Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

increafmg the power, and nnilti- plying the dependants of the prefuient, diii'.iniih hisreipon- fibihty ? But hov.' is the preiident refponlible for the con- duct of officers wh;chhe ap;:oints with the advice of the fenate ? Whynot, if. the conilitution were filenr, as fome fay, make the fenate refponiil>!e for their advice in this cafe ; and fay, that tlie pre'lident, with th.cir advice and confent, may fulpend and deprive? Why fhoidd they, of whofe perfons gentlemen are fo nmch afraid, be fcreened from cenfufe, for the malpractices of heads of departments, more than the prefident ? If the claufe remain in the bill, the ^cai-e may Hand thus: 1 he fenate may concur in appointitig an able, faithful officer ; the preiident may re^iiove him, for not being lublerviert to his views : here is a good method to procure a good fo that officer, fununary procefs to get rid of him at the and a fame time the fare means of producing retentracnt and ; animobty ioetween the prtfkient and fenate, and taking away all rcfponhbility Irt^n the latter, ai.d- dimimlliing that of the former. Thus then we fee, the dodrme of relpon- fupport the claufe. libility faik to It was repeatedly faid. Hrike out the clanfe, and you give the fenate the power they oiight: not to have, flow does this give a poA-er ? It hkiv leave the conilitution at large, and that may give the power ; ar:d, indeed, tltofe gentle- A. 1789. Of C O N a R E S 9. $6i) men feem to be aware that it does, or they woutd not i'ay^ that the fenate will have the powei*, if we do not take ic away. The truth is, the conrtitution does give that power, and wifely gives it, to the fenate, to fecure the inhabitants of the reipedive Hates. It is for no pnrpofe to lay, thaC nations do not blend or fepafate the power, in the niannei" we have done by our conl-titucion, and tc draw mferences from them that it is improper ; becaufe England, and the other nations of Europe, are totally difftrent m their con.< Hitutions Iroin confederated America. It is faid the officers ought to be comniifTioned durante bene placito et ne dure fe bene geflerint * a inonllrous doc- trine. As to inferior officers, who we are told niuil alia be impeached, congrefshave a conllitutional rigiu to em- power the prcfident to appoint, and I fuppofe to remove alfo, wot that the power necefl'arily follows appointment. The call for the qnellion was pretty general through the houfe, and feveral gentlemen were up to fpeak when ; Mr. Suiopter rofe, and begged the patience of the com* mittea until to-morrow. He appealed to their candor on the occaiion ; a!id hoped other gentlemen, who were dif. pofed to fpeak, would be indulged with the privilege He : therefore moved, that the connnittee Ihould life and reporE progrefs. Mr. Lee hoped the committee wou'd not rife, and tha? the fubjecl would be decided. He did not think it poffible! it could receive any further elucidation. Geritlemen lliould remember it had been, on a former occafion, one whole day under conli<ieration, and now again it had been three days this v/as furely allowing time enough for difcuihon^ ; befides, if it was not, gentlemen would have a further op- portunity of delivering their fentiments ; for the decifion now will not be final. Stone faid he had fome further obfervations to make IVlr. on but he would not prefs the committer to this fubjafSt, hear him ; if they were inclined to indulge him on this point to-morrow, he ihould be fenfible of the favor. Mr. Madifon faid, that he did not wilh to prefcribs th.& privileges of members to a hearing ; if the gentlemrin was difpofed to deliver any further fentiments to the commi^^ tee, he Ihould not iniilt upon a decifion at this time. The committee now role, and the huufe adjourned* 1 he houie met and went into a committee of the vvnolg «n the bill for eilabhJhing the department of foreign affy-iy?. 4 ^ 570 DEBATES A. 1789. and refumed the confideration of the motion for ftriking out the words, " to be removable by the prefident." Mr. Jackson. I am well aware, fir, how difagreeable and irkfome it muft be to have another member rife on this queltion ; but when I confider that the liberties of my country may be fufpended on the decUion, I feel myfelf compelled to tref- pafs once more on the patience of the committee. And I cinnot but think the time well fpent that has been em- ployed in the confideration oi this bufmefs ; it is of prreat — magnitude in every point of view whether it be confider- ed as a conflitutional queftion, or a queftion of expediency. And gentlemen will excufe me if my language (liould not be adapted to that delicacy to which fo relpectable a body is entitled ; I have accultoiiied myfelf to a blunt integrity of fpeech, which I hope the goodnefs of my inremions will excule. For I do moft verily believe that this power will become inimical to liberty, and bla(t all thofe delightful buds of happinefs v/hich the eftablifhment of the new con- (Hturion flattered us would expand and ripen into fruition. It has been itrenuoufly contended, as neceflary to the fecurity of freedom, that the executive branch of the go- vernment fl^kould not be blended with the legiflative, but ought to be divided, and kept feparate and diftmft. Now, that this doc'lrine cxifts in practice as well as theory, I beg to be convinced. I do not pretend that fuch an excellency in government is undefirable. 1 only wifli pcrmifiion to afk gentlemen (and will they candidly anfwer tne ?) to brinj;; forward a fingle inflance in any government, when and •wherefoever, in ^vhich the executive and legiflative autho- rities were not blended. Search the annals of hiftory for— 1 difclaim Eutopian politics ; fearch the archives of Kome, the records of Carthage ; infpeft the hiftoric pnge of Gre- cian republics ; examine the Jewifh theocracy and will : gentlemen fay they can bring evidence of the fad ? No ; the whole aflcmblag^e of ancient governments, fo far as has come within the knowledge of the prefent age, bears am- ple teftimony againft them. Turn we then to the middle age ; and not one folitary ray of this benign principle is to be difcovered ; in that period of Cimmerian darknefs, the powers of governriient were blended in the iriof} confufcd chnos. Let us turn our eyes then to the enlightened he- mil'phere that brightens on our Atlantic (liores. 1 he go- vernment? of Europe are in an in)proving Uate ; but ntme, X apprehend, hav;^ yet arrived 10 -that perfet^ion which A. 1789. Op CONGRESS. 571 gentlemen have contemplated. That which we have been taught to conlider inoft pure and lavourable to li- berty is the government of Great- Britain. There we fhall find that the executive authority is connedied with and forms part of the legiflative, and this npou con- a ftitutional ground it expands itfelf further, and within ; its capacious grafp adtually holds the legiflative as well as executive powers ; if we do not find it there, we will not lovik for it in the defpotifms of the Ealt. Come we then to this enlightened part, where the broad efful- gence of the fun of liberty inoots down upon its vota- ries its molt vivifying rays ; where the head, nurtired by fcience, capable to plan the inoit pure and unfullied is fyrtem, for the regulation and government of free-bora men, who fo highly prize tlie ineltimable pal.n they have fo larely won ; who would rather link into annihilation, than facrifice it at the altar of defpoiifm or anarchy. -Look into the production of her ch()ien fons ; lo-jk at your own conltitution. Do gentlemen find that it is modelled upon Are the leg'flative, executive, and judicial their principles ? powers kept fepa-ate and dillindl ? No, Mr. chairman ; they are blended ; not, to be fure, in fo high or dangerous a degree, but in all the poflible forms they are capijble of receiving ; the executive has a qualified check upon the le- giflative ; the legiflative exercifes the powers oi the judicial and executive. Thus then, 1 take it, neither our govern^ nieut, nor that of any nation which now exift?, or hath heretofore exift:ed, was (triftly founded upon the principles contended for. I call upon gentlemen, therefore, to Ihow me, to convince me, for I am open to convicl:ion, how it can be necefTary to veil in the prefident of the United States the power of removal, upon the principle of keep- ing the executive department fingle and di(tiuCt ? Gentle- men will not, they caimot, difputc my fafts. How then can they contend for inferences, contradided by inch de- monftrable and clear hypothefis. An honorable gentleman yefterday was pleafed to treat my honeit apprehenfions as the mere chimeras of a frighted fancy ; but let me aifure him tliey are not the vifionary conceits of an individual ; I believe they will be found to be the fentiment< of the major pare of our conlli- tuents. We know well how much they dread fro:n th« accumulation of power in the hands of the prefident ; not: that they fear the exerciie of it by a Wafhington. but the time may come when veuality will iubtilsiy inliiiuai-e an«r in DEBATES diffufe itfelf through the fyftem, A. 1789. and corrupt the whole co;iilitution ; deltroying its beauty, confumiiig its fpirits, And lubverting its frame Then will be the time that : the pan-ioiic hedrt will fmcerely Igrnent the legiflative eliUlions o! an unguarded moment. Why ihould geiulenien complain of my raifmg fpcctres, ps tiiry term them, when they have indulged themfelves in theiji on jefs moinentous occafions? Thole very genHe- jnen, who are boldelt now, were ihe molt timid then. "Witncfs the fad forebodings with which we were entertain- ed whtn it was propoled .0 tax mulafles witnefs the pro- : phetic alarms to route our a| prehenlion on the fubjedl: of ameudinents to the conititutioii. Ihe gentleman from Pennty hania engraved to himfelf a grim and terrific image, to which we weie called upon to bow the knee, by jnaking proper regulations refpcfting the wellern territory. I wifh gentlemen to be more conliitent, and not complain of prac- tic<s in which themlelves indulge. I have as uiuch right to raile my fpeftre jis another ; but, on this occaiion, it is jjof a mere ihadow v\hich 1 have brought forward, but a j-eality. For if you take away the powers from one branch of the government and give them to another, there is an ev.d of liberty J^^'dge BlackiJone lays, that when the con- iliiutioiiSl bulwarks are removed from one part cl the govcrnirent to another, the whole is fubverted, and an end pur to tlje conltiiution, How was it Carthage loll her liberty? How have allihe ancient republics been fu allow- ed up in ihe gulph pf tyranny and defpotifm, but by an ^ccuniukition of power in one particular branch of their governments ? Kow careful, their, ought we to be in the j>refervation of thole limits w hich the conliiiution has pre- icribed. If then the cpultitution has veiled the pov.er of removal in the preiident ansj fenate, we ought on no pre- tencf whiJtever