Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

they have been more fuccefsful in their refearclies iiito that inftrumenr than I have been. If they are willing to allow a power of luipending, it muft be becaufe they conitrue fomc part of tiie conftitniion in favor of fuch a grant The conftruftioti : in this cafe mull be equally unwarrantable. But admitting it proper to grant this power, what then ? When an officer* is fufpended, does the place become vacant? may the pre- lident proceed to fill it up ? cr mull the public bulineis be hkewile fufpended ? When wc lay an officer is fufpendedj, it implies that the place is not vacant ; but the parties may be heard, and after the officer is freed from the cbjeftions T t ; 514 DEBATES that have been taken to his condue^, he uiay proceed to ex- A. 1789, ecute th: duties attached to him. What would be the con- fequence of this? If the fenate, upon its meeting, was ta acquit the officer, and replace hiai hi his ftation, the prefi- dent wo lid then have a man forced on him vvhoni he con- fidered as unf^iif-hful and could not, confirtent with his ; duty, and a proper rcrarcS to the general welfare, go fo far as to entrult him with full communications, relative to the bufinefs of his denartiiient. Without a confidence in the executive department, its operations would be fubjeft to perpetual difcord, and the adminiltration of the govern- ment become impratT:icahIe. Bur, fuppole rhe fenate to be joined with the prefident in the exercife of the power of removal, what mode will they proceed in? ISball the prflident always propofe the removal, or fhall the ftnate undertake this part of the bunnefs ? If fo, how are they to aT: ? There is no part of the conibniiion which obliges the prelident to meet them, to flare his reafons for any meafure he may recommend : Are they to v ait upon the prelident? In Ihort, it appears to HiC^ that introducing this clalhing of the powers, which the conitiiutinn has given to the executive, will be deilruc- tivc of the great end of government. So far will redrair.ing the pov/ers of that department be from producing lecurity to the liberties of the people, that thty would inevitably be fwaiiO'Aed up ir/ an ardlocratic body. The anien.iiment which I propole will be to this eiTedl; (it will have t'o come in i'on\e other part of the bill) that, '^ whenever the faid otncer iball be removed by the prefi- dent,*' and It-ike out thewords " to be removable by the preiideu,; " Pvlr. Emith (of South-Carolina). The i^rentleiiscn by their arguments in favor of the claufe in the bill, iliew us what ought to be, rather than what is, in the coniiitution but I do not think this the ground on ; which this queiiion Ihould be coritended. I think, if the pov/er !s not found in. the conltitution, we ought not to l>rant it. I am forrv to t;-^];e up tlie time of the connnittee at this late hour of the day ; but I cannot denyvnyfelf the privi- le;i-c of replying lo fome of the arguments which h.ave been urged in oppolition to thofe i have advanced. I mean to do this in as fummary a manrier as I poliiblv can. It has been inferrtd from the clauie in the coniiitution, declarnuy the judges to hold their ciiices during -^ood be- A. 1789. Of C O N G RE S S. s^5 haviour, that there are no other officers who hold their offices by this tenure. Now, I a;)preherid, thai thisclaulb was inferted to diltinguilji them from othtr officers who hold their offices during a litnitcd period For example, : the huufe of reprefentacives for two y'=ars, tlie {euate for fix, the prefident and vice-prefident for four ; and, in order to prevent the legiflaiure from declaring thar they Ihould be eleifted during a limited pericd. it v. a;- lecn to be pro- per to have them independent ; and that could only be fe- cured by fuch a declaration in the conllitution ; it v orilJ be improper that they fiiould depend on this hcufe for tne degree of permanency which is ellential to fecure the inte- grity of judges. With refpecl to the other offices to be eftablllhed by law, nothing to prevent us fro-n li- rlier-e is miting their appointment to two or three years. Let us th.en limit the duration of the fecretary of foreign aftairs, for as fliort 3 period as is thought to be lalutary. Here we are not reftrit^ed. But I conceive as the conllitution nov/ ftands, they cinnot be removed in any other v. ay but by impeachment. Another gentleman in his arguments has declared as his opinion, that in fact the prefident has ihe power of appoint- ment ; a:.d infers from that, upon the general principle that thofe who appoint niyy remove, that the preiident has the power of removal alio. But ii appears extraordinary, ihat the gentlemen who have urged the great fecurity ariiing from an appointment from the prefiden: and I'euate, flioulJ now conrtud that the prclJdeni alouchas ihat pow- er ; if this is true, where is that boafted fecurity ? It has bscu fuid Slfo, that chc fame reafon v.hich applies againft giving this power to the prefident, appiits againft vefting it in the fenate bat I da nor think ihc^y apply with ; equal force. On this poiiit I need only refer gentlemen to [he authoriiy 1 quoted befcM-e. Fubiius ihev.'s dearly the fuperior advantage ot.haviiig the prelideuL and fenate combined in the exercip: of this power. It is contended that the legiflaiure have the pov^-cr of fupplying the defect_, if iliis is an omitted cafe. I cannc; be of that opinion. But ic is unnectlTsry 10 extend this argument, after what has been urged by tiie gentleman from MafTachufeits (Mr. Gerry). Ifihe legin.iture can lu]5ply defects, they may virtually repeal the conlrituticn. Gentlemen fay we ought no: voluppofe fuch au abqfeof power in the preiident. But ihe cuniti-iuiion Vviiely truards again'l his c::price in the appointment ; and why li;ou'd we 5i6 DEBATES abate the fecurity in cafes of removal ? A. 1789, The cor.ftitutioa contemplates infirmity in the chief magiftrate ; makes him removable by impeachment ; and provides the vice-preti- dent to excrcife the office, upon fnch a contingency taking place. B It it is fuppofed that the prefident may be im- peached for an abufe of this power. How can that event take place ? He will lell you he thought it incumbent on Jiim to d)fplace the officer, becanfe he apprehended the pubiick tranquility was in danger ; and if he erred, it was the en or of the head, not ot the heart. And will any lioufe of reprefematives ever be found to impeach the chief jnagiitrate of the United States for an error in opinion ? It was oofervcd that it wt^uld be inconvenient, as the fc- jiare were not always in feffion. Tlie fame objedion lies againft aiTociating the fenate with the prefident in making treaties. If this is an inconvenience, it is impofed upon us by the confticution, and muit be fubmitted to. If he finds the advice of the fenate ncceffary in either cafe, he mull convene them to obtain their afiiitance ; they are neither of them likely to happen frequently the inferior olnxrs may ; be regulated by law, leaving the heads of departments only i'ubjcctto the operation of this power. The gentleman from Connedlicut (Mr. Sherman) feemr ed to think this officer might be conlidered as an mferior officer, and therefore fubjed to legiilative direi5lions ref- pectiiig his appointment and removal ; becaufe the prefident is the cjiecutive head of the departmei-it, and ihis officer is only to aid the prelident- Some gentlemen have I'poken of a two-headed monger in the o-overnment : but I think in this view weflialllind the executive a three-headed n)on[ter, 4 3"cal cerbcrns. 'i'he refolution upon which this bill is foun- ded comprifed three heads of departments ; if thefe are appendages to tlie executive, what kind of a moni'ler do you form ? arid yet your conititution admits ihcfe officers to be beads of departments. it has been faid, that the legifiature may give their opi- nion on the conthtution. I agree with gentlemen if they mean that as an individual, we njay give our'dngle opini- on ; bij- I never can admit it to be right in nur legidaiive capacity to ii^fluence the judges, ;:nd throw our weight inio tiithrr fcale to warp their decifion. I think it liighly cri- llfnial to attcnpt to bias their judgment in any \\ ay. It was laid, that (here was niore dangei" in coniinning a bad man in office than in dilphicing a good one ; and that rlistpi^dicutio}! feemcd to fuppofe thij;^ by giving the hppf^ A. 1789. Of C O N G R E S S. 517 of reprefentatives the power of removal. grant there I is more danger in one cafe than in the other ; but 1 am afraid the prefident will have it in his power to continue a bad man in office and this part of the argument I believe has ; not yet been touched upon ; I lliall however be concife in my obfervations. it is declared in the conditution, that judgments, in cafes of impeacliment, may extend to removal fro.n office, aiid difquahiicarion to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trult, or profit under the United States. !bup- pofe it in contemplation to remove. forne creature of the prefideni's by means o^ impeachment, in order to dilmifs him from all his euiploymeuts, and to prevent his ever thereafter difieminaiing poifon through the councils of his country ; if the impeachment is pcrnntted to lucceed, the ])Gifou is renjoved, and the nation rid of hiin. But fuppofe the prelident fnacches him from his late, by interpoling his authority, laying, you co ;.j)lain of the man, I will fave you the trouble of proceediiig by that circuitous route of im- peachment, I will remove witiiout luch delay. By this collufiou the wretch'i fame is in fome nicafure prefcrved j and when the ]n*efident has waited till the llorm of obloquy has ceafed to blow, and the public mind has returned to a tranquil (late, he obtrudes the inan again into office, when, in fact, he ought ever to be difqualiiied from panieipating in any thing honorable or proliiable which the government has to beltow. Thus th.n may be accoinplillicd the evil which is moil 10 be dreaded, and which the hcnorable gen- tleman from Virginia (Mr. Madifon) fays the cr)nftitution meant to guard againft, by giving the houfe of reprefenta- tives tJte power of trying impeachments. ' An honorable gcntlen^an has laid, he did not fee how tiiis cafe could be brought before a court of juftice in order T.O obtain their decilion. That acntlemen is no ilranper to a jult and venerable law maxin:, Wherever a man has a right he has a remedy ; if he fufFers a wrong he can have a redrels ; he would be entitled to damages for being de- prived of his property in his office. One of the greatcif arguments brought forward on this occaiion is, that this authority is implied in the grant of executive authority which is made in the onilitution the — executive power Ihall be veiled in the prelideut. "i his I apprehend proves too much, and therefore proves nothing; becaufe