Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

officers. They knew that the crown of Great Britain, by having that preiogative, has been ei abied to fwallow up the whole adminiitration ; the influence of the crown upon ihe legiflature fnhjeds both houfes to its will and pleaiure j perhaps it may be thought by the peo- §5'^ DEBATES "pie of that kingdom, that it is A. 1789, bell for the executive ma- giilrate to have fuch kind of influence ; if fo, it is very well, and we have no right to complain that it is injurious to them, while they thenilelves confider it beneficial. But this (Tovernment isdiiferent, and intended by the people to be dirFerent, 1 have not heard any gentleman produce an authority from law or biftory which proves, that where two branches are interetted \n the appointment, that one of thetn has the power of removal. I remember that the gentleman from Maffach ifetts (Mr. Sedgwick) told us, that the two houfes, notwithftanding the partial negative of the prefident, pofTeiTed the whole legiflative power ; but will the gentleman infer froin that, that becaufe the con- currence of both brandies is necefiary to pafs a law, that a lels authority can repeal it ? This is all we conteiid for. Some gentlemen fuppofe, if the prefident has not the power by the conltituiion, we ought to veft it in him by law. For my part I very much doubt if we have the pov/er to do this. I take it we would be placing the heads of departments in a fituation inferior to what the conltitution eontemplates 5 but if we have the power, it will better to exercife it than attempt to conflrue the conffitution : But it appears to me, that the beft way will be to leave the conititution to fpeak for itfelf whenever occafion demands. It has been laid, thcit the fenate are merely an advifory body. 1 am not of this opinion, btcaufe their confent is exprefsly required ; if this is not obtauied an appointment: cannot be made. Upon the whole, I look upon it neceffary, in order to preferve ihac fecurity which the conflitution affords to the liberty of the people, that we avoid making this declaration, efpecially in favor of the prefident, as I do not believe the conuitution veils the authority in him alone. Mr. Amks. I believe there are very few gentlemen on this floor who have not made up their opinions ; therefore it is particu- larly dfagreeable to folicit their attention, efpecially when their patience is already exhaulled, and their curiofity fated ; but Itilt I hope to be of fome ufe in collecting the various arguments and bringing them to a point. I ihall rather con- fine niyfelt to this talk, than attempt to offer any thing that isnew. i !h:l! jnlt obfervc, that the arguments of the gentienian from Pennfylvania (Mr. Scott), which are com- plained of as being ridiculous, were arguments addrefied t» A. 1789. Of congress. ^^-y^ the undenlandlngs of the committee ; ray own underfland- ing was enlightened by them, ahhoiigh they wore the garb of pleafantry. Bat to proceed to my main obje6l. The queCtion, (o far as it relates to tiie coaifitution, is this, whether it has veitcd the io!e power of reaioving in the prefident alone, or \v hether it is to rake place by and with the advice and confent of the fenare ? Jf tlie queilion of conliitutionality was once difpatched, we (hould be lefc to confider of the expediency of the meafure I take it to be admitted on al! hands, though it was at firfl: objecled to by a worthy gentleman from Suuth-Carolina, that the power of removal from otlice, at pjeafure, rehdes fome- where in the government. If it does not refide in the prefident, or the prefident and fenaie, or if the conilitution has not veiled it in any parucular body, it mult 6e in the legiflature ; for it is abfurd to fuppofe that officers once appointed cannot be removed. The argument tending to prove, that the pov»/er is in the prefident alone by an ex- prefs declaration, may not be fatisfaftory to the minds of thofe gentlemen who deem the conilitution to be filent ou that head. But let thofe gentlemen revert to the priiKi- ples, fpirit, and tendency of the conilitution, and they will be compelled to acknowledge, that there is the highelt degree of probability that the power does veft in the prelident of the United States. I ihall not undertake to fay, that the arguments are conclufive on this point : I do not luppofe 't is necclfary that they jiiould be lo ; for I believe nearly as good concluilons may be drawn from the refutations of an argument as from any other proof. lor it is vvelj faid, that dclirudio unius elt generatio alterius. It has been faid, and addrelTed with folemnity to our con- fciences, that we ought not to deftroy the codftitucion, to change or modify it ; nay, it has been infei red, that it is unnecelTary and dangerous for us to proceed in this enquiry. Ic is true, we may decide wrong, and therefore tjiere may be danger; but it is not unneceifary : we have entered locj f:ir in the difculTion to retreat with honor to ourfeives, or fecurity to our country ; wc are fworn as much to exercife conftitutional authority, for the general good, as to refrain from affuming powers that are not given to us; we are as refponffble for forbearing to a;^, as wc are for acting. Are we to leave this queltion undetermined, to be contended between the preiident and the fenate ? Arevve to fay, that the queilion to us is indifibluble, and therefore throw it upon the Ihculders of the prefident to deter muie ? If \% 4 A 554 is DEBATES A. 17%, complex and difficult, it is certainly difingenuous in us to throw olF the decilioii helides, alter fo long a debate ; has been had, a deciiion muft be made, for it never would do ro iirike out the words as that would be deciding, and ; xlecidiiig againit the power of the prelident. It mult be admitted, that the conititution is not explicit on the point in contefl yet the conlVicution ftrongly infers, ; that the power is in the prefident alone. It is declared, that the executive power Ihall be veiled in the prclident. Under theie terras all the povvcrs properly belonging to the executive department of the government are given, and fuch only taken away as are expreisly excepted. If the conUitution had Itopt here, and the duties had not been defined, either the preiident had had no powers at all, or he would acquire from ihat general exprefiion all the powers properly belonging to the executive department. In the conlhtution the preiident is required 10 fee the laws faithfully executed. lie cannot do this without he has a controul over olEcers appointed to aid him in the perform- ance of his duty. Take this power out of his hands, and you virtually itrip him of his auihority ; you virtually de- liroy his refponiibiliry, the great fecurity which this con- ftitution holds out to the people of America. Gentlemen will fay, that, as the contlitution is not e%. plicit, ii mull be matter cf doubt where the power veils. If gentlemen's confciences wiH not let them agree with us,. they ous>ht to permit us to exercife the like liberty on our part. But they tell us we mull meet them on the ground of aecommodauon, and give up a declaration, that the power of removal is in the preiident, and they will acqui- efce in declaring him to have the power of luipeni'ion ; but they IhouM recollei^f, th/at in fo doing we facritice the prin- ciples of the conititution. has been frequently faid, that the power of reniaving It is incidentalto the power of appointing ; as the coniiitution implies, that all officers, except the judges, are appointed during pleafure ; fo the power of removal may, in all cafes, be exercifed. liut li>pp(}fe this general principle true, yet it is an arbitrary principle, I take ir, and one that cannot be proved ; if it w as denied, it could not be elta- hlifhcd and if it was eltablifhed, it is ftill doubtful whe- ; ther it would make for the adverfe iide of this queltion or not ; becaufe it is dubious wijether the fenate do actually appoint or not. It is admitted, that they may check and regulate the appointment by the prelijent , but they can A. 1789. Of C O N G R E S S. 555 do nothing more ;they are merely an advifory body, and do not fecLire any degree of refponfibihty, which is one great objedl of the prefent conftitution they are not an- ; fwerabie for their fecret advice ; but if they wei-e, the blame divided among lo many would fall upon none. Certainly this aflunied principle is very often untrue ; but if it is true, it is not favorable to the gentlemen's doc1:rine. The prefident, 1 contend, has exprefsly the power of nominating and appointing, though he mult ob- tain the confent of the fenate He is the agent ; thefenate : may prevent his ading, but cannot adl themfelves. It may be difficult to illultrate this point by examples which will exactly correfpond ; but fuppofe the cafe of an executor, CO whom is devifed lands, to be fold whh the advice of a certain perfon, on certain conditions ; the executor fells with the confent, and upon the conditions required in the will ; the conditions are broken ; may the executor re- enter for the breach of them ? or has the perfon, whom he was obliged to confult with in the fale, any power to reftrain hiiu? The executor may remove the wrongful pcfleffor Ironi the land, though, perhaps, by the *'ill, he may hold it in truft for another perfon's benefit. In this manntr the prefident may remove from office, though, when vacant, he cannot fill it without the advice of the fenate. We are fold it is dangerous to adopt conltruclions; and that what is not exprelily given is retained. Surely it is asimproper in this way to confer poucr upon the fe- nate as upon the prefident ; for if the power is not in the prefident folely by the confiitution, it never can be in the prefident and fenate by any grant of that inif rument ; any arguments, therefore, that tend to make the firft doubtful, operate againlt the other, and make it abfurd If gentle- : men, therefore, doubt with refpect to the tirit point, they will certainly hefitate with refp;6l to the other. If the fenate have not the power, and it is proved that they have it not, by the arguments on both fides, the power either velts with the prefident or the legiHature ; if it is in the difpofal of the latter,and merely a matter of choice with us, clearly we ought not to bf:lto'.v it on the fenaie lor the ; doubt, whether the prefident is not already entitled to it, is an argument againft placing it in other hands ; beiides the exercile of it by the fenate would be inconvenient ; they are not always fitting ; it would be infecure, becaufe they are not refponfible it would be fubverfive of the great ; principles ot the coultitution, and deitructive to liberty ; SS6 becaufe it DEBATES A. 1789. tends to intermingle executive and legillative powers in one body of men, and this blending of powers ever forms a tyranny. Fhe fenate are not to accnfe offen- ders, they are to try them ; they are no^ to give orders, but on coiujilaint to judge of the breach of them. We