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Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

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in the ; las' e s\oids ; the prefident may appoint the one clafs, and ih>-' legifla'ure may authorife the courts of law or heads of dejiartincnis tq appoitit in the other cal'e. W then it isad- initrcd ihdt the power of removal veils in the jirei'ldcnt, or preiidenr and feriase ; the arguments which i urged yclter- day, aiid thofe which have been urged by honourable geit- tlemcn on this Tide of the cjueliion for thefe three days {'ail, will f.illy evince the tro'.h of the cqnitrucT;ion which -.'.e give, tiiar the power is in the prelidept alone. 1 will not repeat them, hecaule they mutt have full poffefTion of every gciitleman's mijid. 1 am willing, therefore, to refl the deciiion here ; and hope that it will be made in luch a Tnanncr as to perpetuate the bleliiogs which this conlfitu- tion was intended to euibrace. IMr. Page. The n)orc I hear on this all important queftion, the siiore I am ahsrmed. Gentlemen tear tuuch from a blen- dit-'fT of the leoiilaiive and executive authorities . and ] cUi not biamc their icars, for they are but too well groun- d'-d ; but then they ought i;ot to prcfs for the interference oi' tlie IfgiOatiire in a matter which they acknowledge ulicllv to be within the executive deoartment. I think ; A. if6(). Ok CONG K K S S. ' ^^^ UjJOij their own principles they ought to join ns in itri- ; kiug out tl;e claure, and leave this queition w here it ought lo be. There is no fear but a ])roper iiucrpretation will be made, if the chief n.agiltrate is a friend to his country. He will exercife his audiuriiy when it is required ; and if he jud'fes hiinfelf to be pofltilld of the power of reino\al^ he will ufe it, and fubmit it lo his country to judge whethei- he was veited with it or not. But I anial'coniihed at the arguments of gentlemen, who contend, that granting tiiis authority to the prelident is the belt fecurity to j)ub!ic liberty. Has any ilare in the union, ever thought it neceiTary to put fuch a power into the hands of their chief magiitrate, in order to fecure the liber- ties of the citizen ? It it is that great fecurity which Tome gentlemen feeui to think, it is ilrange that it /liould never as vet have been thoujiht of under the Hate governments. If no Itate has yet given iuchapowcr, I tliink we are fetiing a bad example to begin it ; if any have done it we do ill not to fet them a better. When I feconded my colleague's motion for flrikingout there objeclionable wordc, contented myfelf with laying I 2:()ihiug more than that I Icconded his motion. 1 liis 1 did, lir, to fiive time and avoid a repetition of what 1 had faid when the lubjecl was before dikuiltd. I lay it down as a rule, fir,not to lay more words here than are abfolute- ly neceflary to explain the motives which induced mc to %'otein a certain mariner or which I humblv conceive may ; I'erve to elucidate the lubje^l, and induce lo'.iie members to vote with me. Bur, lir, on the prefcnt occalion as much has been faid, and repeated againlfc the motion which I Ifc'conded, and as it is a queition of great importance, I mud again break through the rule which I had impofed on my (elf, and give a loofe to my imaginaiion as others have done ; if my laconic method of arguing does not ftrike the houfe, the members vvho diilike long Ipteches mult excule Jiie for being troublefoine to them. I cannot agree to let thefe words jland as part of the bill becaule 1 think them incompatible with the i'pirit if" not with the letter of the conftitution j as better calculated to excite tlie jealoufy of republics, than to fecure the dueadminiilra- tion of 'he aftairs of our new republics and as diredly tend- ; ing to confirm the fulpicion of thole who haveaffertcd that the new government would run inilantly headlong into a monarchy, tiaving this idea of tlie matter, and being per- iuaded at the fams tiine^ that ilie heaped- up powers on 566 DEBATES the chief niagirtrate efpecially as the bill propofes, does A.- ij^, not render hioj aiore relpondble ; but on the cunidiy, by increaiing his importance, and multiplying his dcpenaauts, clire-'tly tends todmiiniih his refponlibiiuy, and Itture hun if not againil lulpicion at lealt againlt jcharges of dthnquen- cy. To the argument which has been tirged againlt the atnend-.nent, which is drawn from the neceliity of havnig energy in government, difpatcli, fecrecy and decilion 1 ; think all thefe advantages may be had without putting the relpedahle heads of departments in a fituatiou fo humilia- ting, that 1 can fcarcely fuppofe a man of true independent ipirir, and tit to be in fuch an office, could fubmit to. I'his do:l:rine, if pa lied as far as it will go, will lead to great Jengths to imprilbnment, nay to execution. ; Why may it nut be laid that the prcfident may remove a judge from his bench, or a colonel from his regiment ? Does it not ap- pear t!iat much mifchief may be done by a corrupt judge or by a creacheruus or cowardly colonel yet the fonr.er niull ; be impeached, and the latter tried by a court martial ? In ihe lavuT Ciie indeed, as commander in chief, he may ar- reii, fecure and decide. And here I ccHifcfs 1 ihnuld fee no impropriety m thofe who wilh lo guard againlt the evils they talk of, if they syere to move to amend the claufe by i)ropo(ing that the preiidcnt Ihould have ihe power to arrelt and nnprifon as well as remove j nor do 1 fee any rhin^ amifs in dcciarinn; in what marmer an otnctr who is £o be aijpoinied under a law Ihall be renuved. The law may witii propriety fay what fhail be the qualification, and what the dftjnalitication of the officer. Bur, hr, I wiih in the iirii place to get rid of an exprelljon which I think will iiirnilh arms to our enemies, to attack our government with frelh vigour, and will difcourage our Iriends and ; which rnnll ferve to break down ttjc fpirit of our officers of (tate, and make them crouch before the prefident, as the heads of fuvii departments at Conitaiitinople now do before the grand feigner. 1 fee here no prerogatives ; itrike out ihecLiufe lir, and yoa leave your officers refponfible to the prelidcnr but not abjecl tools to him. ; You leave him ef- i poniible to cou'ireis, and to our fellow citizens, his con- ilitucnts. It" lie fee cnnfe it w ill be his duty to lodge inforn;a- tion to ground an i:npeachnjenr and in the mean time he ; will lake i\ich a^eafurcs as ihe public good may require. If trtafon bw* committed^ a coniuji..'nent Oii impeachiiie.it and trial may follow, "ihe mischief which is pHfl^ t;ie prefident may retraft; A. 1789. Of congress. 567 He may caufe be puniflied by conftitutional means ; it to and by the controuling power given in the bill iUeif, in my opinion he may prevent a repetition of the miichiefs. Sir, It is to our infant repu6hc — on which too the eyes of the whole world are fixed, on which the hr ure profped: of the hdippinefs of mankinti depends — of great conleqntnce to avoid every Itep which may even appear to be leading. it into the fatal parts of tyrannical government. Every fentence ot our laws, fir, iliould be carelully guarded againlt expreffions which may tend to increafe the mfolent hopes of the enemies of our governmeiU, and the anxious fear of its friends every word ought to be expunged from our ; laws \\hi(h can have that tendency, if not aufolutely and evidently necefl'ary for the public good. Sir, the arguments in favor of the claufe which I wifli to expungr, are I'lKh as have la d the foundation of tyran- ny in other countries. The dodrine of energy in govern- ment, as I faid before, is the true doclrine of tyrants. I knovv, lir;, nevenhelels, ihat here ic is the triic dodrine of frcea;cn, of parriors, or men Vvho wifii only to fee it ap- plied to fupport that government which they think is wife- iv calculated to nrelerve the liberties of their country. But, fir, I warn thofe patriots againft the nfe of arguments whl^h above all others may, to their grief and mortifica- tion, be cruelly turned againd them. For my part, I fliali ever prefer the fecunty of my fellow citizens, whether in or out of office, to a rigid obfervance of the rules of office ; and an independent i'pirit in our officers, to a prompt fer- vility. Energy of government may be the deifruftion of liiierry ; it (hould not, therefore, be too much cherilhed in a free cotr try. A fpirit of independence ihculd be cul- tiv.ucd — a fcnfe of honor and virtue nouriflied with care ; and though fome irreiiularii ics might take place, they would be !ucii as could not endanger pnolic liberty. 1 willi to (irike out ihe claufe too, lir ; becaufe we fiiall leave theiconilitution to the proper exj^ofitors of it, and betaiife it ill becomes the reprefentaiives of a free people, in their firlf aft, to fhew an eagernefs to extend the powers. ci' the executives. The friends of the claufe fupport it, becaufe it tends to make the prelideni reiponfible, and prevents the fenate froMt txerciling a pn.ver not veiled in them by the confti- tution, w h ch they thiik has already invefted then; with too t7;uch poAcr ; tncy requne linglenefs in the executive to extend the energy of ^overnineni. Need 1 repeat, that 568 this energy DEBATES A ly'Sfj. ofrener employed againil the liberty of a is people than in favor of it. The liberty and tecuniy of our fellow citizens is our great object, and not the prompt execution of the laws, Indecilion, dtlay, bl'.m'ders, nay viilanious as-'tions in tlie adminiltration of government, are trifles compared '.o le^^-.ilizing rhe full ex;n-Jon of a tyran- nical d.fpoiition. Good God! What! authorize in a free republic, by law too, by your fir(t act, the exertion of a dangerous royal prtrdgiuive in your chief magiltrate ? What! where hoilor and virtue ou^i^ht to be the fCijjport of your gn'crnment, will you infufe ar.d cherilh nieannefs and fervility in your citizens, and infolence and arbitrary power in your chief ma iiitrate, wiien you know that thou- lands of Virtuous citizens are dilTalisfied with your govern- ment, becaufe they think they fee the feeds of monarchy in it; arid two whole Hates hav6 refufed to unite with you, becaufe they think your government dangerous to their liberties, will you openly before their faces, in a folemn adl of congrefs, infert words which fully juilify their opi- nions and fcrsrs ? Let me afk again, does

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