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Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text
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power of appointing. If gentlemen will maintain con-
fiftency, they will be compelled to acknowledge the force
of this principle and if they acknowledge the principle,
;
thev rnuft a^ree to Itrike out the words.
Mr. Smith {of South-Carolina).
As my (ilerice may be conllrued into a dereliclion of my
former fentiments, I beg permiffion of the comimttee to
fTure them, my opinion, on the quelVion of conrtitutionali-
ty, has undergone no change whatever. Indeed the argu-
ments of gentlemen in favor of the claufe, have gonenjoltly
on the point of expediency ; and have tended rather to
ihew us what the coniiituiion ought to be, that what it is.
"An honorable gentleman (Mr. Madifon) of great abili-
ties, and who was a mcuiber of the convention that form-
ed the conftitution, has given us an interpretation of the
firitwords in' the fecond article, which requires fome exa-
rnination before it is admitted. He fays that all powers
incidental to the executive department, are vefted in the
prefident of the United States. What powers are execu-
tive, or incidental to the executive dep-nnment, will de-
pend upon the nature of the government ; becaule fome
powers are vefted in tlie executive of a monarchy that are
not ih an ariftocracy, and in the executive of an ariftocracy
I'uit are unknown in a democracy. The leg'flatures of
republics appoint to office ; this povver is exercifed by the
A. 1 789. Of C O N G k E S S. 561
executives of monarchies. In Eiiglami tlie king appoints
all officers ; and do gentlemen contend, that txtcunve
povers velt in the preiideni ? '1 he king confers titles of"
nobility, but the coiiftiiucion pruhihits the United States
from graiitiiifr any. Does it rettru'.n the prcfulcnt, dr coil-
grels, from ihe exercife of this executive power ? 1 believe
they reitr.i!n congrcls : if ib, the conlhtution did not con-
teiupiate ihat the preiident Ihould exercjfe all ex(^cutive
power, or ihe conltituiion did not underltard the power'
of conferring titles as an executive power. Hence what I
contend for is evinced, ttiat executive powers niUil take
their CO iiplex'on from the nature of the government-
Can the preiident eftablini corporations? Can he pre v ^5^,2
citizens from going cut of the country ? He cannot. \et
theie powers are- exerciled, as executive powers,^ \jy i^g
king of Great Britain. There are a variety of o&j^p powers
exercifed, as executive powers, to which the, preiident is
not entitled. From tliis I am led to believe j'hat the gen-
tleiTian may be wrong, when he con(i']<e}-s the power of
removal as an executive power, and ir.ic:dental to the pre-
rog-uive of the preiident. For ni^- part I conceive the
preiident is to c;;ercife all executive powers granted in the
cotulituti'jn, as the legiOature ',$, to exercife all legillative
aut'nority, according to thefs; words in the firit m'ticlc ;
*^'
Ail leg:{la:ive pow.-rs herein granted, fiiall be veiled in a
eongrefs of the United b.rates."'
However folemnly tlie contrary doclrine may be infifled
Upon, however rVvVculuufly our arguments may be treated,
I iiope V. e Ihall prelerve a due attention to the reafon and
nature of tiiuigs, and to tiie conllicution ;and not fufFcr
onrlelves to be forced or laughed out of our principles.
Kidicuie is laid to be the tcft of truth ; and, to be furc, that
'uuLh-llone has been applied, with v. hat fuccefs I iea\&
gtnilemen to determine. For my part, though I admit
the gentleman's talent at caricatura, yet I Ihuuld never
think of employing him at portrait work.
The extreme deiire which gentlemen have manifefted to
retain this claule, makes me lulpicious that they do not
themlelves think there is good reafon to believe the pre-
fident would think oi exerciling the authority which they
arc fo defiro-is of giving him to underlland that he ought ;
to niy mind it is a Itrong proof that gentlemen do not
think the power is vefted in him by the eonltitution. It
gentlemen were latisfied, that the conititution gave this
power to the preiident;, they would not heiitate^ at the re-
562 DEBATES
queft of fo numerous and refpencible a part of the boufe,
A. 1759,
to itr ke our the v\ords 1 lay they would not hefuate to
;
<io this, becaLife tlity d;<i not helliatc 10 Itrike our limilar
wolds. \V hen the hufincfs was Hrft brouglit before the
coiM nitrpe of rbe v/hole, (iemle;nen will recoiled!:, that the
morion for eilribuihing the departments ot Hiiance,. war,
ad Foreign affiirs was tiift introduced, it coniamed a
cbiii'e declaring, that the officers fliould be rilpcdivcly
aj)pointed by trie prefuient, by and -^Nirh the advice autl
CDnfeiu of the f nate. CpntleniCn, who are now in, the nii-
riry, declared fnch 3 tlaufe to be unueceilliry ; beciUilc rlie
cunltitutioi! already given the power.
h:,d i he ioiidity
of this reafi^ning was admitted by a majority 01 the hooi'e
at that time; even the honorable genilenian from V;rgi-
n'a (Mr, Madifoii) acquiefced in tiriking out the words.
It gtiitle;nen viiii to be conudered cor.lillcnt^ they wjU
Gonfent to llrike out the words, *' to be removable by the
preiident ;" j)rcv:dcd they are of opinion, that the conlti-
tution veils this authoriry in the preiident alone. If it is
not vc{\td by the cotifbtuticn in the preiident alone, will
getjtlemen undenake to veil it in him by law, wlien it is fo
well contendtcl that the conllitutioa veils it in the prelidcnc
snd fenate I
Mr. Madison.
The qucflion now feems to be brought to this, whether
k i.? proper or improper to retain thele words in the tlanle,
provided they are explanatory of the conilitution. 1 thmk
this branch of the legiflatnre is as much intcrclted in the e-
ilablifhmeni of the true meaning of the conilitution, as either
the preiident or fenate ; and whei> the conilitution lubmits
it to us to ellablidi offices by law, we ought to know by
what tenure the fhould be held ; and whether it
office
ihonid depeiul vipon the concurrcnee of the fenate with the
preiident, or upon the will of the preiident alone becaufe ;
gen:Ieir.en may hefitate in either cafe, whether they will
nake it for an indtiintte (sr- precilc tune j if the officer can
be i-emoved at difcrction by the preiident, there may oe
faety in letting it be lor an ijtdcfinite period. If he can-
no: exert his pre; oqative, there is no lecuriry even by the
n.ode ot imppachnient becaufe tlie officer may intrtni-h
;^
hindVlf behind the authority f the fenate, and bid dehonce
(
to every other d^jartment oi government. Jn this cafe
rht" quedi(m of dtiration would take a different turn. Heme
it high'y proper that we ar.d cur conliituctits Ihould
I?-
know the tenure of the office. And have we not as good-
A, 1789. Of C O N G R E S S. 563
a right as any branch of the governn^ent to declare our
fenle of the ineaniii<r of the coiiitiiution ?
Nothing has yet been cffered to invalidate the dodlrine,
meaning of the conltitution may as well be afcer-
that the
tained by the legiilative as by ihe judicial auihori'^y. When
a qneiUon emerges as it does in ihis bill, and much leems
to depend upon it, I fhould conceive it highly pro;.er to
make a legiilative condruciion. In another j.oint ol view
it is proper that this interpreiaiion ihculd now take place,
rather than at a time v\ hen the exigency of ihe cafe may
require the exercife of the power ot removal. At prefect
thf difpolition of every gentleman is to feek rhe truih, and
ab de by its guidance when it is dilcovercd 1 have rea-
fdn to believe ihe lame d.ipolition prevails in tlie ier.ate.
But will this be the cafe when fome individual c.fiicer of
- h i'^h rank draws nito queirion the ca:.ac;ty of tiie preiident,
with the fenare, to cfiVdt his removal : Jf we leave the
conftitution to take this courfe, it can never be expounded
until the prelidcnt Ihail thiiik it expedient to exercife the
right ot removal, if he fujipolts he has it ; then the I'erate
may be induced to frc np their preteniions. : And will they
decide fo calmly as at this time, wh'^n no important <iHccr
in any of the great dcpartmenrs is appointed to influence
their jidgoients? I'le nnaginatitin ol no member here,
or of the fenate, or of the pr.ti ient h rufeifj is heated or
difturbed by faction : If ever a proper mouitnt for decifion
iliould offer, it mnll he one Ik., the prefent.
I do notcoriceive that thisqneiiion has. been truly dated
by fome gentlemen. In iiiv (^piniou it nut, wh^ ther
i.-^ we
(hall take tise power from one branch of the government
—
and give it to another but the quclrion 13, to which
branch has the conlfivution given it Some gentlesiien
have faid thit it rtiid.s in the people at large ;' aiid that
if it is neceUary to the governmerit, we mult apply to the
people for it, and obtain it by way of ameudiuent 10 the
conftitution. Some gentlemen contend, tiiat although it
is given in the conllnutiun as a neceilary power to carry
into execution the other powers veiled by the conititution,
yet it is vefted in the legiilaturc. i cannot admit this doc-
trine either ; becaufe it is letting the legifiature at the
head of the executive branch of the govern;nent. If we
take the other conitru£lion, of the gentleman from Sonih-
Carolina, that all officers hold their places by the firm te-
nure of good behavit)r, we Ihaii iir.d it Hill more iinproner,
I think genilenien will xce, npoa rciicction, ih:xz this doc
564
trjiie is
DEBATES
incompatible with the principles of free govcrn-
A, 17159,
jiieiit. if ihrre is no leii'ovability but. by \\ay of impeathi.
jiienc, then all the executive olricers oi i^overniueni ht»ld
their (offices by the hrni tenure of good behavior^ trom the
chief juftice down to the tide-uaiitr
[Tvir. S'n.iih intcrru],ttd Air. Madilbn ; and faid that he
had admitted that uiit'r-or officers iright be retfoved be« ;
caule tlie tor^ititution hail leit'ii in ihe power of the legif-
lauire to eliabhlh them on what terms thcv pleaftd cun-—
fequenily, to direi^l their appointuieiit ai'd ren;oval ]
Mr. Madison
Had nnderftood the gtntlema"; as he now explained him-
felf But fill! he contended that the confequence^ he h.id
drs\\ Ji v>('u'd n'cellanly follow becaufe there was rm ex-
:
prels auihorjiy given to the legiilaturc in the conllitu'iion
to enaijle the pr- iident, the courts of law, or heads of de-
partmcntSj to remove an inferior oificer ; all thai was iaid
Ofi that head v^as contincd folely to the power of appoint-
jng them. If liie gentleman admiis, l"ay« he, that the le-
gillaiure may velt the power of removal, with refped: to
inferior cfrucrs, he nniil aifo adiriit tiiat the coniti.ution
ve:'s ihe preiicleiit with the power of removal in the cafe
Ot Superior oliicers hecaule both powers arc implied
