Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

of all executive powers, it is right and proper that the perfon who appoints fliould remove. This lead? me to confider in whom 'he appointment is veft- ed bv the conftirution. The prefident nominates and ap- points ; he is farther exprefsiy authorifedto con^.miflionall officers. Now, does it aj-'pear from this diftribuiicji of po'.ver that the (enate appoints ? Docs an officer exercife povvers by authority of the fenate ? No ; I bc'ieve the prefident is the perfon from whom he derives hisauihnnty. — He appoints but under a clieck ; it is necefl'ary to obtain the confent of the fenate ; bur after that is obtairc'l, I afk v.'ho appoints? who velts the officer with authority ? v. ho commilFions him ? The prefident docs tiiefe afts by his fole power, but they arc excercifed in confcquence of the ad- vice of another branch of goverinnent. Tf, therefore, the officer receives his authority and commiiTjon from the prefi- dent, furely the removal foil ov.-s as coincident. Now, let us examine whe'her this coi^flructicn conriPts with the true intereil of the United States, and the gene- ral principles of the conftitution. It confilts with the ge- neral principles of the conftitution ;becaufe the txecutive power is given to the prelident, and it is by rtafon of his incapacity that v.e are called upon to appoint ailiilants. Mention, to be fure, is made of principal officers in departments; but it is irom conftruction only that we de- rive cur pov.er to conftitute tliis particular office. If we were not at liberty to modify the principles of the con- ftitution, 1 do not fee how we couid erecl an office of foreign affairs. If we eftabliih an office avowee! v to aid the prefident, we leave the condjft of it to hisdilcretion. Hence the v^hole executive is to be left v. ith him, agreea- bly to this maxim, ail executive power fliall be velteo in a prefident. But how does this comport with the true interelt of the United States? Let me afk gentlemen v.here they fufpeft dinger ? Is it not made exjirefsly the duty of the lecretary of foreign affairs, to obey fuch orders as Ihall be given to him by the prefident? And would you keep in office a man v.'lio fiiouid refufe or ncgletl: to do the 54a d ifies adigned him ? DEBATES Is A. 1789. not the prefident refponlible for the adiiiiuiltraiior. ? He certainly is. How then can the public inierelt iuiler? Fheii, if we hiid it to be narurally inferred from the principles of the conltitution, coincident with the nature of hiS dary iliat thi'i oriicer ihould be dependant upon him, , and to the benetit of the United States, for what purpofe ihall coMoi-/-{'s refLife a legiilative declaration of the conftitu- tion, a, id leave it to remam a doubtful point? Becaufe, if congrei's refufes to determine, we cannot conceive that others will be more entitled to decide upon it than we are. 1 his aill appear to gve grourd for what the gentlemen have alTerced, that we are afraid to carry tb.e conlHtution inuj Lifecl : This I apprehend would not be doing our duty. Gentlemen they have a fuflicient remedy for every fay evil likely to relult from connecting the fen^te with the prelident i his they propol'e to do by allo'^ing the power : of luli^euiion. 'j his, in the fnlt place, does not anfwcr the end becaufe there is a poflibility that the officer may not ; be ddplated aft* r a hearing before the lenate : And, in the feioiid place, it is entirely inconliitent with the whole CO nie iii reafoning purfued by the gentlemen in oppofi- non 1 would alk them, if the conftitution does not give to tiie prefident .the power of removal, what part is it that gives the power of fufpeniion? If you will in one cafe con- itrue the Conltitution, you may do it in anoihcr ; for I look u.-cn it a> d^mgcrous to give the power of fulpenfion by iii»i;li(.atioii as to give the full power of removal. Gen- tleman obkrve, that I take it for granted that the preiident has vm exi^rels right to the power of fulpenfion, and that, if lie ia to excrcile it, it mult be drawn by conftruftive rea- loning aiime from tlieconlfitutiou. if we are toexercile our ruuhoiity, we had better at cnce give a pow er that would anfAertwo valuable purpoies than one altogether nugatory, ill the h'-il place, it would entirely feparate the legillaiive a. id executive departments, conformably to the great prin- ciples ot the conituution ; and, in tiie fecond place, it would a-ifA er the end of government better, and lecure real be- jieiirs to the union. The fear« of ihe gentleman from Virginia (Mr. White), appeared to me untouiided. Why does he fuppofe the in- of North Carolina will take umbrage at our deci- liaoitaiits lion ? cannot be becaufe we are averfe to uniiing the It executive and legiflative departments^ becaufe they arc A. 1789. Of C O N G R E S S. 541 avowed opponenrs to th;it dodrine : They cannot be afraid of the preildcut. by realon of his havipa ihc pouer to ex- ercile fuch authority, for the (.ianger does not lay on that fide :The great evil, as was Ihued by ihe gentltinan from Virginia (ivlr Mad'fon) ytft^i'day is. that bad officers ihall continue in office, and not that good onts nsay be removed ; yet this la(t iiall chat is in the oower of the prefident. If he removes .1 good otfi er, he cannot apj)oint his fuccelTor without the conient of the ftnatt ; and it is fairly to be prefumed, that if at any time ht; lliould be guilty of Inch an overfight, as to remove a uf^tul aiid valuable officer, the evil will be fmall, becaufe anothtr as valuable will be placed in his (lead. If it is la.d, that this is an injury to the indi- vidual ;I confefs that it is pollible that it may be fo : But ought we not in the firlf place to confult the public good ? But on mature conlideration i do not apprehend any very great injury will rtlult to the individual from this pradice; becaufe, when he accepts of the office, he knows the tenure by which he is to hold it, and ought to be prepared agaiuit every contingency. 1 hefe being the principles on which I have formed my opinion, in addiiion to what was ftated, I do conceive that I am perfeftly jultifitd to my conitituents and to my oath to fupport this conltruction. And when I give my vote that the preiideni ought to have the power of removal from office, I do it on principle ; and gentlemen in the oppoli- tion will leave us to the operation ot our judgments on chis as well as every other quelfion that comes before us. For my part, I conceive it is impoHible to carry into execution the powers of the jjrefident in a falu'ary manner, unlefs he has the power of removal velttd in him. I do not mean, that if it was not vtjttd in him by the confiitution, it would be proper for coi'grel's to confer it ; though 1 do believe the government would cithcrwife he ver\ deledive, yet we would have to bear this inconvenience until it was rtdified by an amendment of the conlfitution. For my part, I would adhere to every principle contained in it, however defective, and not mfringe it for any purpofe whatever. In fo doing we (hall be jullified by our conitituents, and have nothing to dread fniji ihole apprchenlions which have been held out ; bccaulcl trult in the good fenfe of our fellow citizens, that while we do cur dury they will t^ot be backward on their part to conform to theirs. Mr. Jackson. I think it iiecelTary to anlwer a few of the arguments that 542 D E 'B A T E S A. 1789. have been brought forward on the other fide of the houfe, although 1 a'M well fatisned the fuhjev-l has been worn threadbare. W.th refpecl co what has been faid about the bufinef's being ingenioufly handled, I airree wirh the gen- tleman that the difcuiTion of the bid has been ingenious ; and it has been ingenioufly brought forward for the com- ; mittee have tal<en care 10 brisig m the prefent bill previous to the bill for organising; the treauiry, that the principle might be edabhlhed before that more delicaie bufmefs came in their view. A gentleman from iVIaryland (':Ar. Stone) has brought forward fome arguments which are of grear weight But whilil I ackno.vledge their weight generally, I mufl beg leave to differ with him in one particular. He conceives the prefident, or prefident and lenate, to be the head of all the executive departments of government- IN! ow 1 cannot fee it in this point ot light. I would afk, where is the ne- ceflicy, if tliis do(5trine was true, of grafting into the con- ffcirution a power to authorife the preiident to receive the advice of the fenare, and require the opinion in writing of the heads of departnjents ? I appeal to the good feofe of the committee to determine, whether thefe oiiices are not *-(lablilhe(l by the conftitution as heads of departments. How then can they be merely infi:ruments of the prefident, to conform implicitly to his will > For I deny the principle that they are mere creatures of the law. They have con- jtitutional rights which they may exercife. If the prefi- dent alone is the head of the whole executive department, ar.d thefe the mere creatures of the law, where is the ne- ceffi:y of calling them heads of departments in the conftitu- tion? iruretythe convention did not ufe a redundancy ofwords, and infert a claufe without a meaning. They either rnult have done this, or contemplated your fccretary of foreign nfFairs as head of an executive department. Where elfer {;ia!l we fearch for a meaning f Shall we look into the bill noA' before the hf/ife ? That bill (tares gentlemen in the face ; acknowledges the fecretary of foreign affairs to it be the head of a department. Shall the conltitution be ta- ken nr> and conftrucd ? If it is, it ihould not be conllrued in the manner vvhich the gentlemen have done. I s<rree with the honorable member lall up, that we hzve a right to modify the judiciary fyllem, and in doing tliis, that conftruction is nccellary. But it is a conftruc^ion of a different kind from what is now contended for ; we hsve a right to extend the powers of that department bj A.1789. Of C O N G R £ S S; ^^ conltruftion. There is a great difference between organi- zing and modifying a department and modifying the princi- ples of ciic conUiiution ; there would he great danger in this. If we begin once to conifrue and dcfiite the princpies of the coiiftitution, there is no end to our power ; we may begin with the alpha and go to the omega, changing, re- verling and fubverting every principle contained it. m This never can be the meaning- of the conflituiion : this ne- ver was the intention of our conltituencs they never fenc ; us here for the purpofe of altering the fyltem of govern- ment •, they referved that power to themfelves. I differ with gentlemen who fay that the lisnate have nd part of the executive power, or that the prtfident has nrt part of the legiflative authority. I confider them as checks upon each other, to prevent the abufe of either ; and it is this way in whicli the liberries of the people are fecured. I appeal for the truth of this fentinient to the writings of Publius