcufTing que.lticns refpcOing iiie general gocd ; they will difcufs the propriety of the lenate's conducl ; while the eleclors of the preduent are too widely I'preyd, and too Ihort a time afl'embled, to efFed: a purpole of this nature. It has been judged by foir.e gentlemen a dreadful affair, that the prefident iaouid bcrome a party before the feisate ; it would degrade his dignity. It was fa.d the judiciary would be pleafed if this weighty quellion could be taken off their hands. To what a height do gentlemen exak that characler in their own minds ? How tar above the level of the people, when they conlider it derogatiuy to his dignity to inititute an examination into the conducl of an oiiicer next himl'elf in rank When they confider it ainioll above ! human nature to deterniirie a quelUon of right between the prelident and a great ofHcer of the United btares If gen- ! tlemen have an idea that this character is to have iuch a degree of elevation above the community, it is tune to be- gin to think of reliraining his power. Upon what does power depend ? Not upon the (irength of arm, but opi- nion. If gentlemen will exalt a characler above thenuelves, call him what you will, he will be pofTeiTeJ of monarchy. In this enthufiafm of confidence, we fecm to forget the confidence we have in the j relident, fenate, and great ofii-