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Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text
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in the
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las' e s\oids ; the prefident may appoint the one clafs, and
ih>-' legifla'ure may authorife the courts of law or heads of
dejiartincnis tq appoitit in the other cal'e. W
then it isad-
initrcd ihdt the power of removal veils in the jirei'ldcnt, or
preiidenr and feriase ; the arguments which i urged yclter-
day, aiid thofe which have been urged by honourable geit-
tlemcn on this Tide of the cjueliion for thefe three days
{'ail, will f.illy evince the tro'.h of the cqnitrucT;ion which
-.'.e give, tiiar the power is in the prelidept alone. 1 will
not repeat them, hecaule they mutt have full poffefTion of
every gciitleman's mijid. 1 am willing, therefore, to refl
the deciiion here ; and hope that it will be made in luch a
Tnanncr as to perpetuate the bleliiogs which this conlfitu-
tion was intended to euibrace.
IMr. Page.
The n)orc I hear on this all important queftion, the
siiore I am ahsrmed. Gentlemen tear tuuch from a blen-
dit-'fT of the leoiilaiive and executive authorities . and
] cUi not biamc their icars, for they are but too well groun-
d'-d ; but then they ought i;ot to prcfs for the interference
oi' tlie IfgiOatiire in a matter which they acknowledge
ulicllv to be within the executive deoartment. I think
;
A. if6(). Ok CONG K K S S. '
^^^
UjJOij their own principles they ought to join ns in itri-
;
kiug out tl;e claure, and leave this queition w here it ought
lo be. There is no fear but a ])roper iiucrpretation will
be made, if the chief n.agiltrate is a friend to his country.
He will exercife his audiuriiy when it is required ; and if
he jud'fes hiinfelf to be pofltilld of the power of reino\al^
he will ufe it, and fubmit it lo his country to judge whethei-
he was veited with it or not.
But I anial'coniihed at the arguments of gentlemen, who
contend, that granting tiiis authority to the prelident is
the belt fecurity to j)ub!ic liberty. Has any ilare in the union,
ever thought it neceiTary to put fuch a power into the
hands of their chief magiitrate, in order to fecure the liber-
ties of the citizen ? It it is that great fecurity which Tome
gentlemen feeui to think, it is ilrange that it /liould never
as vet have been thoujiht of under the Hate governments. If
no Itate has yet given iuchapowcr, I tliink we are fetiing
a bad example to begin it ; if any have done it we do ill not
to fet them a better.
When I feconded my colleague's motion for flrikingout
there objeclionable wordc, contented myfelf with laying
I
2:()ihiug more than that I Icconded his motion. 1 liis 1
did, lir, to fiive time and avoid a repetition of what 1 had
faid when the lubjecl was before dikuiltd. I lay it down
as a rule, fir,not to lay more words here than are abfolute-
ly neceflary to explain the motives which induced mc to
%'otein a certain mariner or which I humblv conceive may
;
I'erve to elucidate the lubje^l, and induce lo'.iie members to
vote with me. Bur, lir, on the prefcnt occalion as much
has been faid, and repeated againlfc the motion which I
Ifc'conded, and as it is a queition of great importance, I mud
again break through the rule which I had impofed on
my (elf, and give a loofe to my imaginaiion as others have
done ; if my laconic method of arguing does not ftrike the
houfe, the members vvho diilike long Ipteches mult excule
Jiie for being troublefoine to them.
I cannot agree to let thefe words jland as part of the bill
becaule 1 think them incompatible with the i'pirit if" not with
the letter of the conftitution j as better calculated to excite
tlie jealoufy of republics, than to fecure the dueadminiilra-
tion of 'he aftairs of our new republics and as diredly tend-
;
ing to confirm the fulpicion of thole who haveaffertcd that
the new government would run inilantly headlong into a
monarchy, tiaving this idea of tlie matter, and being per-
iuaded at the fams tiine^ that ilie heaped- up powers on
566 DEBATES
the chief niagirtrate efpecially as the bill propofes, does
A.- ij^,
not render hioj aiore relpondble ; but on the cunidiy, by
increaiing his importance, and multiplying his dcpenaauts,
clire-'tly tends todmiiniih his refponlibiiuy, and Itture hun
if not againil lulpicion at lealt againlt jcharges of dthnquen-
cy. To the argument which has been tirged againlt the
atnend-.nent, which is drawn from the neceliity of havnig
energy in government, difpatcli, fecrecy and decilion 1 ;
think all thefe advantages may be had without putting the
relpedahle heads of departments in a fituatiou fo humilia-
ting, that 1 can fcarcely fuppofe a man of true independent
ipirir, and tit to be in fuch an office, could fubmit to. I'his
do:l:rine, if pa lied as far as it will go, will lead to great
Jengths to imprilbnment, nay to execution.
; Why may
it nut be laid that the prcfident may remove a judge from
his bench, or a colonel from his regiment ? Does it not ap-
pear t!iat much mifchief may be done by a corrupt judge or
by a creacheruus or cowardly colonel yet the fonr.er niull
;
be impeached, and the latter tried by a court martial ? In
ihe lavuT Ciie indeed, as commander in chief, he may ar-
reii, fecure and decide. And here I ccHifcfs 1 ihnuld fee
no impropriety m thofe who wilh lo guard againlt the evils
they talk of, if they syere to move to amend the claufe
by i)ropo(ing that the preiidcnt Ihould have ihe power to
arrelt and nnprifon as well as remove j nor do 1 fee any
rhin^ amifs in dcciarinn; in what marmer an otnctr who is
£o be aijpoinied under a law Ihall be renuved. The law
may witii propriety fay what fhail be the qualification, and
what the dftjnalitication of the officer. Bur, hr, I wiih in
the iirii place to get rid of an exprelljon which I think will
iiirnilh arms to our enemies, to attack our government
with frelh vigour, and will difcourage our Iriends and ;
which rnnll ferve to break down ttjc fpirit of our officers of
(tate, and make them crouch before the prefident, as the
heads of fuvii departments at Conitaiitinople now do before
the grand feigner. 1 fee here no prerogatives ; itrike out
ihecLiufe lir, and yoa leave your officers refponfible to the
prelidcnr but not abjecl tools to him.
; You leave him ef- i
poniible to cou'ireis, and to our fellow citizens, his con-
ilitucnts. It" lie fee cnnfe it w ill be his duty to lodge inforn;a-
tion to ground an i:npeachnjenr and in the mean time he
;
will lake i\ich a^eafurcs as ihe public good may require. If
trtafon bw* committed^ a coniuji..'nent Oii impeachiiie.it and
trial may follow,
"ihe mischief which is pHfl^ t;ie prefident may retraft;
A. 1789. Of congress. 567
He may caufe be puniflied by conftitutional means ;
it to
and by the controuling power given in the bill iUeif, in
my opinion he may prevent a repetition of the miichiefs.
Sir, It is to our infant repu6hc —
on which too the eyes of
the whole world are fixed, on which the hr ure profped:
of the hdippinefs of mankinti depends —
of great conleqntnce
to avoid every Itep which may even appear to be leading.
it into the fatal parts of tyrannical government. Every
fentence ot our laws, fir, iliould be carelully guarded againlt
expreffions which may tend to increafe the mfolent hopes
of the enemies of our governmeiU, and the anxious fear of
its friends every word ought to be expunged from our
;
laws \\hi(h can have that tendency, if not aufolutely and
evidently necefl'ary for the public good.
Sir, the arguments in favor of the claufe which I wifli
to expungr, are I'lKh as have la d the foundation of tyran-
ny in other countries. The dodrine of energy in govern-
ment, as I faid before, is the true doclrine of tyrants. I
knovv, lir;, nevenhelels, ihat here ic is the triic dodrine of
frcea;cn, of parriors, or men Vvho wifii only to fee it ap-
plied to fupport that government which they think is wife-
iv calculated to nrelerve the liberties of their country.
But, fir, I warn thofe patriots againft the nfe of arguments
whl^h above all others may, to their grief and mortifica-
tion, be cruelly turned againd them. For my part, I fliali
ever prefer the fecunty of my fellow citizens, whether in
or out of office, to a rigid obfervance of the rules of office ;
and an independent i'pirit in our officers, to a prompt fer-
vility. Energy of government may be the deifruftion of
liiierry ; it (hould not, therefore, be too much cherilhed
in a free cotr try. A
fpirit of independence ihculd be cul-
tiv.ucd — a fcnfe of honor and virtue nouriflied with care ;
and though fome irreiiularii ics might take place, they would
be !ucii as could not endanger pnolic liberty.
1 willi to (irike out ihe claufe too, lir ; becaufe we fiiall
leave theiconilitution to the proper exj^ofitors of it, and
betaiife it ill becomes the reprefentaiives of a free people,
in their firlf aft, to fhew an eagernefs to extend the powers.
ci' the executives.
The friends of the claufe fupport it, becaufe it tends to
make the prelideni reiponfible, and prevents the fenate
froMt txerciling a pn.ver not veiled in them by the confti-
tution, w h ch they thiik has already invefted then; with too
t7;uch poAcr ; tncy requne linglenefs in the executive to
extend the energy of ^overnineni. Need 1 repeat, that
568
this energy
DEBATES A ly'Sfj.
ofrener employed againil the liberty of a
is
people than in favor of it. The liberty and tecuniy of our
fellow citizens is our great object, and not the prompt
execution of the laws, Indecilion, dtlay, bl'.m'ders, nay
viilanious as-'tions in tlie adminiltration of government, are
trifles compared '.o le^^-.ilizing rhe full ex;n-Jon of a tyran-
nical d.fpoiition. Good God! What! authorize in a free
republic, by law too, by your fir(t act, the exertion of a
dangerous royal prtrdgiuive in your chief magiltrate ?
What! where hoilor and virtue ou^i^ht to be the fCijjport
of your gn'crnment, will you infufe ar.d cherilh nieannefs
and fervility in your citizens, and infolence and arbitrary
power in your chief ma iiitrate, wiien you know that thou-
lands of Virtuous citizens are dilTalisfied with your govern-
ment, becaufe they think they fee the feeds of monarchy in
it; arid two whole Hates hav6 refufed to unite with you,
becaufe they think your government dangerous to their
liberties, will you openly before their faces, in a folemn
adl of congrefs, infert words which fully juilify their opi-
nions and fcrsrs ?
Let me afk again, does
