Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

by implication to the prelident. and the fame principle is applied to the legiflaiure ; this govern- ment would be the moil tyranuital on carih [Mr. White interrupted Mr. Lee, and declared he never mads ufe of luch an exprtlTion he laid it would poiieis ; the powers of the moil abfoiute govennncni.] Mr. Lee. The gentleman fliould remember that this government is noc veiled with thaie ample powers which he conteinpla- A. i;89. Of CONGRESS. _$35 ted when he made this obftr^atinn. This governmer.r. is inverted wirh powers tor enumerated purpole^ only^ and cannot excrcile any othtrb whatl'ever. He advifes us to auhere itrittiy to the conftitiuion. I hope we fhall. But I would net aft urder the wflueiice of arguments addrefled to the palFujus of the coniisiittee. This, (ir, is a lubjed to be dtcidtd on cool and dil'paf- fionate reafoning, and not in the htai of fervid declamation, or under the fe.irs and apprehtnfions ariliug from the litu- ation of North Carolina or Kentuckey ; luch references, therefore, appear to me unfit to be made on the pre- fent occafion. 1 hope no gentlciiian w ill conceive that this is a power that can in any way endanger the general wel- fare— I believe it can do no luch thing. It has been faid by my colleague (Mr. White), that the conftitution does not veit the power of making this declara- tion by law. Here, br, I dilagree with him ; becaufe the conftitution vtlts in ccngrels pov. er to make all laws neceflary ard proper to carry into execution the powers veited by the conltitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. Now, he admits that the conltitution veils the power of removal, by neceflary implication, in the government of the United States. Have not congrefs, therefore, the power of making what laws they think proj>er to carry into execution the powers veftcd by the conlfitution in the government of the United States. It is laid down as a maxim in government by all judicious writers, that the legiflative, executive, and judicial powers fliould be kept feparate and diitind as poiiible, in order to fecure the liberties of the people. And this maxim is founded on the experience of ages For we find that how- : ever goverinnents have been eltablilhed, however modified in their names or forms, if thefe powers are blended, or exercifed by one body, the etferis are ever the fame —the public liberty isdeftroyed. The feverai itates, in forming their confiitutions, have attended particularly to this facred maxim : Wefind they leduloully feparated thefe powers of government ; and many of their declarations of rights were intended to perpetuate the inviolable truth. The framers of the conltitution of tlie United States came from among the people, who vene*. rated this general principle they were the feleft and ; honored fonsof thofe people, who like them were impref- itd with fovereign relped for a truth which fupported the 536 D E B x\ T E S A, i7S^, great obje£t— a good and free government. Charafters like ' tbefe, with fuch impreirions, were not likely to forego principles in which they were nurtured. Did they fore -^o them? Examine the relult of their deiibtrarions, and lee how carefully they are preferved They have divided our : governir.ent into three principal bianchts, with exprefs declarations, that all iegidative power ihal! veil in one, all executive in another, and the whole judicial in a third. It is our bounden duty to imitate iheir great example, and to fupport the feparation which they have forn.ed. The legiflaiure has the power to create and eJtabliih offices; but it IS their duty lo to modify thein as to make them con- form to the general fj'irit of the conititution. The people ought to knovv what belongs to each department ; what belongs to the executive niagiltrate, and what is expedtd from him. Upon what can their fenfe be exercifed, un^ lefs they know the particular puv»fers inveltcd ui every branch? if a rmfchievous legiflative act is pafled, thev look to the legillaLure, they remonltrate with you, and aflv, why was this done ? it a wicked executive act is perpetrated, they look to the executive ii.agiltrate, and aik, why did you do this, or fulfer it to be done ? If an improper decilion takes place in a coart of law, they allv of the judicial to correct the error, it is by leparating, and keeping dilHnft thefe pow ers, that the public jealouf) can be directed to thofe objecls which are iiuft necelTary to be watched ; they can dilcover the error and know who to blame ; but if the powers are blended, their attention is divided, and the re- fponiibility, if not annihilated, is greatly diminilhed. On the public jcalouiy, therefore, the freedom of the govern- ment exifts ; fur if tlie government is not watched, it either becomes negligent or tyrannical ; and to induce the people to keep an oblerviag eye over the actions of men in power, they muit have their objeil fpecihc and tingle Now, as I contend we have the power to modify the eftablidr.r.ent of oflices ; fo ought we, mr. chairman, t© modify liictn in fuch a way as to proinote the general welfare ; -which can only be done by keeping the three branches diltinc^ ; by informing the people where to look, in order to guard againit iiiiproper executive atts. It is our duty, therefore, to veit all executive power., belonging to the government, where the convention intended it flionld be placed. It adds to the refponlibility of the moft re- fponfible branch of the government ; and without refpon- ftbility, we {lioald have little fccurity againil the depreda- A. 1789. Of congress. ^27 tions and gigantic ftricles of arbirary power. T f<iy it is neceiTary, Hr, to hold up a lingle and Ipetlfic ohjeci to the public jealoufy to v\atch therefore ii is neccfl'dry to con- ; ned the pouer of removal wiih the pretident. i'he exe- cutive is the fource of all appointments ; is his refponiibilicy complete uulcTs he has the pcnver of removal ? If he has ^his power, it will be hisfauic if any wicked or milchievous aelion is committedand he will hardly expofe hi iiielf 10 ; the refeutment of three niilliousof people, of whom he holds his power, and to whom he is accountable every four years. If the power of removal is vefted in the fenate, it is evi- dent at a lingle view, that the refponlibility is dilTipated, becaufe the fault cannot be fixed on any individual ; befide the members of the fenate are not accountable to the people, they are the reprefentatives of the Itate legiflatures ; but even if they were, they have no powers to enable them to decide with propriety iii the cafe of removals, and there- fore .ire improper perfons to exercife fuch authority. Mr BoUDixNoT. Notv;ithftanding the long inveitigation which this quef- tion has undergone, I mult beg the attention of the com- mittee to a few fentiments farther. I have attended with the greatert care to the arguments which have been brought forward on both iides. 1 refped the charafters of the gentlemen who advocate the amendment ; their arguments have itruck me with confid^rablc force, and induced nie to tread A-ith caution. Sir, the tfHcacy of your government may depend upon the deterarnation of this houfe refpeft- ing the prefent queftion. For my part I fliall certainly attend to the terms of the conftitution in making a decifion ; indeed I never wiih to fee them departed from or conllru- ed, if the government can poifibly be carried into eft'td in any other manner. But 1 do not agree with the genile- Uien, that congrefs have no right to modify prii;cij)les efla- blilhed by the conUitution ; for, if this doctrine be true, we have no bufinefs here. Can the conditution be exe- cuted if its principles are not modified by the leg.flature. A fupreme court is eftablilhed by the conititution ; but do gentlemen contend, that we cannot modify that court, direcSt the manner in which its fundions lliall be performed, and aflign and limit its jurifdidion. I conceive, notwiihltand- ing the ingenious arguments of the gentleman from Vir- .ginia (Mr. White), and the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Smith), that there has not been, nor can be, any foUci Y y y 538 DEBATES reafon adduced to prove, that this houfe has not power A. 1789. to modify the principles of the conftttuiion. But is the principle now in dilpute to be found in the conttitution ? If it is to be found there, it will ferveas a line to diredl the modification by congrefs. But we are told, that the mem- bers of this houfe appear to be afraid to carry the principles of the conftitution into efFeCl. 1 believe, iir, we were not fen: here to carry into efFecl every principle of the conlti- tutioa ; but I hope, whenever we are convinaed it is for the benefit of the United States to carry zny of them into eifect, we ihall not hefitate. Under thefe iuipreihons the commitee will conceive with me, that every thing relative to the ilt'iation of Morth-Carolina and Kentuckey, ought to be thrown out of the ouellion. What influence ought North-Carolina to have over this body ? 1 hey are not reprefcnted ; we are to coiilider the queftion on its own nierits, and if we iv.d it calculated to encreafe the public lecurity, we need not heikate from an apprehenfion fo un- certain, io viiionsry, as the one that has been laid before us. Having premifed thus far, I Ihall offer a few remarks upon v/hat has been advanced by the gentlemen who fup- port the motion for itriking out the claufe; and I fiiall en- deavor to ihew, even en their own principles, that this power is veiled in the prtlident of the United States, and ought to be io decided by congrefs. The prniciple of the conftitution is generally to veil the government in three branches. 1 conceive this to be com- pletely done, if vvC allow for one or two inllances, where the executive and legifiacive poweis are intermixed, and the cafe of iiopeachiiient. Thefe c?.fes I take to be ex- ceptions to a principle v.hich is ii'ghTy edeenied in America. Let gentlemen attend to what v/as iaid by feme of the conventions when they ratified the conftitution. One great objecTiion was, that the powers were not totally feparated. The fame objection is, I believe, to be found among the atnendments propcfed by the ftate of Nonh-Carolina. Now I conceive, if we do any thing to coticiliate the minds of people to the cciiffitution, we ought not to niodify the principle of the governmtijr, fo as to encreafe the evil complained of, by a further blending of the executive and legiflaiive powers, and that too upon conftrudion, when gentietren deny that we ought to uf'e conflruclion in any cafe. Kow let us take up tlie confiituticn, end ccnfider from A. 1789. Of C O N G R E S S. 539 the terms and principles of ir, in whoin this power is veft- ed. It is faid by lorr.e gentlemen to be an omiued cafe; 1 fhall taiie up the other principle, which is eaher to be maintained, that it is not an omitted cafe, and fay the power of removal is vefted in the prefident. I fnail alfo take up the principle laid down by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wiiite), at the beginning of this argument, that, agreeably to the nature