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Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

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power of appointing. If gentlemen will maintain con- fiftency, they will be compelled to acknowledge the force of this principle and if they acknowledge the principle, ; thev rnuft a^ree to Itrike out the words. Mr. Smith {of South-Carolina). As my (ilerice may be conllrued into a dereliclion of my former fentiments, I beg permiffion of the comimttee to fTure them, my opinion, on the quelVion of conrtitutionali- ty, has undergone no change whatever. Indeed the argu- ments of gentlemen in favor of the claufe, have gonenjoltly on the point of expediency ; and have tended rather to ihew us what the coniiituiion ought to be, that what it is. "An honorable gentleman (Mr. Madifon) of great abili- ties, and who was a mcuiber of the convention that form- ed the conftitution, has given us an interpretation of the firitwords in' the fecond article, which requires fome exa- rnination before it is admitted. He fays that all powers incidental to the executive department, are vefted in the prefident of the United States. What powers are execu- tive, or incidental to the executive dep-nnment, will de- pend upon the nature of the government ; becaule fome powers are vefted in tlie executive of a monarchy that are not ih an ariftocracy, and in the executive of an ariftocracy I'uit are unknown in a democracy. The leg'flatures of republics appoint to office ; this povver is exercifed by the A. 1 789. Of C O N G k E S S. 561 executives of monarchies. In Eiiglami tlie king appoints all officers ; and do gentlemen contend, that txtcunve povers velt in the preiideni ? '1 he king confers titles of" nobility, but the coiiftiiucion pruhihits the United States from graiitiiifr any. Does it rettru'.n the prcfulcnt, dr coil- grels, from ihe exercife of this executive power ? 1 believe they reitr.i!n congrcls : if ib, the conlhtution did not con- teiupiate ihat the preiident Ihould exercjfe all ex(^cutive power, or ihe conltituiion did not underltard the power' of conferring titles as an executive power. Hence what I contend for is evinced, ttiat executive powers niUil take their CO iiplex'on from the nature of the government- Can the preiident eftablini corporations? Can he pre v ^5^,2 citizens from going cut of the country ? He cannot. \et theie powers are- exerciled, as executive powers,^ \jy i^g king of Great Britain. There are a variety of o&j^p powers exercifed, as executive powers, to which the, preiident is not entitled. From tliis I am led to believe j'hat the gen- tleiTian may be wrong, when he con(i']<e}-s the power of removal as an executive power, and ir.ic:dental to the pre- rog-uive of the preiident. For ni^- part I conceive the preiident is to c;;ercife all executive powers granted in the cotulituti'jn, as the legiOature ',$, to exercife all legillative aut'nority, according to thefs; words in the firit m'ticlc ; *^' Ail leg:{la:ive pow.-rs herein granted, fiiall be veiled in a eongrefs of the United b.rates."' However folemnly tlie contrary doclrine may be infifled Upon, however rVvVculuufly our arguments may be treated, I iiope V. e Ihall prelerve a due attention to the reafon and nature of tiiuigs, and to tiie conllicution ;and not fufFcr onrlelves to be forced or laughed out of our principles. Kidicuie is laid to be the tcft of truth ; and, to be furc, that 'uuLh-llone has been applied, with v. hat fuccefs I iea\& gtnilemen to determine. For my part, though I admit the gentleman's talent at caricatura, yet I Ihuuld never think of employing him at portrait work. The extreme deiire which gentlemen have manifefted to retain this claule, makes me lulpicious that they do not themlelves think there is good reafon to believe the pre- fident would think oi exerciling the authority which they arc fo defiro-is of giving him to underlland that he ought ; to niy mind it is a Itrong proof that gentlemen do not think the power is vefted in him by the eonltitution. It gentlemen were latisfied, that the conititution gave this power to the preiident;, they would not heiitate^ at the re- 562 DEBATES queft of fo numerous and refpencible a part of the boufe, A. 1759, to itr ke our the v\ords 1 lay they would not hefuate to ; <io this, becaLife tlity d;<i not helliatc 10 Itrike our limilar wolds. \V hen the hufincfs was Hrft brouglit before the coiM nitrpe of rbe v/hole, (iemle;nen will recoiled!:, that the morion for eilribuihing the departments ot Hiiance,. war, ad Foreign affiirs was tiift introduced, it coniamed a cbiii'e declaring, that the officers fliould be rilpcdivcly aj)pointed by trie prefuient, by and -^Nirh the advice autl CDnfeiu of the f nate. CpntleniCn, who are now in, the nii- riry, declared fnch 3 tlaufe to be unueceilliry ; beciUilc rlie cunltitutioi! already given the power. h:,d i he ioiidity of this reafi^ning was admitted by a majority 01 the hooi'e at that time; even the honorable genilenian from V;rgi- n'a (Mr, Madifoii) acquiefced in tiriking out the words. It gtiitle;nen viiii to be conudered cor.lillcnt^ they wjU Gonfent to llrike out the words, *' to be removable by the preiident ;" j)rcv:dcd they are of opinion, that the conlti- tution veils this authoriry in the preiident alone. If it is not vc{\td by the cotifbtuticn in the preiident alone, will getjtlemen undenake to veil it in him by law, wlien it is fo well contendtcl that the conllitutioa veils it in the prelidcnc snd fenate I Mr. Madison. The qucflion now feems to be brought to this, whether k i.? proper or improper to retain thele words in the tlanle, provided they are explanatory of the conilitution. 1 thmk this branch of the legiflatnre is as much intcrclted in the e- ilablifhmeni of the true meaning of the conilitution, as either the preiident or fenate ; and whei> the conilitution lubmits it to us to ellablidi offices by law, we ought to know by what tenure the fhould be held ; and whether it office ihonid depeiul vipon the concurrcnee of the fenate with the preiident, or upon the will of the preiident alone becaufe ; gen:Ieir.en may hefitate in either cafe, whether they will nake it for an indtiintte (sr- precilc tune j if the officer can be i-emoved at difcrction by the preiident, there may oe faety in letting it be lor an ijtdcfinite period. If he can- no: exert his pre; oqative, there is no lecuriry even by the n.ode ot imppachnient becaufe tlie officer may intrtni-h ;^ hindVlf behind the authority f the fenate, and bid dehonce ( to every other d^jartment oi government. Jn this cafe rht" quedi(m of dtiration would take a different turn. Heme it high'y proper that we ar.d cur conliituctits Ihould I?- know the tenure of the office. And have we not as good- A, 1789. Of C O N G R E S S. 563 a right as any branch of the governn^ent to declare our fenle of the ineaniii<r of the coiiitiiution ? Nothing has yet been cffered to invalidate the dodlrine, meaning of the conltitution may as well be afcer- that the tained by the legiilative as by ihe judicial auihori'^y. When a qneiUon emerges as it does in ihis bill, and much leems to depend upon it, I fhould conceive it highly pro;.er to make a legiilative condruciion. In another j.oint ol view it is proper that this interpreiaiion ihculd now take place, rather than at a time v\ hen the exigency of ihe cafe may require the exercife of the power ot removal. At prefect thf difpolition of every gentleman is to feek rhe truih, and ab de by its guidance when it is dilcovercd 1 have rea- fdn to believe ihe lame d.ipolition prevails in tlie ier.ate. But will this be the cafe when fome individual c.fiicer of - h i'^h rank draws nito queirion the ca:.ac;ty of tiie preiident, with the fenare, to cfiVdt his removal : Jf we leave the conftitution to take this courfe, it can never be expounded until the prelidcnt Ihail thiiik it expedient to exercife the right ot removal, if he fujipolts he has it ; then the I'erate may be induced to frc np their preteniions. : And will they decide fo calmly as at this time, wh'^n no important <iHccr in any of the great dcpartmenrs is appointed to influence their jidgoients? I'le nnaginatitin ol no member here, or of the fenate, or of the pr.ti ient h rufeifj is heated or difturbed by faction : If ever a proper mouitnt for decifion iliould offer, it mnll he one Ik., the prefent. I do notcoriceive that thisqneiiion has. been truly dated by fome gentlemen. In iiiv (^piniou it nut, wh^ ther i.-^ we (hall take tise power from one branch of the government — and give it to another but the quclrion 13, to which branch has the conlfivution given it Some gentlesiien have faid thit it rtiid.s in the people at large ;' aiid that if it is neceUary to the governmerit, we mult apply to the people for it, and obtain it by way of ameudiuent 10 the conftitution. Some gentlemen contend, tiiat although it is given in the conllnutiun as a neceilary power to carry into execution the other powers veiled by the conititution, yet it is vefted in the legiilaturc. i cannot admit this doc- trine either ; becaufe it is letting the legifiature at the head of the executive branch of the govern;nent. If we take the other conitru£lion, of the gentleman from Sonih- Carolina, that all officers hold their places by the firm te- nure of good behavit)r, we Ihaii iir.d it Hill more iinproner, I think genilenien will xce, npoa rciicction, ih:xz this doc 564 trjiie is DEBATES incompatible with the principles of free govcrn- A, 17159, jiieiit. if ihrre is no leii'ovability but. by \\ay of impeathi. jiienc, then all the executive olricers oi i^overniueni ht»ld their (offices by the hrni tenure of good behavior^ trom the chief juftice down to the tide-uaiitr [Tvir. S'n.iih intcrru],ttd Air. Madilbn ; and faid that he had admitted that uiit'r-or officers iright be retfoved be« ; caule tlie tor^ititution hail leit'ii in ihe power of the legif- lauire to eliabhlh them on what terms thcv pleaftd cun-— fequenily, to direi^l their appointuieiit ai'd ren;oval ] Mr. Madison Had nnderftood the gtntlema"; as he now explained him- felf But fill! he contended that the confequence^ he h.id drs\\ Ji v>('u'd n'cellanly follow becaufe there was rm ex- : prels auihorjiy given to the legiilaturc in the conllitu'iion to enaijle the pr- iident, the courts of law, or heads of de- partmcntSj to remove an inferior oificer ; all thai was iaid Ofi that head v^as contincd folely to the power of appoint- jng them. If liie gentleman admiis, l"ay« he, that the le- gillaiure may velt the power of removal, with refped: to inferior cfrucrs, he nniil aifo adiriit tiiat the coniti.ution ve:'s ihe preiicleiit with the power of removal in the cafe Ot Superior oliicers hecaule both powers arc implied

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