Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

are warned ngainil betrayinci, the liberties of our country ; we are toid that all power tends to abufe ; it is our duty, thereft>re, to keep them fingle and diiHiTd. Where the executive fv\ allows up the legillature, it becomes a defpo- til in; where the legillature trenches upon the executive, it approaches towards dtlpotifin ; and where they have lefs power than is neceirary, it apjiroximaies toward anarchy. W^e liionki be careful, rhererore, to preferve the limits of each authority in the prelent queltion : as it refpefts the power ot tiie people, it is but of little importance; it is not pretended that the people have referved the povvcr of removing bad officer?. It is admitted on ail hands, that ihe government is pofiefTed of Inch jjower ; confequently the people can neither loft nor gain power by it. We are the lervants of the people, we are the watchmen, and we iiiouid be unfaithful ia both charaders, if we Ihould fb ad- minifier the government as to deltroy its great principles, and nioft efi'ential advantages. The queltion now among U3 is, which of thefe fervants fliall cxercife a power already granted? Wile and virtuous as the fenate n\iy be, fuch a pov/er lodged in their hands v/ill not only tend to abufe, but cannot tend to any thing elfe. Need I repeat the in- convcniencies which will refult from vefiing it in the lenate ? No. 1 appeal to that maxim, which has the lanctinn of experience, and is authorifed by the decifion of the wiiefi: men ; to prevent an abufe of power, it muft be diftributed in.to three branches, who n.ult be made inde- pcndfnt, to watch and check each other ; the people are to v.atch them all. While ihele maxims are purfued, our liberties will be preferved. It was from neglecting or de- ipiiing ihefe maxims, the ancient comn)onwealths were de- ilroytd : Avoice ifiTucs from the earth which covers their juins, and j roclaims to niankind the I'acrednefs of the truths that .ire at this moment in controveriy. It is faid, that the coniiirution has blended thele powers which we acivile to keep feparate, and therefore we ought to follow in compk-ting fiuiilar regulations; but gentlemen ought to jecoilccl:, thai has been an cbjeftion againlt the conibtution ; and if it is a well founded one, we ought to endeavor al! thai is in our slower to rcllrain the evil rather than to cii- A. 1 789- ^^F CONGRESS. 557 creafe it. But, perhaps, with the fole power of remova' in the prefideiit, the check of the ft-iiate in appointments, may have a fakitary tetidtncy in removing from office, ; their advice and confent is liable to all the obje.l;ions thaC have been Itated. It is very proper to ouard the introduc- tion of a man into ofii.e by every check that can properly be applied ; but after he is appointed liiere can be no ule in exerciiing a judgmenc upon events which have hereto- fore taken place. If the itnate are to poffei's the power of removal, they will be enabled to hold the perfon in of- fice, let the circumttances be wjiac they may that point out the necefliry or propriety of his removal ; it creates a per- manent connection ; it will nurfe taciion ; it will promote intrigue to obtain prote<^ors, ar,d to ihelter tools. Sjr, it is inidling poiion into the coultitunon ; it is an impure and unchatte connexion ; there is ruin in it ; it is tempting the fenate with forbidden fruit ; it ouglit not to be poirible for a branch of the legiflature even to hope for a fliare of the executive poner ; for they may be tempted to encreafe it, by a hope to Ihare the exercife ol i:. People are felJoni jealous of their own power ; iCAd if the fenate become part of the executive, they will be very improper perfons to watch that department ; fo far from being champions for liberty, they will become confpirators againlt it. The executive department Ihouid ever be independent, and fufficiently energetic to defeat the attempts of either branch of the legiflative loulnrp its prerogative. But the propoled coniroul of the fenate, is letting that body above the preiident » it tends to eftablilh an ariilocracy. And at the moment we are endangering the principles of our free and excellent conftitution, gentlemen are undertaking to amnfe the people with the found of liberty. If their ideas fliould fucceed, a principle of mortality will be infufed ii to a government which the lovers of mankind have wiihed nnghc latt to the end of the world. With a mixture of the executive and legiflative powers in one body, no go- vernment can long remain uncorrupt. VV iih a corrupt ex- ecutive, liberty may long retain a trembling exiltence. Vvitha corrupt legiflature, it is impofhble the \itals of ; the conftitution would be mortified, and death inull follow on every Ifep. A government thus formetl would be the nioft forn)idabIe cuffe that could befal this country. Per- haps an enlightened people might tiaiely forelce and cor- rect the error : but if a leafon was allovs ed .for fuch a com- pound to grow and produce its natural frtiit, it would ei« 558 DEBATES A. 1789. ther bani/h liberty, or the people would be driven to ex- ercife their unalienable right, the right of uncivilized na- ture, and deitroy a moniter whole voracious and capacious jaws would cruili and 1 wallow up theml'elves and their pulleriiy. The principles of this conrtitution, while they are ad- hered to, will perpetuate that liberty which it is the honor of Americans to tiave we-11 contended for. The claule in the bill is calculated to I'tipporc thofe principles ; and for this, it there was no other reafun, I Ihould be inclined to give it my fnpport. Mr. Liver. MORE. think gentlemen ought to content to ftrike out the I H'ords, evcu ujDon their own principles for we ought not : to blend the legiilacive with the executive powers ; and lurely a declaiauoii like that coniamed in the bill, is ;An interference on our pirc with the executive de- partment. Leave them to do their duty, and let us do ours. The decilion of this queftion depends upon the conflruc- tiou of a Ihort claufe in the conUuuiion, in wh'ch is defig- natcd the power of the preiident. it is laid he lliall have power, by and wiih the advice and confent of the fenate, CO make treaties, provided two thirds of the fenators pre- fent concur ; he ihall nominate, and by and with the ad- vice and confent of the fcnaie appoint ambaffadors, oiher public niinillers, and confuis, julhces of the fupreme court, and all oilier officers of the IJnited States. Such llrange conltraflions have been given to ihis advice and confent of the fenate, which if agreed to will make the whoie conrti- tution no.tiiing, or any thing, ju(i as we pleafe. If we can deprive the fenate of their power in making treaties, and fay with truth that they have no authority in the bufmefs, the legiilaiure will become a dangerous branch of the go- vernment. So in the cafe of appointing officers, if it can be truly laid that thcle heads of departments are the fer- vjnts of the preiident alone, we ihall make the executive department a dangerous one. I (hould not dw ell fo Itrong- [y on thel'e two points, had not a gentleman from Mafl'a- chufeits (Mr. Sedgwick) alTerted that the power of ap- pointing did not veil in any fenfe in the fenate, nor that they were inllrumental in making treaties ; that all officers were thefcrvants of the preiident, and he alone refponfible. Mr. Sedgavick Jmfl^incd the gentleman had mirun^erftood hitn, becaufe A. 1789. Of congress. 559 he faid when he was laft up, that it was not conceded on this llde that the power of appointing vefted in the lenate, nor in the cafe appeared analogous, namely that of that making treaties ;but he did not deny that the concurrence of the fenate was neceffary to the completion of the acl. He had undertaken to fay that tiie leginaLure were at liber- ty to determine that an officer Ihould be removable by the prefident, or whom they pleafed ; that he was abiolutely the creature of the law, and fubjedl to legiflative difcretioii. He alfo laid it was more plaulibly contended that the power of removal was more conftitutionally in the prelident, than in the prefident and fenate but he did not fay that the ; arguments on either (ide were conclulive. JVIr. LlVERMORE Did not defire to lay any llrefs upon arguments which he had luifunderHood. Ke would therefore pafs over what he had intended to fay on that head ; and he would endea- vour to give fp.ch a condi udion to the claufe he had read as would jullify the houfe in llriking out the words from the bill. If the confent of the fenate is abfolutely requifite with refpecl to appointments, it is one thing ; but if the prefi- dent has no more to do than to alk their opinion, or to re- ceive their advice, it is another thing. The latter appear- ed to him to be the fentinicnt of another gentleman from Maifachufetts (Mr. An>es). [Mr. A.uies rofe and denied fuch an opinion. His idea was that the prefident was the agent, and the fenate a check to rcgwiate his agency.] Mr. LlVERMORE. I Ihall take it then, with the tonfent of gentlemen, that the fenate has an ablblute controul over the prefident in cafes of appointment new, being thus appointed, how are : officers to he difpiaced ? On this point 1 undertake to give my opinion ; though, in the firft place, I muft differ with one of the gentlemen on this tide of the queilion (Mr. vmith of South-Carolina). 1 do not admit that any man has an eitate in his office. I conceive all officers to be ap- pointed during pieafure, except where the conltitution fti- pulates for a different tenure, unlefs indeed the law Ihould create the office, or officer, for a term of years. After ob- ferving this, I muil contend, with the honorable gentle- man from Virginia (Mr. White), that the po»ver of re- moval is incidental to ihe power of appointment. ]f it was the prefident alone that appointed, he alone could difplace. 560 DEBATES A. 1789. If the prefulent and fenare, by a joint agreement, appoint an officer, they alone have the power to fupertede him; and however any gentleman may fay he doubts, or does not under(bnd the force of this principle, yet to me it appears as clear and as deinontlrabie as any principle of law or juliice that I am acquainted with. There is another me- thod to difplace officers exprefsly pointed out by the confl:i- tution ; and this implies, in the cleared manner, that in all other cafes officers may be removed at plealure and if ; removed at plcaiure, ic muil be at the pleafure of the par- ties who appointed them. Congrefs are enabled, by the conflitution,to eftablifh offices bylaw in many cafes they will, no doubt, veil thepow-jer ; of appointing inferior officersin the prefident alone they ; have no exprefs right, by the conftitution, to veil in him the power ot removin^j; thefe officers at pleafure yet no ; gentleman will contend, but inferior officers ought to be removable at pleafure. How then can the preddent acquire tiiis authority, unlefs it be on the principle, that the power of removal is incidental, ar,d the natural confequence of the