Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

provided fo many regulations relative to it. When they directed that the judaes fliould hold their offices during good behaviour, did they not intend all others fhould be held during pleafure ? So far then from being an omitted cafe, I contend it is fully provided for by fair conftruftion of the couitirution. I mean before I fit down to fay lomething on conitrudion in general, whicii will throw light on this fentiment. Gentlemen have fuppofed that the prelidcnt may fufpend ; and liiat as he has a riglit to make a temporary appointment^^ he has alfo a right to make a temporary removal : I think he has, fo far as it correfponds with his pr wer of appoint- ment. Jt has been faid, if the concurrence of the fenate is ne- cefiary, they may refute to concur when a removal is pro- j)er. If we are to fupjiofe, that the goverr.ment caimot be executed in its prefent forn), there is no remedy for fuch a misfortune :But we are not to fuppofe it we are to pre- ; fuiiie the lenate will do their duty. You may go on with- out end in fuppofing. You may fuppofe the prelident may not do what is right you may even fuppofe this houfe ; may nor do what is ri^ht v\ hat is the conlequence ? ; why our conflitutenrs muli bear with us till they have an op- portunity of applying a remedy. But ihali we, becauir A..17B9. Of congress. 52; the fenate may do wrong, give the prefuient the po^ver to adt without them? is it contended that the prelident has any fuperior agency in this bufinefs becaufe he nominates ? We may as well contend, on the fame principle, that be- caufe this honfe has the exciuiive power of originating money bills, we may repeal a law of that nature without the confent of the fenate. It has been afkcd, whether a per- fon in the elevated ilarion of the prelident would abufe his trult ? I do not prefume he will, but I prefunie he may ; to prevent fuch evils the conftitution has wifely guarded the exercife of every power. But I would aflc, is there more danger of the fenate's abuling their truft than the prelident's his ? A gentleman (Mr. Sherman) has recurred to that part of the conftitution which fays, that congrefs may by law veft the appointment of fuch mferior officers as iliey think proper in the prelident alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments • and infers from hence, that the prelident is to cot.fider hin>felf as the head of all thele de- partments, 'i hele argusnents come from a gentleiiian whom I always hear with pleafure, on account of his found reafoningand perfpicuity ol expreflion ; but, in this cafe, I differ from him widi;ly. Who are the heads of depart- ments i We arc to have a fecretary for foreign affairs, another for war, and another for the treafury ; now, are not thefe the principal officers in thofe departments? they are denominated fuch in the bills, and in the foriner refolu- tion of the houle ; it they are, they are the heads of thofe departments. But v.'ho are the inferior cffiters ? The chief clerk, a:.-,d all others wlio may depend upon them. Thefe then are the inferior ofKcers, whofe appointment may be veiled in the refpedive heads of depariments. I would beg jult to obferve here, that the gentlemen u ho formed the conftitution feem not inclined, at all events, to give to the prelident the pov.er of appointmg even thefe inferior officers, to which is attached ibe power of removal. When I iat out with laying the conftitution is the pre- cife limits to the deliberations of congrefs, and as 1 laid fi)ineihing with refpcdt to conlhudion, it may, atfirft view, appear foinewhat mconliflent. I promifed to explain oa this head. 1 fay, fir, that whatever is granted in general terms, that whuh. is in its own nature attached to it, and neccffiry to j-eiider that grant of effeft, mult alio go with it,wiiliout pcirticuiar explanation. Without thii: principle, congrefs cculd not execute the fyfteni cf governmenE, J28 DEBATES To elucidate this point, you will obferve, that the confti- A. 1789, tiitioii vefts in the governinent the power of appoint ing fupreine and inferior judges. By natural and neceflary conftruction, therefore, the legiflature iiiay fay how many judges there IhaW be, how often and where they may hold their terms, and what their falaries Ihall be. Thefe are natural and fafe conitruftions ; but conllrudlions of every other kind are beyond the liniics of the conititution. I <hould not have troubled the coMimittee fo long but ; on a matter of lo n)nch importance^ one that lies lb heavi- ly on my mind, and for which I am (o aiixioufly c nccrned, I could not avoid exprefling my fentiments folly. I zm ftrongly impredtd with the idea, that givnig powers which are not within the letter of the conltitution, will be to the people a circuinttance of alarm and terror. I would wi/h to avoid exciting apprehenfions and therefore leave the ; poAer to the dilcretion of the chief iriagdirate ; let him exercife it, if he judges it necefTary en any occalion ; and that circuiiiftance may reconcile tiie people to it. This brings to my mind an obfervation made on legiflative con- ilruclion. I imagine the legiflature may conitrue the con- ftitution with refpecT; to the powers annexed to their de- partment, but fubject to the decifion of the judges. The lame with rega-d to the executive ; the prelident and fe-- nate may condrue the power in qneflion ; and as they de- termine refpecT;)ng the mode of re:noval, fo they may aft— but liable alfo to the decilion of the judiciary. Mr. Page. I caimot acquit myf^lf of the duty I own to my confti- tuents, aiid my own feelings, tu pafs this fubject with a (ilent vote. I recoUecl: when thisarguinent was firft brought forward, that great Itrefs was laid upon increafing the pre- lident's refponfibility. I think it had more weigiit with fome gentlemen than it deferved ; for inftead of increafing his relponfibility, i think it diminilhes it : Becaufe I holcl it an incontrovertible maxim, that the more power you give him, the more his refponfibility is Itlfened. By ma- king the heads of all the departments dependent upon the preiident, you enable him to fwallow up all the powers of government ; you cncreafe his iiifluente, and every one will be Itudious to pleafe him alone. This was never the intention of the conititution, or he would have the fole power of appointing. The framcrs of the government had confidence in the I'enate, or ihey v;ould not have com- bined thein with the executive in the performance of hie A. 17S9. Of CO N G fl ESS. ^1^ duties. The conftitutioi] aifu has coijfidf-nce in the heads of departments The prefidtiu is direds-d to have theii' : advice relative to the particular duties of their itaiions. Now, what neceifity, let nie a(k gentiemen, was there for a conititutioT'al proviliou to enable the preGdent to obtain their advice, if it was iinderltood that all fuch officers were to be the mere creatures of the prf iident, dependant upoa his will alone ? Would not I'uch a liiuation coinpj^l theiu to do every thing he direded f The claule in the conilitntion which provides^ that all civil of the United States fhall be removed frcnl officers office on impeachment for, aiid convidion of, high crimes and mifdemeanors, plainly includes all officers and cffences which it is in comeniplation to make the prefident lole judge of. I afk gentlemen then, if the claui'e in the bill is not fubverhve of the right u hich the fenate holds under this claufe of the conllitucion ? i vvouid caution rhole gentleinen, who are fo fond of energy in tbtir government, that they do not go too far, and lay the fouiidation of a future defpotifm. By this grant of power yoii lecure the prefident againft impeach- ment you fence him round with a fet of dependant officers, ; through v.'hoin alone it is probable you could coine at the evidence of the preftdtni's guilt, in order to obtain his con- vidion on impeachment. If has been ^aid, if we irrike out the words in the bill., we Jhall leave thib pov. er to the fenate. I contend, nir. chairman, that it is iafer to leave it to the preiident and fenate than to the prefident alone ; but I do not conceive that we decide the queition b\ any means 5 when we Ifrike ©ut the claufe we leave it only v^here we found it.. Some gfiitlemcn contend, that the fenate are a danger- Otis and ar.lloimtic body ; but I contend, that they area fafe and lalutary bianch of the government, reprefenting the republican legifLuures of the: individual itates, and intended to preferve the fovereignty and independence of the itate governments, which they are m.ore likely to do than the prefident, v. ho iseleded by the people at large. A popular prefident, iiiiluenced by the fentiments of his eledors, may be induced to btheve that i: would be belt for the gererai intereifc that thufe governments were deltroyed but as : long as we have that, body independent of him, and lecured in their authority, we may defy fuch impotent attempts ; they will v.atch his coiulud, and prevent the exercife oJ' ^cfpotic power j but if they are weakened^ and (tripped ©f 5:;o DEBATES thtir efTential authority, they will become weak barriers A 1789. aganlt -ihe itrides of an uiicontrolled power. If you take froin the.n their right to chtck the prelident in the removal of officers, they cannot prevent the diliniliion of a faithful lervanr, who has oppoied the arbitrary mandates of an am- bitious prelident. The principles laid down in the confti- tuiion clearly evince, that the ienate ou^ht not only to have a voice in the framing of laws, but ought alio to fee to their execution. If this claule is inferted in the bil], it v. ill excite the jealouls of the people ; and I venture to pred cl there will be a ten- told clamor for amendments to the conltitution. I myfelf Ihall nt ver be latisfied uiilefs I fee four fold checks upo:i the prelident : It will inevitably lead to the eilabliih- inent oi thofe odious prerogatives which we, by an arduous conflicl, have been endeavoring to get rid of. I not take up more o? your time, mr. chairman ; will but 1 call on the gentlemen to rcfled they nmlt lee plain- ; ly, that conferring this power, fo far from making the preiident more relVo bbie, diminifhes his rtfponllbihty,and inclines to eilablilh hnn an hidepei dtnt monarch. Mr, Sedgwick. Kohvithftanding the length of the debate, and the fa- tigue gentlemen have undergone, I ftil! flatter ni)feU that the importance of tiie fubjtc^ will entitle me to a farther induMrence however, my intention to tra\'erfe It is not, tiir- which lies bc-fore me, nor attempt a general valt field d.icuiiion, after what has taken place. M} intention at jre- fent is to remark upon two or three cafes that have particu- l.:rly ihnuk rny mind Firli, It is contended, on each fide : of the qntilion, that it is already-