Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

; he has proved that the fenate are a check upon the executive, for the cxprefs purpofe of fecuring the free- dom of the people. Gentlemen have come forv/ard and told us that a pov/er of this kind is weceifary to prevent a milapplication of the public money ; and to make the OiHcer con^plctely con- trolable by the preiidcnt, would be the heft lecurity. for his fidelity. But tiie vigilance of the htmfe of reprcfenta- tives, and the power of inipeachment and punifhme:;r, would be a better fecurity ; for if the prtfident has the power of removing all ofHcers who may be virtuous enough to op- pofe his bufe mtalures, what wouki become of the liberties of ourftUow-cicizens ? Y'jur treafury would fall into his haiids ; for nobody in thrt department v.ould dare to oppofc him. Maving ihen the army and the treafury at his com- mand, we might bid a farewell to.the liberties of Auerica forever. 1 he balance wouid be on his lide, and if we were to lofe the benefit of the ccnilitution for a day, a month, or a year, it could never be regained, but by an arduous and dreadilil confii.T:. 1 repeat u again, there are but tvv'o things necfllary to make a man a delpot, the purfe >nd the fword. The conilituiion gives to the prelidenc the po\\er of the latter, and the legiHature is about to give the power of the former into his hands ; when this is done the liberties of the people are furrendered to his difcretioa. Gentlemen have faid, tr.at the power in the hands of the fenate would be equally darjgeroub ; but let me afk them 'fthether molt danger is to be apprehended frcm a power  544 DEBATES A. 17^9, or many ? Be fides the fenate are velte^l in the hands of one a body perpetually changing, returning to, and renovating from the niafs of the people they will alfo be contniu- ; ally watched over by the Ttate iegifl-itures. It will be rea- dily admitted that the (iare governments are good centinels and proper checks over tiie conducl; of their reprefentatives. I look upon the fenate as-a more harmlefb body than what gentlemen feem inchned to fuppofe them. But it is not To with the prelident he is conltuutionally arined with high ; and dangerous powers,- v>diich if left unchecked and umef- trained, might be prod'-ixSli've of dangerous confequences. But to extend thofe powers w6uid increa'.'e the danger to 'an alarming degree if you grant him the power of ren>o- ; ving whom he pleafes from ulfice, you will give hi.n a com- plete control over the whole trcafdry depariment. Having got the fvvord, give him the purle, with the" army and navy, and what is there left for hin'i to require with the command of the Ilrong box ? he would be able to raile up a legion of ofiicers, who would fupport his meafures, fecure his elec- tion, and thus perpetuate his political exillence. Gentle- men will not contend that there is no fear of corruption when the prefident has the power of bribing by a difpofal of tiie public treafure among his partizans. Let us look round at this moment ar.d fee the progrefs we are iliaking towards venahry and corruption. VVe already hear the fi)unding title "of highnef* and molt honorable trumpeted in our ears, v/hich ten years fince would have exalted a man to a (huion as high as Hainan's gibbet theie ; titles have been echoed even in th'i Bollon papers, a tovv-n, which fifteen years ago, would acktiowiedge no lord but the Lord God of Holts. i call. upon gentfemen to (hew me why the heads of de- partments are neceffarily dependant upon the prelident, when the con.ftitution fpecifically points them out. I cannot for my part admit, that any pai t of the conOitution autho- J. riibs tlie prefident to exercile an "uncontrolled power over ihem; 'becanfe I perceive, as a fundamental principle in the conftiirution, that the exercife of all power Ihould be pro- perly checked and guarded the fenate is the proper check • on the prefident, and the prefident on the fenate and this honCe. Thefe being niy fentinients, and conceivmg it the only way to fecure the rights of the people, 1 Ihall be againfl tlic claale, and hope it may be rejected. Mr. Scott. Before I call again for the quellion, although I confefs I A. 1789. Of congress. 545 Have been long (ince ready for it, I beg leave to fay a iew words, and I allure the coaimiuee I do ndt mean to be tedious. 1 have lilliened co the arguments in fupport of th's motion thefe three d^ys with great attention, and think, when taken together, they tonliil in this; the raifing of a great number of frightful pit-lures, w hich, at fir(t light, appear very terrible, but when tliey are attentively con- templated, they appear to be the vagaries of a difor- dered imagi;!acion. Let us examine one or two of thefe frightful pictures, merely as a fample of the whole frt, and fee what they amount to. The mod frightful of all that have been brought into view is, that the treafurer nmit be the inere creature of the prefident, and conform to all his directions, or he arbitrarily removes him from office, and lays his hands violently upon the money-cheff ; then having the ("word and the purfe, you fee the prefident boldly ad- vancing, fupported by the army and navy, and the money cheit in the back ground, engaging the liberties of ;he people; armed with all this omnipotence of power, the proieddr rnlhes onward with irrefiftible impetuofity ; 10 fudden and fatal is the ftroke, that the expiring genius of America has hardly time family to fay, farewei Liberty. Tiuis defpotifm rides triumphant, and freedom and happi- nefs are trampled in the dult. Strange, that all this flioulcl arife from the executive raaslilraie's having the power of removal. Bat gentlemen tell us, that if we keep the treafurer oat of the power of the prefident, he cannot injure Us ; that being thus independent, your ftrong box 'vvill be well guarded, and the prefident cannot get your money, unlefs he fteals it ; and if he iteals it, and the trea- furer fees him, he will tell ; this will lead to an impeach- ment, and we fliail get rid of the caule of our apprt-hen- iions. But the conltitution fays, that no money Ihall be taken out of treafury but by appropriations : this alone I think a fuiScient anfwer to all that has been faid, and will ferve to foften down the harOi features which the terrible picture I have jufl now mentioned difplayed. I fay,- firy our money may be in the treafury by millions, and v.irhout fpecial appropriation by the legillature, the prelident and treafurer either or both together cannot touch a farthing of it, unlefs they (teal it. This being the cafe, I fee as litile fe- curity to tlie treafury in the independence of this cfficer, a» danger ariling from his dependance, without a imgle excep- tion; for if the prefident, with a ftrong army at his back^ tomes violently to lay hold of the money-cheit^ tbisofiicer Z z 7. 546 DEBATES A. t?^. ftandsbutn very poor fecurity againfl: fuch a power. I think the prefulent, (upported with theannyand navy, making a decent upon your treafury, would be very apt to carry aw ay the money and the treafurer too if he Itood in his way. Argmnents like thefe may tend to amufe, but they can make no lerious iniprefiion ; it is only drawing pictures on a hard wall, in order to batter them down with our own- knuckles. Another piftare is d-awn, by way of coinparifon, be- tween the fehate and the prefident and we have gone into ; argurnenis to proVe who are nenreft akin to the people. Here we have run deep into the ftience of calculating kin- dred ; and It feeins to be coiiclnded by the lupporters of this motion^ tliat the feitate is much nearer relaud to thein than the prcftdent ; thtrt-fore the latter, as a llrangtr, muft: not be intruded with the removal of officers, but our kmf- ;nen the lenate may. But is this a fair conltru<3:ion of the relation (h ip ? Is any thing more plain than that the preli- den.t, above all the ofiicers of government, both from the manner of his appointment, and the nature oi his duties, is truly and jullly denonnnatcd the man of the people ? 1$ there any other perfon who reprefents lo many of them as the preiident ? He is cledfed by the voice of the people of the whole union ; the fenate are the reprefcntatives of the ftare I'overeignties ; the reprefcntatives of that very fpe- cies of beings, which if any thing (lands in the way of the jull execution of the federal government, they are the crea- tures : The feparate fovereignties of the feveral flates are the moft efK-ctu.;! bar to prevent the operations of the pre- I'jnr fyftem ; yet this body is held up as more nearly related to the people than the prefident l;imfelf, when no man in the- United States has their concurrent voice but him. H^^nce. it aj^pears, that although this pidure is not quite fo ludicrous as the firii, it is ecjually a caricature, and fo of the reft. Sir, 1 have really felt amazed hov/ thefe kind of arguments ever foiiod tiieir way into the njinds of wife and enlightened men. Mr. Goodhue. It has long been an opinion entertained of the people of America, that they would not trnft the government with the poA-er of doing good, leit it {lioald be abufed but con- ; trary to the expeclatjon of iis enemies, a conilitution is formed providing thoi'e powers which we fnffcrc d io much for want of under. the old confederation. The queilion on the prefent occailon {eems to Ihmd on nearly the iamc A.1789. Of C O N G R E S S. 547 ground, whether we Ihall trull the power of doing good to the execuiive magillrate, or deprive him of it \ur fear }ie may abufe it. 1 he conlliiucion has recognized three great branchts of the governiiieut, and diih'ibuied among them all the powers which are granted 1 conceive, there- fore, in no cafe whatever any kind of conlhiiclion can be put to lellVn the powers of either of thofe branches. I'he only fecuriiy which the conltitution means to give us, is to call the office-s or govermiK'nt to account if tiiey abulb their powers ; and not to cramp their exercife lb as to iviake them inefficient. It is contended by fome gentlemen, that the confritutioii lias by implication vefted the power of removal m the pre- fident and fenate ; but are we to decide a queltion by i n- plication in favour of the fenate, and not to conltrue any part of the conltituiion in favour of the prelident i It has alfo been laid that the power would be more lafe in the hands of the fenate than in that of the prefident ; but I do not view it in that light. it has however been jultly ihewn, that it would be a very inconvenient and ulelefs power for them to be poirdTtd of it. It is notiung limilar to the power they have in appointments. There they are really ufeful by their advice becaufe it is more probable ; that the ienate may be well acquainted with the charac- ters of the officers that are nominated than the preiidenc himlelf. But after their appointments fuch knowledge is little required. The officer is placed under the coniroul of the preiident ; and it is only through iiim