Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

a matter of conilitutional .dcttrnunaTicin and if fo, gentlemen on one tide lay, there ; is no ne.ceiljry for '.he interpretation of the legiflature upon it. Again, it is contended, that the power ot removing is incidental to the power of appointing, and necellarily con- fcqucrtial upon it. In forming the union, did it neceflarily foiiovv that the convention Ibould give the one as incidental to the other? I believe gentlenien will hardly extend their arguments fo far. Then the rule is by no means well f(^i.':;d(d; and the conOiiUtion might have given the pew er of a{)pointment fo one branch of the government, and the remrva! to another. 1 he gentienian from Virgiiiia (Mr. White) has laid do'''', n a leading principle in flie government, that here a v> general auvaorny is giantecl to one brand), every thing A 1789. Of C O N G R E S S. 531 fuhDidiiiate and neceflary to eft-cl the objeft follows of couiie. he power of creating ufiices is given to the le- i giflarure : Under thi*- general gratit, the legiflature h.n-e itUiider their fupreine dtcition to determine the whole organization, to affix the tenure, and declare the control. This right or determining arifes not from exprels words, but by natural conltrudion So the legillature may deter- : mine that an office may be held three, five, or feven years ; to be removable by the prelident, the preiident and icnace, or the legiflature, or any other perlon wiiom they luK^^ht introduce into office, merely for that particular purpoie. 1'his appears to me to be the trus; conitrnction and nnlefs ; fomething as decitive is Ihewii from the conltitucion, 1 ihall favor this opinion. I am obliged to contradicl. and would therefore afk par- don for the obfervat on it is not conceded on one tide, : though affirmed on the other, that the power of appoip.r- ing velts m any ienfe in the fenate. I he words m the conit;tution (and the argumen's have been dra^^ n ouiy from their conltruclion) lead to a different obje(!;t : It is ilu rein faid that the prefident fiiall nominaie and appoint — he words are clear. i\ow, it we take auotiitr po<ver, which is made analogoias in the fame clau(e, the power of mak.ng one contend ihai treaties are :i)3t!e by trie treaties, will any fena"e ? The words, in th:s inltance, are ; •' he :;iali have pouer, by and wiih tVe advice and confent of the fenate, to make treaties." bo the leg flat>ve po^ver is lodged in rhe fenate and houfe ot reprcleniatives yer this legiflanve ; power is txcrcifed to a certain di'gree under the n.ilucijce of the executive magiltrati But has it ever been coniider- : ed, that the [)rtl.'dent conllituies part ot the leglfiatnre ? \\ hy, therefore, \\\[\ gentlemen contend, that the influence which one branch of the legiflature has over the executive, velts that brawch with executive powers? The doctrine of the conltitutioi) is the '-everle of this. I ihall not untJer- lake to fay, that it is with more plauiibility toniended, that the power of renn)Vai is coniti tutionally in the preiident; becaufe the powers ot government being diilribuied among diitn.ft bodies, and all executive autlu-rity beiiig veiled in him, he tlierefore has it of courfe But 1 think the faft: may be as fairly inferred upon the princip'e of the eeritle- iiiaii from Virginia (Mr. VVhite) in favor of tlie [^rcfuJenP, 'v\ho expreftly nominates and appoints, as in favor ot the prefident and fenate. But thefe arguments have been held ;in in fo many points of view, that it will be a niiipence 532 DEBATES — o time farther to dwell upon them it was with anothcf A. 1789, view which i arofe. It will be agreed on all hary.Is, that this officer, without obfervmir on the fubjedt at large, is merel/ to fuppJy a na- tural inco !jpetency in man ; in other words, if we could fi rul a prelident, capable of executing this and all other bu^mefs allign^d him, it would be unnccelTary to introduce any other officer to aid him. It is then merely from neceiliiy that v/e inftitute fuch an office ; becaufe all the ducies detailed in the bill are, by tiie conftitntion, pertain- ing to the department of the cxecuiive magilb-ate. ii the queitioij refpefted the expediency, I ihould be content to aiN'ocate it on that ground; if expediency is at all to be coiilidered, gentlemen will perceive that this man is as much an in'lrument in the hands of the prefident, as the pen is the inltrument of the fecretary in correfponding with foreign courts. If then the fecretary of ioreign af- fairs is the mere inllrumerit of the prefident, one would fuppofe, on the principle of expediency, this officer ihould be dependant upon him. It would feem incongruous and abfurd, that an officer who, in the the reafon and nature of things, was dependant on his principal, and appointed merely to execute fuch bulinefs as was committed to the charge of his luperior (for this bufuiefs, I contend, is commuted foiely to his charge) ; I fay it would be abfard in the higheit degree to continue fuch a perfon in office con- trary to the Will of the prehdent, who is refponlible that the bufinefs be conduiled with propriety, and for the ge- !;£ral interefl of the nation 1 he prefident is made re- fp'onfible ; and Ihall he not judge of the lalmts. abilities and integrity of his in(tru:i;ents? Will you depend on a u)un who has impofed Uj)on the prefident, and continue him in office when he is evidently difqualified, unlefs he can be j-enioved by iuipeachment ? if this idea ihould prevail, which God forbid, what would be the refult.' bnppofy even that he Oiould be removable, by ar.d with the advice find confent of the fenate, Vvhat a wretched liiuation might Siot our public couiiciis be involved in? buppole the pre- fident has a fecretary, in wjiom he difcovers a great degree pf ignorance, or a total incapacity toconducf tlie btrfmeis he has afTsgned him ; fuppofe hnn inimical to the prelidcnt, or fuppofe any of the great variety of cafes which would be p;ood caufe for removal, and imprefs the propriety of iuch ? Hieafure flrongly on the mind of the p-rcfidenr, v^ithout iijy oilier eyiiience than what trjih in his own ideas frcr.i A. 17 89- ^^^ CONGRESS. 533 a contemplauon of rhe Uian's conikicl: and cbarjfter clay by- day : What, let nie afk, is to be the confequtnee if the le- gate are to be applied to ? If they are to do any tiimg in this bulinefs, 1 preluaie they are to deliberate, becaute they are to advife and confent if ihey are to deliberate, yoa ; put them between the officer and the prefident ; they are then to enquire into the caufes of removal ; the prelident muft produce his teftinjony How is the queftion to be in- : veliigared ? becaufe, I preiutne, there mult: be fome rational rule tor condnftin^ this bufinefs. Is the prefident to he fworn to declare the whole truth, and to bring forward fads ? or are they to admit fufpicion as teilimony ? or is the word of the prefident to be taken at all events? If fo, this check is not of the lealt efficacy in nature. But if proof is necefTary, what is then the confequence ? why, in nine cafes out often, where the cafe is very clear to the mind of the prefident that the man ought to be re;noved, the effed cannot be produced ; becaufe it is abfolutely ini- poflible to produce the neceffary evidence. Are the fenate to proceed without evidence? Some gentlemen contend not then the object will be lolt. Shal! a man under thefe ; circuuiitances be faddled upon the prefident, who has been appointed for no other pnrpofe in the creation, but to aid the prelident in perforrning certain duties Shall he : be continued, I a(k again, againit the will of the prefi- dent ? If he is, where is the refponiibility ? Are you to look for it in the prefident, who has no control over the officer, no power to remove him it he ac'ls unleelingiy or uiitaithtully ? Without you niake him refponfible, you weaken and dcftroy the ftrength and beauty of your fyllem, What is to be done in cafes which can only be known from a long acquaintance with the condudt of an officer ? But fo much has been faid on this fubjed, tiiat I will add no farther obfervations upon it. Let me afk, what/will be the confequence of ftriking out thefe words ? Is the officer to be continued duri;?g an indefinite time ? For it h^s been contended that he cannot be removed but by impeachment ; others have contended that he is always in the power of thofe who appoint him. Eur who will undertake to remove him ? Will the prefi- dent undertake to exercife an authority which has been fo much doubted here, and which will appear to be determin- ed againft him if we confent to flrikc out the words ? Will the fenate undertake to exercife this power ? I apprehend they will not. But if they ihoukl, would they not alio be 534 DEBATES A 1789, bioiight before the judges, t.: fhcw by what authority they did it ? becaufe it is ruppoled Dy one gentle nan, that the caie might go before that tpibanai, if the pretident alone removed the officer But hov is this to be done ? Gen- tlemen tell you, the man wiiu is dilplaced 'nuit apply tor a mandamus to admit him to his office. 1 douDi much if this would be adequate to thf purpofe. It vvi>uld be diffi- cult to fay whether the mandamus (hould be directed to the prefidv-ut, to the prelident and lenate, to the legiflature, or to the people, dmld ihc prelident be co npelled to an- fwer ni a civil fuit, for eKertiling the powers veiled in him by law, and by the conltituK-n i* Th; qaeilion upon ei- ther of thofe points would be involved in doubts and diffi- culty If the(e obfervations ftrike the commiitee in the fame point of light, and with the fame force as they have Ilruck my mind, ihey ^vill proceed to determine the prelent qucifion, and I have no doubt biic they will determine Mr. Lf,e. I agree with my worthy colleague (Mr. White), that the day on which this queilion (hall be decided, will be a memorable day, not only in the hiftory of our own times, but in the hiitory of mankind ;that on a proper or impro- per detiiion will be involved the future mifery or happi- nef? of the people of America. Viewing the fubject in this light, I am influenced by its importance, and vveigh with fcrupulous attention the argu.nenis wtiich induce a preponderation in cither Icale. Hitherto they appear fa- yc^-able to that decifion which accords with my fentiments t>f exjjediency and conttitutionaiity. I hope that a great niajurity of this honfe coalefce in thefe fentiments ; for I truif, upon mature reflcdion and full difcullion, the rea- foning of the gentlemen in uppoliiion will be found to be more fpecious than Iblid. My colleague has laid, that ii the principle that all pow. ers of an executive nature except fuch as are qualifieii in the couititution belong