Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

create may alio de- : flroy. Now, I would infer from this, that the houfe having the power lodged with them of creating offices and palTing all laws necefl'ary to carry the conftitution iwto efftct, they have 3 right to declare the tenure by which the office ihall be held. Having then the power to create offices, and difcharge from office, they have a right to delegate the ex- crcife of it to whom they pleafe. And to whom can this be moie properly intrufted, than the prefident of the Uni- ted States i Another clapfe in the conftitution gives the congrefs power to vcft by law the appointment of fuch inferior offi- cers as they think proper in the prefident alone. l{ the officer to whom thi< bill relates is of fuch a nature, and this feems to fome gentlemen a doubtful point, we have power to invert the prefident at ieaft with the removal. Jt is infifted upon, that there can be no appointment but by and with the advice and conlent of the lenaie, nor dif- charge but in the fame way. What does this lead to? 1 hr prefident is the whole executive branch of govern, ment ai.d yet you fo fetter him, by attaching to him a ; legiflative branch, that he has licile or no agency in dil- placing a public officer who holds his commifiion of him ?lone. Another gentleman contended, that impeachment was the only w ay to remove an officer. Many gentlemen, who oppol'e this clanfe, oppofc his principle ; but they fhould reniember, tliat the wiode of connecting the fcnaie to the prefident in difcharging from office, is little or nothing different from an impeachment ; and if this is the only way of removing officers, they have all of them an inhcrritante in office. Fur this reil'on both their dodrines prove too much, confequenily they prove nothing. Let us confider the expediency of eftablifhing the doc- trine, that officers have a tenure in cffice for life, or during good behaviour, which is (aid will be the cafe if no time is limited in the b'll. Ail officers will have to be impeached ; this will require a vote of ihis houfc, and a trial before the 552 fenate. DEBATES If the necefilty for difmiflion is A. i; prefling, clearly the mode by impeachment is not likely to anfwer the pur- pofe. It can never be thought expedient to eftablilh z dcK^rine To big with tnifchief, and likely to drive the whole government into confulion. It is not the doftrine of the eonilituiiun, and ti)ercfore ought not to be fanftioned : if it was to be found there, however inconvenient it might be^ we ftionld put up with it becaufe I do believe there ; is not a member in this houfe who is difpofed to violate a conltitution he has fworn tofupport. and am fully I tru(t, pcrfuaded, we fliall not do it by our deci(ion. Surely it will not be any longer contended, that we have no right to give our fentiments ? We certainly have that right ; for without fuch a power we could pafs no law whatever. It is certain that the judiciary will be better able to decide the queltion ofconftitutionality in this way than any other. If we are wrong, they can corre(ft: our error ; if we are right, the queftion will be decided at a time when no ill can re- lult from factious or contentious parties all is now Hill, ;, and a favorable difpofition to liften to reafon prevails. Conceiving, therefore, that we do not infringe the con- /lituiion, and that the public good requires it, I am in fa- vour of making the deoifion, and enabling the executive ni;<giflrare to exercife the duties veiled in him, whenever lie iuppofes the good of his country requires fuch an exer- tion obferving that if tliis power was anywife obnoxious : io the tonilitution, I fliould be oppofed to it. Mr. Stone. It hardly to be expected, mr. chairman, that any thing is new can be oiFered at this ftage of the debate the com- ; mittee will therefore believe that the motives for deliver- ing our opinions, do not arife fo much from an expeda- tioo of being able to convince, as from a defire to aflign the icafons upon which our vote is founded. I coulider this as a very important quefiion, the decifion of which will form a leading feature in all our future con- dnd, and give the tone to the adminlftration of the govern- 75)ent. But if the evils we apprehend, fliould abiolutely arii'e from our determination, I do not conceive with fome otiirr gentlemen, that we are inevitably ruined. I believe tiie people can apply a renicdy ; and i have no doubt but iliey have fenfe and refolution enough for that purpole. "ihe people of America, fo far as they are included in a Hisjority, and fo far as they have exprefied their fenfe of aftjendments^ have adopted this conltitutioii. It was not A. 1789. Of congress. 583 adopted bccaufe they confidered it perfeft, of becaufe they luppoled it would become lo even if all their amendments took place but becaufe they fuppofcd it would more ef- ; fectually anfwer the purpofes of union than another. All the objedtions that were made to the conflitution, went to fecure the liberties of the people. I believe, and fo far as my information goes it is true, that there is no ilate but thinks the general government fufficiently efficient. We who are to adminiiter the government, ought to carry it into execution agreeable to that principle. We muft, in- dependent of any confideration that the powers are too large here or too fniall there, judge impartially of all the component parts of the government ; and however our af- fe<5tions may be drawn to the one part or to another, we mult preferve the conllitutional conncdion and balance. It is not according to my idea, that becaufe the people have given a grofs amount of pow er, they are indifferent as to the dlfpolal of it ; or that the iegiflature may diftribute it as they pleafe. V/hat makes a free government ? The equal power of the three branches of the Iegiflature, or two Icgiflative and one executive ; thefc adino- inde- pendent and control ing each other in a precife, conftitu- tional manner. If thefe powers arc blended or allimilated in one body, it becomes a tyranny. Then you ought to keep the balance as the conltitution direds, not as fancy didates. I Ihould be extremely unhappy if I could believe that the aflociatioii of tlie powers of the prefident and lenate is fo nionllrous as fome gentlemen conceive. If it is true that all governments are odious and dangerous which afTociate the leg.flacive and executive powers in one body, I fhould be the lalt man to fnpport this. Becaufe in all the great bu- fniefs of the executive department, in every thing ferious and affeding the government, there is not only a tempora- ry adociation, but a continued one. The firft and moft in- tercititig communication of thefe powers is of a continued duration, l^he appointing officers is but a temporary con- iiedion ; but in making treaties, in w hich all our concerns are at (take, the connedion is durable. Is not the fame in- foriKation ncccllary for two thirds of the fenate, as for the prelid* 111, at liity are to advife hun in the negociation, and concur with him in the ratification ? And how can this necefTary information be obtained, but by a connecT:ion with the executive magiitrate .' Hence, if the aflbciation of the executive and iegillative powers in one body is odious and  5^4 DEBATES dangerous, we are in a dangerous and odious fituation un- A ryS^. der this government. What portion of power have congrefs ? I fuppofe it Is neccflary to keep up the balance between the cxecuiive ma gilt rate and the ienate. What is this balance ? It is laid down in the conltitution that the prelident Ihall nomi- nate, and the fenate approve ; we are bound, then, to car- ry this balance throughout all the fubjecfts to which it re- lates. It' the preiideni. has fhe fole power of removal, you de'lroy the power of the fenate • and though you do uoc exprelsly put the power of appointment in the prefident alone, yet you put it there efFetlively, becaufe he may de- feat, by removal, the joint appointment. Will this ba giving the proper balance which the conftitution direds ? No J it will bediretlly the reverfe. Suppofe the conliitution had been fo far filent with re- . fpecl to difplacing officers, as to have left it within the pow- er of the legiflature to lay down a rule on that fubjeft ; how would you lay down that rule ? in favor of the pre- fident ; why ? becaufe the fenate has too much power al- ready, and you v/ould give it to the prefident to equalize the power. This woukl not be right I conceive ; becaufe 1 beleive we are bound to fupport the intention of the conitiiution as well as the letter. Suppofe we hare pow- ers to d'.ftribure, what is it to guide us in the dalribution ? Our own caprice > No. Look into the cdnilitution and fee where like powers are diSlributed If I found powers diilribured, I would follow the example with a limiiar dif- tributioi), and not impofe leiitiments of my own for a guide, when I had more certain and proper ones to Itad me. A reparation of the powers of government, between the legillative, executive, and judicial branihts is confidercd as the proper ground lor our opinion, and a principle which we mult admit. Are we to get ir b^o^^'lt in to the conttitu* lion ? for 1 apprehend there is no lucu principle as a fepa- tatiou of thole powers brou<>,ht into the conftitu.ion a£ prefcnt, but to the di^gree whidi an exnmir.ation will ap- pear to exiil. Is there any exprfcfs declaration, that it is a principle of the coniiicuticn to keep the legillative and ex- ecutive powers dilliiitt ? No. Kas the cdnftitution in prrictice kept ti-e n feparatfi ? No. Whence is this idea ilra-vnfrom ? VJiac lu is a principle in th's conilituiion, that thepowers of government fliould be kept lepin^aie ? No fare ground is afforded for it m tne cou(,litutioii itfelf* A. 1789. O F C O N G R E S S. ^^^ It found in the celebrated writers on gove'Tment is and,; in general, I conceive the principle to be a (^ood one. But if no fuch principle is declared in the conttirution, and that inftrument has adopted exceptions, 1 think we ought to follow thofe exceptions, flep by ftep, in every cafe to which they bear relation. It has been granted by every gentleman, that a difniifial may take place v/ithout trial ; fome gcntlei^ien have agreed that it ought to take place by thofe who appoint : Though this feems to be admitted as a pretty good getieral rule ; yet no reafon has been afligncd for it. 1 believe that one may be adduced. Comparing fniall things with great, I believe a man in New- York would hnd the truth and rtalon of the thing, if the cafe was brought home to him. A man is employed as an agent to manage our concerns ; and if no limitation is given to the agency,