Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

it implies that powers which are exj)refsly given liy the conftitution, would have been in the prclidMit with- put the exprels grant. 1 alk the gentleman^ if the conili' 5i8 DEBATES A. 1789. tution hsd been filent with refpcifl: to his exercifing the power of granting reprieves and pardons, whether the prelident would have th^t authority ? 1 apprehend it is in ibme degree an executive power. It is exercifed by fome of the executives even in the United States ; but there have been great doubts about the exercife of it in others. It has been f.iid in fonie of them, that as this conllitution did not give it, the governor has no right to it ; and this they prove by ihe'conllitutions of other itates, in which an exprefs grant is made. For inftance, the conftitution of MafTachufetts declares that the Governor fliall have the power to grant reprieves, &c. but if it had not been gi- ven him, he would not have had it. If the convention v»'ho framed the conllitution meant that he Ihould have the power of removal, the propriety of inferting it mufl have occurred to them, where it is faid he ihould have power to fee rhe laws faithfully executed, and he Ihould coramif- fion iall ofHcers 5 there are other places in which it would v/ell come in. As it muft have occurred to them, and they have omitted it, I take it for granted they never intended to oive it to him. 1 apprehend, if he faw an officer miihehaving he v/ould tranfmit the neceffary information to us, and leave us to de- termine, whether the perfon fliould be impeached or not ; and the bufmsfs could in my judgment be fatisfaflorily ac- complii'iied in this way. From all thefe reafons, there will be no doubt but the conllitution does not give the power ; that the legiilature ought not to fupply its defecls ; and that even if it were a matter ol doubt, we ought by no means to interfere in adjuiting or determining it. I'herefore, in whatever point of view you confuler it^ the claufe ought not to Hand as parr of the bill. Mr. ViNiNG. i am extremely folicitous, Mr, chairman, that this claufe Ihould Hand as part of the bill ; and therefore muit beg to add a few words more in its fupport. I take this power to be necefl'ary, lir, to the execution ol your government. In vain do wecontempj'ate the wifdomof a legillative branch, in vain do we expect the energy of the executive arm, and in vain will be the integrity and independence of thejiidi- ciary, if one deparim&Ht- after another is to be ftripped of its budding pov.'ers". The branches will not expanvi their umbrageous and falutary verdure to iht;lter our iqns from the teinpelt of calamity, nor delight them with the fair fruits of good government^ for \\hich they- are in anxious expec- A.17S9. Of C O N G R E S S. pg tation. have liilencd, fir, with ft me degree of avidity T to the arguments cfFtred on this fubjed. 1 find the point of txpedier.cy and refponfibility is acceded to, and the quelliun nov/ turns upon the ccnftitutionality of the mea- fure. Here, fir, I agree with gentlemen, it does turn on the conlhudlion of the coriftitucion ; and to my mind the conftrudion which we give is irrefilHbly true. Does the conftitution lay fuch a conftruftion ftall be given? I afk gentlemen, dues the conflitution, does reafcn, does ex« pcrience, does any one principle upon which good govern- ment deper.ds, deny cur conffrudion ? I believe not one of them. W hat kind of a monfter this will be I do not pretend to fay ; whether it will have two heads, three heads, or four heads as gentlemen contended but I will be bold to fay it is a ; moniter of a peculiar enormity ; for gentlemen are putting liie heads where the tails fhould be, or rather niaking it without any head at all. If we do rot permit the prefi- dent to exercife this power, lurely this will be the moft unreafonable thing in nature. The arguinent of convenience is flrong in favor of the prefident ; for ihis man is an arm or an eye to hirn, he fees and w rites his fecret difpatches ; he is an inftrument over which the prefident ought to have a complete com- mand. I hope gentlemen, who requeft us not to be daz- zled with the fplendor of the prefident, will not them- felves he mifled by the brightnefs of fenatorial dignity, and fuffer officers to fkulk out of the prefident's enfeebled reach within the eifiilgence of their lullre, which is moft likely to lay the foundation of univerfal empire over the liberties of the people. If the preiident removes a valua- ble officer, w hith Teems to be the great danger the gentle- man from South-Carohna (Mr. Smith) apprehends, ic would be an a^l of tyranny winch the good fenfe of the nati.^n woulii ne^'er iorget ; but if the lerate turns out a good man, they mig.u be re-eleiled by the Rate legilla- lures. But the fenate n.ay remove a good officer witnout feeling any it jury ; they are rot feelingly fenfible of the advantages aritiiig from his labours, becaufe they do not act in concert with fr.m, while the prefident, by fuch a remo- mova), deprives hiiiiftif of a valuable and necefiary aid. When a go^d officer is obtained, the prefident has every n>oiiveof jufticc, and public good to retain fclf-interett, him in his lituntion. 'Xone of thefe motives operate, or bat faintly opeiate, upon the fenate. jflo Does DEBATES A. 17^9. the conftitution any where fay the prefident fliall not have the power ? It does not. But the principles of the conllitution declare, that the kgiflative and executive departments l]iall be kept diltindr. An exprels declaration of this kind is fought for as an amendment to the conltitu- tion ;and would gentlemen be lo weak as to confound them in the firll operation of government ? It has been afked, if the tame properties are notrequifite in removing a man from office as to appoint him ? I appre- hend a difference in the degree of information neceffary. A man's ability may be known to many perfons, they may en- tertain even a good opinion of his integrity ; but no man, wiikont a fuperintending power, can bring this fidelity td the tclir. The prefident will have every opportunity to difcover the real talents and honedy of the officer, the fenate will have none but from common fame; How then are their properties equal. The departn)ents of foreign afF.drs and war are peculiar- ly within the powers of the preliJent, and he mull be re- fpunfible for them ; .but take away his comptrolling power, and upon what principle do you require his refponiibility. The gentlemen fay the prelident may I'nlpend. They were aflced if the conftitution gave him this power any more than it gave him the power of removing. Do they contend the one to be a more inherent power than the other ? if they do not, why ihall it be objeded to us that we sre making a legiftative conftruftion of the conftitution, when they are contending for the lame thing ? I look upon it as begging the queftion, to fay the power that appoints, muft likewile remt)ve. The poiition ought to be proved. For my part I think wiiere the refponiibility is, and where the power of overfeeing and comptrolling re- iides, that there alfo muft be the power of removal. If the conftitution does not prohibit the exercife of this power, I conceive it to be granted either as incidental to the executive department, or under that claufe which gives to conprefsall pov. ers nectllary ai'd proper to carry tin- con- Itit'jtiun inti» effect. This being the cafe we are at liberty loconilrue, from the principles and expreilions of tlfe con- ftitution, where this power relides. This, I truft, is w hat •we are about to do; and after the full difcuHion which the lubjecl has had, 1 flatter myfelf ^ve (hall do it with a degree of unanimitv, which I molt ardently wi!h. On motion, the committee now rofc, and the fpcaker refuiv.ed the chair* A. 178(7; Of C O N G R E S S; pt Another member, viz. George Matthews from the flats of Georgia, appeared in the houfe, and took the ojitb to fupport the conftitution. — Adjourned. June 18. A petition from Mr. Frazer, late of the continental army, praying a compenfation for his fervices, was read. A meffage from the fenate, by Mr. Oils their fecretary^ Was received, informing, that the fenate had paffed the tonnage afl, with amendments. The houfe then v/ent into a committee of the whole, on the bill for eftablifhing the department of foreign affairs. The queflion on ftriking out the words, " to be removed by the prelident/' Itili under confid-ration. Mr. White. This queftion, complicated in its nature, and interefling in its confequences, has occafioned a ferionsand folenin de- bate J although fome gentlemen have thought it lb clear in its nature, and trivial in its confequences, as to excite 'm them furprife at its being brought a fecond time under the confideration of the houie. Formy own part I confider it as the molt important quelfion that has yet come before ths legiflature of the union ; I am fure it is the moft importans queltion I ever had a voice in difeuilhig. or a vote in de- termining, except that of adopting the conftitution itfelf in the convention of Virginia. 1 confider the day, cm which the fenfe of the houle is on this fubje(5t, uS a to be taken memorable day iu the annals of America. I do not confi- der the queltion is limply, whether the power of removing the great officers of the government jhall be vefted in ths prelident, or the prefidenc and fenate ? The conllitution has determined that point. do not confider it a queltion I before us to determine, whether offices are to be held du- ring good behaviour, or during the pleafure of thofe who appoint them ? I fuppofe, on a fair and necefTary conitruc- tion of the conltitution, that matter is alio feitled- All thefe arguments, therefore, tending to Ihew, thnt the one or other mode of appointment or removal is proper or im- proper, or that they ought to be difpatched by impeach- ment, are inapplicable to the prefent cafe but the refpeft* ; ability of the characters who fupport' thefe argoiii'jnts entitle them But I Ihull pafs over them, to fome refpeft : and proceed to enquire, whether we may grant to otbcrS;, or aiTume to ourfelves, powers which the conltitution has iiot given, either in exprefs terms, or by neceffary impiiea- U VJ M 522 tion. DEBATES X.iyZij, This I conceive to be the true qaeftion ; and it is A qneftion of the im,;)orrance which ha^ been Itated, Ic is not contended, that the power which this bill pro- pofes to veil, is given to the preiident in exprefs terms by the conftirution ; or that it can be inferred from any particular clanfe in that iuftrn nent ; it is fought tor from another lource, the general na ure of executive power. It is on this principle the claufe is advocated, or I miitake the arguinenrs ur^ed by my cjlleague (Mr, Madifon) It was fa'.d by ihac gentleman, that the tonllirution having in- veitcd the preiident witli a genera! executive po.v cr, thereby all tho(e pow' rs were velted which were not exprefsly ex- cepted and therefore he pofieflTed ihe power