Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

to change the body authoriled to exercile it, 1 lie y> ords ot th? conliituiion forcibly imply our conlhuc- iiu I and it has never yet been proved, nay, it has hard- 5 ly been controverted, that the pouer which appoints is not jche po\\.cr to remove It admitted, that in cafes cf ambafladors and public mi- 15 piilers, it would be improper to recall them without the pontprrcnce oi the itnaie ; becanie the lenate are combin- jEf! with the prefident, and llrongly too in the objeds of fheir negotiations How then can gentlemen difcrin)inate ? The conflitution vtH^ the power of ap])ointing in the one ^afg \\ip |ainc as iri the ether 3 a!:d thefe officers are alfi}  A. 1789. Of C O N G R E S S. 573 public minifters ; the conlVitution views them in that h"ght ; they are iVilcd the heads of departinents, and are appointed to advife the pretideur. But fetiing afide the conllitutiqnality of the queftion where it mult be admitted we have the advantage, let tis examine the queltion of expediency, and meet gentlemen on their own ground. In this cirtle we mult exped to meet Ipedires indeed Has not your prelident got the fword m his own hands ? tor I looic forward to the tnne -when America will have both ar. army and a navy I do; not confine myfelf to the pre lent pencd you may then ; have a prelident different from the prefent magiftrate that fills the chair. If then he has the power ol rejiioving and controlling the treafury depariujent, he has the purle- ilrings in his hand and you only fill the ftrong box, and ; coUecl: themoney of ihe empire, for his ufe. The purfe and the fword will enable him to lay proflrate the liberties of America. Is this a mere fpedre ? No. Experience confirms the obfcrvatinn, a Wile people will never let their freedom lie at the will and pleafure of any man. Another obfervation has been made to prove the expe- diency ol^ the mealure. It was faid by the gentleman fiom Virginia, that the prefident was chofen by a: id from the mafs of the people, and therefore miglit be luioly trulted. But the prelident may be cholenby ejeclcrs appointed by the State; legifiatures ; and therefore he is an improper perlon to be entrulled with this authority. Ke is not accountable to the people jfor they have no imii^ediate hand in appointing or rejecling him. While iome gentlemen allert ar.d others deny the refponfibility of the prefident, there is danger in deciding. Thefe oppofing opinions cannot be rtccnciled ; and thereibre will give no proper data to decide in iavor pf the prelident. I call once more on gentlemen to anfwer me this quef- tion, and I ihall relt fatisfied in giving up my opinion ; let them prove to nie that it was not the intention of this con- flitution to blend the executive and legillative pov. ers. If thefe are the principles of the conflitution, v hy will gen- tlemen contend for the independency of each branch ot the government ? The celebrated Mr. Wilfcn agrees with ine in this'fentiment ; for he declares that the fenate v. as eonltituted a clieck upon the prelident. Let gentlemen turn over his fpeeches, delivered in the convention of Penn- fylvania, and they will find he aliens it as an uncontro- y^nible igct. This feiitiment is confirmed by other writers 5?4 of reputation. DEBATES A. lySf. It is our bufinefs to preferve the conftitu- tion inviolate ; and if thcTe are its principles, we are to lee that they are not injured or deviated from. Mr. Baldwin. I have feir an unufual anxiety during the debate upo« this question. I have attentively lillened to the arguments which have been brought forward, and have weighed ihera in my mind with great dehbera ion ; and as I conlider a proptr decilion upon it of almoll inH;)ite importance to the government, I muft beg the indulgence of the houfe while i fub)nit a few obfervations. The main ground on which the qucftion is made to reft is, that, if we adopt this claufe, we violate theconltituiion. Many of the gendeiucn who advocate the prelent motion for ftriking out, would, if they could do it with confiftence to the conititution be in favor of the claufe. AVe have been reminded of our oaths, and warned not to violate the folemn obligation. This injnnftion has come from fo many parts of the houfe, that it arrelted my whole attention for ;i few minutes ; and then they produced us the claufe in the conititution, which direfted that officers (hould be ap- pointed by and with the advice and confent of the fenate. They then tell us, that he fliould be removable in the fa-nc manner. We fee the claule by which it is directed that they ihould be appointed in that manner ; but we do not fee the claufe rtfpcding their removal in the fame way. Gentlemen have only drawn it as an inference from the former they conltrue that to be the meaning of the con« ; ftiiution, as we conllrue the reverfe. I hope, therefore, gentlemen will change their exprelTion, and fay, we (hall violate their conft ru. tion of the conititution, and not the conditution itfclf. This will be a very different change ; nnlels the geuilemen pretend to fupport the doftrine of infallibility, as it refpedts their decilions ; and that would perhaps be more than the houfe are willing to admit, and more than the people in this country are accullomed to be- lieve. I have faid the gentlemen red their principal oppofit ion on this point, that the conititution plainly means that the olKcers mnlt be removed in the way they are appointed. Now, when gentlemen tell me that 1 am going to conltrue the conititution, and may interpret it in a manner which nas never intended, I am very cautious how I proceed. I do not like to conltrue over much. It is a very delicate and critical branch of onr duty ; ai^d there is n©i, perhaps. A. 1789. Or CONGRESS. sfS 4ny part of of the conftitmion on which we iliould be more cautious and circumfpeiTt than oti the prefent. I am well authorifed to fay, that the minghng the pow- ers of the prefident and feuate was llrongly oppolcd in the convention which had the honor to fubmit to the confide- ration of the United States, and the different btates, the prefent fyilem for the government of the union. Some gentlemen opppfed it to the lalt ; and finally it was the principal ground on which they reiufed to give it their lig- nature and alFent. One gentleman called it a monftrous and unnatural connexion ; and did not hefitate to aflirm, it would bring on convuUlons in the government. 1 his ob,- jeftion was not confined to the walls of the convention ; it has been the fubjecl of newfpaper declamation, and per- haps juftly fo. Ought not we, therefore, to be careful not to extend this unchafte connection any farther ? Gentlemen who undertake to conftrue, fay that they fee clearly that the power which appoints mult alio remove. Now, I have reviewed this fubjedt with all the application and difcernmeni my mind is capable of, and have not been able to fee any fuch thing. There is an agency given to the prefident in making appointments, to which the fenate are conneded. But huw it follows that the coiinedion exterds to the removal, politivcly 1 cannot fee. They fay that it follows as a natural, ihfeparable confequcnce. This founds like logic. But if we confult the premifes, perhaps the concUilion may not follow. The conlhtution oppofes this maxun more than it fupports it. The prefident is appoint- ed by eleftors chofen by the people thtmlelves, or by the Slate legiflatures. Can the Hate legidatures, either com- bined or feparate, eifedl his removal ? No. But the fe- nate may, on impeachment by this houfe. The judges are appointed by the prefident, by and with the advice and con- feiit of the fenate ; but thty are only removable by im- peachment ; the prefident has no agency in the removal. Hence, I fay, it is not a natural conlequence, that the pow- er which appoints Ihculd have the power of removal aifo. We may find it neceflaiy th^t fubordinatc cfficers fliould be appointed in the firft inftance by the prtCdent and ff-nate. I hope it will not be contended that the prefident and fenate fhall be applied to in all cafes when thejr removal ma7 be necefiary. This principle, fir, is not purfued by the fenate themfelves, in the v<_ry bi;I that ii now before this hi>ufe, fent down by the fenate, to eltablifh the judicial courts of the United States, it is directed, that a luarihal j7fl iha!l be DEBATES A. 1789. appoinred for each didrid, who (hall have power lo ap')Oint one or more deputies ; and thefe deputies are to be removab'e from o'Hce by the jucln;e of the diltridl court, or the circuit court litting within the diftrict, at the pleafure of either. It is not laid they Ihall be appointed by the mari'hal, who may remove them at pleafure ; which ought to oe the cafe, if the maxim is true, that the power which appoints neceflanly has the power of removal. But I dil- piite tlie maxiin akogether for though it is fometiii:es ; true, it is often fall.icious but by no means is it thai kind ; of conchifive argument which they contend fur. Gentlemen proceed in their conli:ru(fi:ions, and they afk why did not the convention infert a claufe in the conftitu- tion, declaring the removal 10 be in a manner different from the appointment ? They tell us, that it muft naturally have occurred to them, and that here and there was the proper place ro infert luch a claufe. Now, let me afli them alfo, if their's is the natural conftruction ? Why the con- vention, after declaring that officers (hould be appointed by ar^d with the advice and confent of the fenate, did not add, to be removed in hke manner? It mu(t have as naturally occurred to infert the one as the ether : It is very pofiible that fuch a claufe might have been moved and contended for ; but it is hardly probable it would meet with luccefs from thole who oppci'ed giving the fenate any check or contruiil whailoever over the powers of the preiident, much lefs was it probable that thofe gentlemen who oppo- fed it there Ihould wilh to en'arge it by conUruc^ion ; for my part I hope never to fee it increaled in tliis way. What o{ this nature is brought in by the letter of the con- ilitunoo, set it be there 5 but let us never increafe evils of which we have fome right to complain. A gentlemen alks, where is the danger 0} mixing thefe powerS; if the conllitution has already done it. That gen- tleman kno^\s, that ic has always been viewed as an evil, and an aflbciation of the lec^iflative and executive powers in one body have been foui d to produce tyranny, it is a maxim among the wifelt legiflators not to blend the branches of government, further than is necefiiiry to carry trieir (eparate pov.ers into more complete operation. It was found neced'ary to blond the powers to a certain de- gree, fo far we n.uit acquiclce. 'j'he fenate nndt concur with the prefident in making appointments, but with re- fpeft to the removal they are not aflofiated j no fuch claufe is in tive conltiuruon and therefore I fhould conclude^ •, A. 1789. Or C O N G R £ S S'. 5;? that, the convention did not chufe they (hould have this power. But what need was there