Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

that luch a cla-ile (houlJ be there ? What is the evil it was intended to guard againrt ? Why, wt; are afraid the prelident will unneceifa- rily remove a Worthy man from office ; and we lay it is a pity the poor man ihould be turned out of fervice without a hearing ; it is injurious to his reputation ; it is his life, fays the gentleman frOm New-Hamplhire (Mr. Liver- more) ; it is cruelty in the extreme. Bur why are we to fuppofe this ? I do not fee any well grounded apprehenfitm for luch an iibufe of power. Let us attend to the opera- tion of this bulinefs. The conftiiution provides for what ? That no bad man flrould come into office This is the tirft : evil. Hence we have nothing to dread from a fyftem of favoritifni ;the public are well fecured agaihit that great evil therefore the prelident cannot be influenced by a ; delire to get hs own creatures into office t for it is fairly prefuniable that they will be rejefted by the fenate. But fuppofe that one fuch could be got in, he can be got out again in dcfpite of the prelident we can impeach hiin, and ; drao; him from his place, and then there will be fome other perlon appomted. Some y;ent]emen feena to think there flioUld be another claufe in the conltitution, providmg that tne prelident Ihould not turn out a good offirtr, and then they would not apprehend fo much danger from that quarter. Inhere are other evils which might have been provided againft, and other things which nnght iiave been regulated ; but if the convention had undertaken to have dune tliem, the conltitution, inftead of being contained in a Iheet of paper^ would have fwelled to the fize of a folio volume. But what is the evil of the prelident's being at libeity tO fexer- cile this power of removal ? Why we tear that he will difpiace not one good officer only^ but, in a fit of palTion,) all the good officers of the government, by which, to be lure, the public would fufFer :but I venture to fay, he would fuifer himfelf more than any other man. But I trtitt there is no dearth of good men. 1 believe he could not turn out fo many, but that the ftnate would ftUl have fome choice, out of vvhich to fupply a good one. Bat, if even he was to do this, v/hat would be the confcqnence ? He would be obli;red to do the duties hnnlelf ; or, if he did nor, we would impeach hnn, and turn him out of office, as he had done others. I mull admit though, that there is a 4^ 578 pollibility of DEBATES fuch an evil, but it is A. 1789. a remote poflibility indeed. I think gentlemen mull concede, that, if there fliould be fuch a pallKMi, fuch refentrnent as I have fuppofcd betvicen the prelident and the heads of departments, the one or the other ought to be removed they njuit not go on pulling ; different ways, for the public will receive moll manifeft injury ; therefore it mitigates the appearance of the evil by fuffering the public bulinefs to go on, which, from their irreconcileable difference, would otherwife be at a ftand. But Ibnic gentlemen feem to think this is not the only evil that ought to be apprehended. They fay it would in- preafe the power of the prefident to a moft alarming degree jnderd that the prefervation of the liberties of our coun- : try would be rf^ndcred iinpradticable that an accumulation : of powers in the hands of the prelident would eflablilh a tyranny that America would no longer furnilh that afy- : lum to pcrfecutcd freedom which Ihe was wont to do. But is all this Itrictly true ? We have feen in our day the f\vord,and alniod every power cxilt in the hands of one man without deftroying the happinefs of this country. He was the head of the church and Itate, the fountain of honor; could appoint and remove all the officers of his govern- ment yet this man, v^ith the aid of many millions of : pounds fterling, with a numerous hod of men, and perhaps the fineil navy \n the world, had it not in his power entirely to ruin thii country. Ihe difference between the two characters is great indeed — A man elected for but four years, and an hereditary monarch, -r—fuhjcd to impeach- ment, and ever dependent upon the will of the people for his re eledion. Checked and furrounded as his powers are^ I let little caufc for apprehenlion. In the honeit integrity of n)y heart, 1 confefs I fee nothing to alarm my fears on this fubjftt, I'here was a turn given to this daufe which feemed to make it appear, that we ought to agree to firike it out. It is faid, that ihe power is already given by the conllitution, and therefore it is unnecefl'ary to retain the claufe in the bill. Others again contend, that we are giving the power bv conflrudiou to the prefiderit, which we ought not to do. The gentleman from CoiiueClicut (Mr. bhcrinan) tells us, we Iht-uUI leavethe prelident to difcover what it to is his Ai firlt there appeared great duty on this fubjed. plauiibility in this obfervation, and I was incliwed ro favor :hat opinion ; but, on further reflection, it appears to me A. 1789. Op C O N G R E S 5. 579 as bad a fentiinent as any that has been iuggeftecl. The great divifion of this committee proves that it is a quefton not fo ealily refolved as the others which have heretofore engaged our attention. Now, if we, whoare a diliutereft- ed branch, find fo much difficulty in determining the point, how much more will the prefident and fenate, who are par- lies concerned, be perplexed in the deciiion i Gentlemen may fay, that the fenate would chufe to have it left to the parties themfelves : Then why Ihould we interfere ? But I am perfuaded, when the fenate perceive we are difinter- eiied parties, they will refpedl our decifion. I feel a moft profound refpcft for that honorable body, and I never wifh to lee them difturbed in the exercife of any parr of their power ; but I do conceive they will receive with plealurc our opinion on this queftion ; and therefore I am inclined to give it. We are fellow-labourers together, endeavor- ing to raife on the fame foundation a noble (trufture, which will fhelter us from the chilling blads of anarchy, and the all-fubduing ftorms of defpotifni. Hence I flatter myfclf they will receive this aifiltance kindly at our hands ; but if they are otherwife inclined, they have the power to counteract what we may do. But I would by no means retreat at this time from a decifion ; I would let the bill go forward with our full determination the fenate • will receive it with candor. Gentlemen fay it properly belongs to the judiciary to decide this quelUon. Be it io It : is their province to decide upon our laws ; and if they find this claul'e to be unconltitutional, they will not helltaie to declare it fo; and it feems to be a very difficult point to bring before them in any other way. Let gentlemeft confider themfelves in the tribunal of juilice, called upon to decide this quertion on 3 mandamus :What a fituation ! almoft too great for human nature to btar they would ; feel great relief in having had the quellion decided by the reprefentatives of the people. Hence I conclude liiey alio will receive our opinion kindly. Mr. Sylvester. In the debate of yellerday, fir, we v\ ere entertained u ith the. marvelous, the fublime, and the pidurtlque. We had mongers with heads and without heads we h.^d tliepow- ; ers of the government diilorted into every iLape. lint this, fir, is not the proper treatment which the important queftion demands, We ought, fir, in my opinion to confi- der this fubjed ferioufly, as it relates to its conliitiuionality and expediency ; and not to fuffer our deliberations to be  ; ^8.o DEBATES A 1789. warped on cither hand, by too great apprehenfion or ielf- fufficieucy. It hasbeen infifted upon by the gentlemen againft the claufe, that we ihould nur go mto a conftruflion of the con- ftitution, becujle we have no right to infer any thing from it in this way yet all their arguments are founded upon : codllniclion and implication, and lead to the very ohjecl which iivy cauiitm us :o avoid. But I will agree with the gentle!ii<rn in the oppofition, that if it can be demonftrated tiut our interpretation is contrary to the true meaning of the conititutiun, we ou^ht not to proceed to the dccifion ; but if it is a doubtful point (and it appears fo by the cou- troverfy we have had, and by the contrariety of fentiments advanced), I hold it to be prudent an^l wife to come to a decifioii. Tlie queftion, to be fure, lias had a thorough if not tCr dious inveitigation. But I do not repine, becaufe I con-- ceive ihe time has been well fpent, as it now appears clear-* ]y that there is nothing in the claufe contradictory to either the letter or fpirit of the conltitution. This being demon- itrated to fatislaclion, the only queftion which remains is, W'heth.-.T we Ihall give our opinion by decb.ration er impli- cation. VVith refped to a declaration, I would obferve, that if the poAcr of removal is lodged in the prelident by the conltiiucion, it is not ufelefs for us to interfere ; and if it }s not lodged there by the conftitution, can we give it ? It does i;ot appear to be e>;preisly given by thatinftrviment \)i}i there is nothing in tontradiJlton to it. • I lay it down then as a poiitive cafe, that the prcfident is }nvei*£;d with all executive power necfclTaiy to carry thp conltitution, and ihe laws pafltci in purlognce thereof, into full eiicii ;lo far as thel'e powers are unchecked and uncontrolled by exprefs ttipulations in the conltitution. If the exceptions, with refpc6l to appointments, had not l^ecn made, the prelident would have had that power, ^s well as the power of removal. In the firft, h:s power is eclipfecj by th^? iiuerferfnce of the fenate ; but, in the lalt, the uunitelhtion JS clear. Bqrh thcfe powers being inherent in the executive branch of the government, niuit vemain there yet the cgngreis have the power to give ; them ground to ad up«n. I'he conftitution declares, that fongrefs iUAl have power to inake all laws neccflary and proper ta carry into execution all the powers contained f herein. Now, the hrtl power of nomination and :ippc:nt- r*J£iT; cpRld i;gi ye e:;c;-ciied^ ut^lcf^ congrefi were to c^U A. 1789. O F C O N G R E S S. 581 officers into exiftence by law ; for particular officers are net mentioned in the conllitution; they are to be ercded by law. If then we are authorifed to create them, we are warranted to modify them in the fame way, as has already been fully explained by gentlemen who have gone before me. Gentlemen have urged, that thofe who have the power to appoint may remove. This doftrine may be extended further thofe who have the power to