Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

of ren)oval. ; This is a do-ilrine not to be learned in American govern- ments ; it is no part of the conilitution of the union. Each (late has an executive magiftrate ; but look at his j)ouers, and I believe it will not be fou;id th<it he has in any one, of necellity, the right of appointing or removing officers. In Viroinia, I know, all the great officers are appointed by the genera! aiTembly. Few if any of a fubordinate nature are appointed i)y the governor without fome modification. The cafe is gienerally the fame in the other dates. If the doctrine of the gcnclemen is to be fupported by examples, it niiiii:be by thufe brought from beyond the Atlantic ; we mnft alfo look there for rules to circumfcribe the latitude of this principle, if indeed it can be limited. Upon the principle by v,hlch the executive powers are expounded, mull the legillative be determined. Hence we are to infer, that con-refs have all legiflative powers, not exprefsly ex- cepted in in the conditation. H this is the cafe, and the prendent is invefiedwith all executive powers not except- edj I do not know rhat there can be a more arbitrary go- vernment. The prcfiJent will have the powers of the molt abfoiure monarch, and the legiflatnre all the po^vers of the mofl fovereignlegiflation, except in thofe particular inftances in which the conilitution iias defined their limits. This [ take to be a clear and necedary dedudion from the principle cm wkich the claufe in the b'l! is founded. I will n-:.'.'rit!on the exceptions, and then Jet gentleiren form their opinion of the gnveniment, if it is thus conitituted. The prelment is runitcd m the appointment of anroafLidm-Sy "confuls, judges, and all other officers, and in making trea- ties, but no further Take from him thefe, and give him : al! other powers exerciled by monarchs, and iee what they will be. There are alfo exceptions to the legillative pow er j A 1789. Of C O N G R E S 5. 523 fuch as, they n:iall not for a certain period prohibit ihe im- portation of flaves ; that direct taxes fhall be apponioi.ed in a particular manner ; that duties, imooiis and excifes Ihall be uniform ; that they Ihail grant 1:0 tides of jiohiiity, no bill of attainder ; no ex polltae'to la.v ihall be pafled ; no preference in commerce to be given ; no monty to be drawn bur by law. Thefe are the cxcej-ticns to cht leoir. lative powers. Now give them all the pouers vhich the parliament of Great- Britain have, and Nvhat kind 01 a go- vernment is yours ? 1 cannot delcnbe it. It aj.j.tars to me as abfokue and extenlive as any dtlpotifm. 1 hen we muft adhere to the limits defcribed in the conllitution If . we advance one ftep beyond its boundaries, vhere are tve to draw the line to circundcnbe our powers, or fecuie the liberties of our fellow citizens ? I underftand our fyllem ac differing in form ant! (j'irit from all other governmeijts in the world. It is in pare na- tional, and in part federal ; aud though it is more exienhve in its powers than inoit other governments, yet the c< n- grefs is not to be compared to national legiflaiures ; to thele general powers are granted, with or v^ni,out i)arti(uL'r re- fervations in favor of the rights of the people ; to ihtle r!ie genrlemen's arguments will apply, but to no other Here is no analogy, 'j^his is a government coni-iiuti d for par- ticular purpofes only ; and the powers granted to carry it intoeftecl, are fpecifiealiy enurncrated, and dilpofed among the various branches. If thefe powers are niiiifficiei.t, or if they are improperly diilnbuied, it is not our laiilt, lor within our power to remedy 1 he pcojde wiio bellowed them mud grant furiher powers, orpai.ize tiioie alre;idy granted in a more perfecl: manner, or fuifcr ironi the de- fed:. We can neither enlarge nor niodity thei;.>. Tiiis .'.as the ground on which ilie friends of governnient fuj)portcd ihe cunllitution. It was a iafe grouid ; ar.ci I venture to fay could not have been lup];cr!ed on any it other. If this principle had not been (ucceijfuHy n an- tained by its advocates m the conveniicm of the Itate iiovii which I came, the coiittitution won'd ne\erhave been ra- tified. I do not mean ^o retail the folt!i;n debates v. inch took ])lace upon this point, or the popular l-,arangnes ,n- tended to defeat us adoption, i wili only quuie the rciih- cation by the ilate of Virginia ; in which you will ddcovel; in itrong terms, the fenfe of the federal any on .tii,s fub- j jecl ; Ithe federal pariy, becauie they oew ii up. fay tyithout the interference of any ocht-j-, tjiou-h u was a 524 DEBATES claufe agreeable to both fules of the houfe. A. 1789. [The part of the ratilicacion alluded lo, was a claufe propofed as an ainendiDenc to the conltitution, to referve to the dates in- dividually the powers not delegated by the conftitution, nor prohibited by it to the Hates.] How far the ellablilhmeni of the principle which I oppofe snay tend to the completion of the union, 1 will not un- tlcrtcike to fay. 1 will only remark, that the (late of IS] orvh- Carolina has exprefled nearly the fame fenfe as Vir- ginia, with this difference onlv, that Ihe would not adopt the conltitution until Ihe was fatisfied of the eilabliihnient of this great principle, That we Ihould not by condrudlive a.6ls enlarge our powers, in order at a tuture day to fwallow up the itace governments, and with them the liberties of the people And Virginia took in my opinion the more prudent courfe ; Ihe adopted the conlfitution under a firm behef tiiat this fecurity would be obtained. 1 wouli fuggell to gentlenien the local (ituation of that ftate. It is contiguous to Kentuckey ; and, united with if, forms a territory of amazing extent, froni the Atlantic ihores to the banks of the Ohio. The people of this tra6t are m lisch a lituation that a imgle fpark from this houfe woMid kindle a flame which it would be difficult if not im- pol'ible to extinguifh, and excite fuch a dread as would re'id.M- ihcm utterly irreconcileable to our government. This is not a vain icar or apprehenfion. 1 he oppofers of the cuiUfitution farmed tiieir arguments upon it. They cciiieiided that tfie conlUtution was defective, that you would go beyond it and make coniiruv'tions in your favor, and a^Vume powers which the people never intended to grant. My appr.eheniions therefore are not more chimeras of my own invention ; I hope ihey are ill-founded, and may be contradidcd by the event. The mealiire propofed, I acknow ledge, is advocated by refpeiftable and knokvn friends to the union within thcf'e doors, and by many without. But I believe much of this r>rifes froii the claule in queftion, conferring the power on a jnan w hom all the world admires, and w hum they know will never abufe it. .Bur on this occalion, I would forget who is prelident ; yet I would not forget that the woiff of pre- cedents are often effabtiihed in the bed of times. We may «Tive a power to a particular man in office, bccaufe he will not fjbnfe ic ; btit we cannot take it away from his fucceflbrj vvho usay be dilpofcd to make an ill ute of it. I do not f,7fi.an IQ infer froai Um, that if the confliiuticn had invef* A. 1789. O F C O N G R E S S. 525 ted thepower in the preTident, it would be dangerous or improper that he ihould have it. I do not deternine this quettion or give an opinion upon it ; becaufe it is unnecelTa- ry to decide it, the true queltion before lis being {imj ly a conltitutional one. Without entering into the evils which may arife, as gen- tlemen on both lidts of the houfe.have done, let us con- fider whether greater evils will not arife from our ex- plaining the pondituticsn at thislime ; if fuch events as I have apprehended fliould arife from our attempt to exer- cile an unconltitutional authority, it would more than coun- terbalance any poiTiole good that tan reiult from our deci- fion within a moderate period of time, l^nt is there any necefiity for the mea'ure ? If the cunltitution has given this power to the preiidene which lome gentlemen fuppofe, jcannot he exercife it Vviihouc our pajnug an a<S on the iub- ject ? If the couititution has n(jt given it him, Ihall we go beyond the limits liiat are let us m order to extend it to bim ? I hope nor, Bu it leems a difficult point to deter- mine whether he has or has not this power by the conftitu- tion becaufe fome gentleinen couter.d he has, others that ; he has not. Why need we be toncerned to determine this point ? It will be better to leave tlu conltrucftion to liimfelf, if it ihould beconie necefTary to exercile this authority, let him coniider his powers. 1 will venture to fay the oc- calion for the exercife of it, will be a better comment on the conllitution than any v. e can give ; it will better ex- plain it to the people, and more perfedlly reconcile it to ihcm than any law frou) the leglflature. It would be better for the prelident to exttnd his pow- ers on iome extraordinary occafions^ even where he is not ftrictly juftified by the conliitution, than the legiflature iiioqld grant an improper power to be exercifcd at all times. I believe there is not ati executive power but which goes rtt foiTie times beyond the i\r\d letter ot the law. But a partial evil is Cciiier fuftained than a general one. I will re- late an example. In Virginia, when the operations of the war required exertions of' the chief magdlrate beyond the authority of the law, our late governor NeHon, whofe name nmlt be dear to every friend to liberty, was obliged to iflue his warrants and imprcfs fupplies for the army ; though it was v.ell known he exceeded his authority, his "tvarrants were executed, his country was benehted by this relblute meafure, and he himfelf afterwards indemnified by the legiflature. This correfponds with the practice midcr 526 DEBATES every limited fyovernment. A. 1789. AnJ although I do not wifh toencoura|Te acls of ihis kind, I fay it \voiiid be better for the executive to allume the exercil'e of fiicha power on ex- traordinary occafions, than for us to delegate to him autho- rity to exerciCean extraordinary power on all occafions. Some gentlemen have luppofed that the conltiLution has made no provifioa for the reinoval of officers ; and the}/- have called an omitted cafe, or defed:. it They afk, if we may not fupply that defect? I fay in general we n.ay not ; for if we can affume tke right of fupplying defcds and making alterations, we may go on and make the con- ftitution juit what we pleafe. But as a further anfwer, I fay, it is not an omitted cafe ; for the conltitution having direded by whom oificers fliall be appointed, it does di- redalfo by whom they fhall be removed. But that doc- trine was fo well fupported yeflerday by the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Stone), that I need not add any thing on that head, and I will not trouble the conmiittee with repetitions. This muft have been in the contempla- tion of the gentlemen who formed the conftitution. Is it probable they never thought about the manner in which an officer Ihould be difplaced when they