Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

chat the im- proper conduct of a perfon in a (ubordinate fnuation can be known. He therefore is the only perfon who can proj^er- ly apply the remedy ; unlel's, indeed, the officer's mal- practices a^re fo confpicuous as to tnrnilh ground for im- peachment ; and this power vefted by the coiiftitution in the houfe of reprefentatives and fenate, will apply the re- medy in fuch cafe, if the prefident Jhould negle t, or if the officer ihould be a favorite of his. It moreover appears very clear to me, that the fenaie, who are a judicial body, ought not to meddle with the (luiinefs of removal ; becaufe they will have prejudged the cafe, if an impeachment ihould be thereafter made. IV'r. Jackson. I admit, the juftnefs of an old obfervarlon, tliat ridi- fir, cule is the telt of truih. I would rather that my arguments were caricatured airainlt a wall to be batered down by my ®wn knuckles^ than join a lyltem torgiu^ chains for my  ; ^4S DEBATES country. It will be matter of Imallconlolation to the gentie- A. \^'6i), nian from Penni'ylvania, when the hour of repentance ar- rives, that he has been facetious at the expence of his fel- low citiZL'n's Iccurity. Mr. Gerry. So far, nir. chairman, am 1 from feeling hurt by the lu- dicrous (ituation in winch our arguments are placed by the gentleman from Pennfylvania, that I am obliged to him fur the relaxation it has aiTurded ; rhefe fportive fancies unbend the iiiind, and make us in better humor with each other. But \\Ki gentleman expe(^b that we Ihall be laughed out of our reafon, or our liberty. I'he parliament of England is one of the mofi important bodies on earth ; but they can do nothing without the con- currence of the executive magiltrate. The congrefs of the United States are likely to become a more important body ; the executive magilfrateNhas but a qualified negative over them. The parliament of England, with the confent of the king, can expound their coiiltitution ; in fadl, they are the coiiftitution itl'elf. But congrefs may, if once the the dodrine of conftruction is efiabliiiied, make the coniti- iution what they pleafe, and the prelident can have no control over theni. It has been faid by my colleague (Mr. Sedgwick), that the prelident not only nonunates but appoints the officers j and infers from hence, that as the power of removal is in- cidental to thepov\er of appointing, the prelident has the povvtr of removal alfo. But I llicuid be glad to know how it can with judice be faid that the prelident appoints. 1 he conffitution requires the confent of the fenate ; there- fore they are twodiltir.<?i; bodies, and intended to check each other. If my colleague's is a true conftrutlion, it niay be extended further, and faid, that in the ad of nominatingj the aPier.t of the fenate isviriual'y given, and therefore he Jiab a right to make the whole appointment himfelf with- out any interference on the psrt of the feiiate. I contend, iir, that there is iuit as much propriety in the one conitruc- tion as in the oiher. if we oblei ve the enading Itile of the ifstutes <.\ I3rit:iin, we IJiall find pretty near the fame wcidsas what are ufed in the coi Hitution, with reipect to appcjijitmetits. Be it enaded by the king's molt excellent !n;!Jeity, by and with the advice and cbnf'ent of pariiamcnt licre ic might be fnid that the king enads all laws^; but I believe the truth of this fad will be difpnttd in that coun- |..'yo 1 beiievt; It},) one will pretend to lay that the king i^' A. 1789. OF C O N G R E S S. 549 the three branches of parliament ; and unlefs my colleague will do all this, 1 never can admit that the prelident in himfelf has the power of appointment. My colleague has gone further, to lliew the dependance of this officer on the preiiclent. He fays 'the neceffiry of appointing a fecretary of foreign affairs arifes from a natu- ral defect in man ; that if the prelident was able to admini- fter all thefe departments, there would be no occafion of making proviiion by la.v. If the prefident had power fu- perior to the limits of humanity, he might render his coun- try great fervices but we are not likely to have any fuch ; prefidents ; the conftitution itfelf contemplates none ; it hiakes proviiion for the infirmities of human nature ; it au- thorifes us to eftabliili offices by law ; and this is the ground upon which we itand ; indeed this is the ground that v. as af- fumed yelterday by niy colleague, \\hen he faid, that this officer was the creature of the law If he is the creature of : the law, let him conduft according to law, and let it not be contended that he is the creature of the prefident ; be- caufe he is no further the creature of the prelident, than that he is obliged to give his opinion in writing when re- quired. But ii is faid the prelident is refponfible for the fonducft of this i;fficer I w iih to know what this refpon- : fibility is ? Does it mean if a fubordinate executive officer commits treafon, that the prelident is to fufter for it ? This h a ftrange kind of refponiibility. Suppofe in the cafe of the fecretary of the treafury there Ihould be a de- falcation of the pc;blic revenue, he to make good the is lofs ? or if the head of the army fiiould betray his trul^, and facrifice the liberties of his country, is the prefident's bead to be the devoted facrifice ? The conltitution lliows the contrary by -the proviiion made for impeachment ; and this I take to be one of the ftrongeft arguments againll the pre- fident, having the power of removing one of the principal officers of government, that he is to bear his own refpon- iibility. It has been urged by the gentleman over the way (Mr. Scott), that the prefident is the man of the people, and their particular reprefentaiive. Now how this can warrant thofe ftrong terms in which it has been alfcrted, I leave the committee to determine, when he can be elected by electors appointed by the Hate legillatures. Is the creature of the deputy of a deputy nearer to the people than the crea- ture of their deputy ? Would that gentleman confider the iHue of his wife's maid nearer ^ kin to Jiim thaa the ill'ue pf his wife. 550 13 E B A T E 5 A, I78fj. The queftion before the comniirtee inuft be decided on one ofthefe two grounds. Either they mult fuppule this power is delegated particularly to the prelidentby the con- Ititution, or it is uot. Let us examuie thel'e twocales. If gentlemen lay that it is delegated by the conltitutiorj, then there is no ufe for the claufe ; but if it is not particularly- delegated to the prefident by the conititution and we are inchned to authorife him to exercife this power, I would aflcgentlemen, whether this is the proper way to doit? whether a little claufe hid in the body of a bill can be cal- led a declaratory aft ? I think it cannot. It looks as if we were afraid of avowing our intentions If we ai"e determi- : ned upon making a declaratory a6l, let us do it in fuch a manner as to indicate our intention But perhaps gentlemen may think we have no authority to make declaratory adts. They may be right in this opinion for though I have ex- ; amined the conititution with attention, I have not been able to difcover any claufe which velts congrefs with that power. But if the power of making declaratory acts real- ly velts in congrefs, and the judges are boiind by our de- ciGons, we may alter that part of the conftiuuion which is iecured from being amended by the filth .irticle we may; lay, that the ninth fetT:ion of the conititution, refpedling the migration or importation of perfons, does not extend to negroes ; that the word perfons means only white men and women. Wethen proceed to lay a duty of twenty or thir- ty dollars per head on the importation of negi oes. The merchant does not conltrue the conititution in the manner that we have done. He therefore inttitutesa fuit and brings it before the fupreme judicature of the United States for trial. 1 he judges, who are bound by oath ro lupport the conititu- tion, declare againft this law ; they would therefore give judginent in favor of the merchant. But, fay congrefs, we are tl;e conltitutional expounders of this claufe, and your deciiion in this cafe has been improper. Shall the judges, l>ecaufe congrefs have ufurped power, and made a law four.dcd in conltruftion, be impf.'ached by one branch, and convicted by the other, tor dtjing a meritorious a<ft, and itanding in oppofition to their ufurpation of power i If this is the meaning ot the conititution, it was hardly worth whde to have had fo much bultie. and uneihnefs about it. I would afk gentlemen, if f.lie conititution has given us power to make declaratory a^cts, where is the necelhty of iuferiing the fifth article for the purpofe of obtaining a- jiiendineuts? The word, amendment implies a dwtecl j a A. i;89. Of C O N G R E S S. 55? declaratory acl conceives one. Where then is the difference between an amend. uent and a declaratory ad ? 1 call upon the gentleman to jooint out what part of the conltituuon fays we fliall correft that inllrument by a declaratory aft. If gentlemen once break through the cotiftitutional limits of their authority, they will find it very difficult to drav^ a boundary, which will fecure to themfelves and their pode- rity that liberty which they have fo well contended for. [Several gentlemen rofe to fpeak, but fatdownagain upon which feemed to be pretty general a call for the queftion, through the houfe ; when Mr. ^umpter arofe, and beg- ged gentlemen not to be fo precipitate :If they confidered the importance of the queftion, and the confequences of the decifion, they would reflecl: niore deliberately before they gave their votes. For his part he had fat patiently, and attended ferioufly to the arguments offered on both fides : He had received confiderable information from the difcuf- fion which had already taken place, and he hoped that more light would ftill be thrown upon it, if gentlemen were not precluded from purluing the fubjeft by a precipitate call for the gueltion. He hoped gentlemen would give fur- ther time, and let other members fpeak, who were dcfirous of delivering their fentiments.]] Mr. SHRK.MAN. The importance of this quelHon requires mature delibe- ration J the: more I have heard it dilculled, the more con- vinced 1 a'u that the claufe ought to be itruck out. If we fu[)pofe (and gentlemen do fuppofe on this fide of the quef- tion), that tiie povver is veiled in the prefident by the con- (btution, why ihould we intermeddle in the matter? Why are we nfficiondy to intrude our opinions upon the prefix- dent ? Are we to fuppofe he is unacquainted with his duty, and is to be taught it by our fuperior wifdom ? I apprehend- tliat the eleftors who chofe the prefident, thought him competent to underitand his duty ; what then can induce us to give our advice unaiked ? If he was in doubt, and was to apply to us for fuch a purpofe, there might be fome propriety in it- The convention, who formed this confti- tutiou, thought it would tend to fecure the liberties of the people, if they prohibited the prefident from the fole ap. pnintment of all