Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

Itrike out theclaule. In Great-Britain, there are three effates, kings, lords and coumions ; neither of thefe can be reprefeuted by the other; but they conjointly can form conffruflions upon the rights of the people which have been obtained fword in hand from the croan. Thefe, with the legiflative acfjts, torm the Britiih conftitution ; and if there is an omit- ted caie, parliament has a right to make proviiion for it. But this is not the cale in America, conliiting of a hngle eltate The people have exprefsly granted certain powers : to congrefs, and they alone had the right to form the con- ilitution ; in domg fo they dire^^lcd a particular mode of making amendments which we are not at liberty to depart from. The fyftem, it cannot be denied, is in many parts obfcure ; if congrefs are to explain and declare what it fliall be, they certainly will have it in their power to make it v\hat they pleafe. It has been a Itrong objedion to the conilitution, that it was remarkably oblcure nay, fome have gone lb ; far as to allert, that it was {iudicully obfcure, that it might be applied to every purpole by congrefs. By this very 510 DEBATES A. 1789, adl the houfe are afluming a power to alter theconftitution. The people of Amer'ca can never be fafe, if coiigrefs have 3 right to exercii'e the power of giving conltrudions to the conftitution duTtreiit from the orignial inftruiuent : Such a power wouid render the nioil iinportanr claule in the conltitution nugatory, and one without which, I will be bold to fay, this fyltem of government would never have been ratified. If the people were to find, that congrefs meant to alter it in this way, they would revolt at the idea ; k would be repugnant to the principles of the revolution, and to the feelings of every freeman in the United States. It is faid, that the power to advife the prefident in ap- pointing officers is an exception to a general rule ; to what general rule ? That the prefident, being an executive offi- cer, has the right of appointing. From whence is this general rule drawn ? Not from the conftitution nor from cuftom, becaufe the ftate governments are generally againll it. Before the gentleman had realoned from this general rule, he ought to have demonflrated that it was one ; he ought to have fliewn that the prefident, ex officio, had the power to appoint and remove from office ; that it was necelTarily vefted in the executive branch of the gorern- nient. It is faid to be the duty of the prefident to fee the laws faithfully executtd, and he could not difcharge this truft without the power of removal. I ailc the gentleman, if the power of fiifpcnfion, which we are willing to give, is not fufficient for that pnrpofe ? In cafe the fenate fhould not be fitting, the officer could be fufpended, and at their next feflion the caufes which require his removal might be enquired into. It is faid to be incumbent 011 us to keep the departments dillind. I agree to this ; but then, 1 aik, what depart- iiieni is the fenate of, v.hen it exercifes its power of appouit- ment or removal ? If legiflative, it ihows that the power of appointment is not an executive power; but if it exer- cifes the power as an executive branch of government, there is na mixing of the departments ; and therefore the gentleman's cbjeftions fall to the ground. The dangers which lie againfl inveifing this power joint- ly in the fenate and prelideot have been pointed out ; but 1 think them more than counrer-balanced by the dangers arifmg from invefling it in tiie prefident alone. It was laid, that the community would take part with the injured oificer agr.inft the prefident, and prevent his re-ekctipn. I -A. 1789. Of congress. 51V admit that the injured officer may be a man of influence and talents, yet it is fifty to one againlf him, when he is oppofed by fuch a powerful antagoi.ift. It is faid, that if the fenate fliould have this power, the government would contain a two headed monfter ; but it appears to me, that if it con- firts in blending the power of making treaties and appoint- ing officers, as executive powers, with their legiflative powers, the fenate is already a two-headed monifer. If it is a two-headed monfter, let us preferve it a ccnfiitent one ; for furely it will be a very inconliftent Oionfter, while it has the power of appointing, if you deprive it of the power of removing. It was faid, that the judges could not have the power of deciding on this fabjeft becaufe the con. ftitution was filent but I allv, if the judges are ex officio, ; judges of the law ? and whether they would not be bound to deJare the law a nullity, if this claufe is continued in it, and is inconfillent Nsith the conflitution ? There is a claufe in this fyftem of government that makes it their duty, I allude to that which authorifes the prelident to obtain the opinions of the heads cf departments in writing ; fo the prelident anil fenate may require the opinion of the judges refpediiig this power if they have any doubts concern- ing It. View the matter in any point of light, and it is utterly impolFible to admit this claufe, both ufelefs and unne- it is ceilary, it is inconfiffent with the conftitution, and is an officious interference of the houfe in a bulinels which does not properly come before them. We expofe ourfelves to moffc dangerous inno\ations by future Jegiflatures, which may finally overturn the conltitution itfelf. Mr. Benson. The queilion has been Ifated as refpefting a conftruftion of the conifitution and it has been afktd, how this mean- ; ing is be determined ? I fuppofe a legillative conftruc- to .tion is to be admitted, as I conceive there mufl be given, generally, to the government the power of removal at pleafurc becaufe it cannot be rationally intended that all ; offices fhould be held during good behaviour, becaufe the conltitut oii has declared one office to be held by this tenure. If then the conifitution intends that all other offices fhall be held during will and pleaiure, the queifion will be, du- ring who's ? If we declare in the bill that the officer fhall be rcQiovabte by the prelident, it has the appearance of conferring the pov. cr upon hiin. Now, I thmk this im- proper ; becauie it v. oulJ be admitting the houi'e 10 be pof- 512 fefled DEBATES A. i/By,, of an authority vliich would deftroy thofe checks and balances which are qatuioLidy introduced into the con-, itirurion, to orevent an ain.al'raniation of the lesriflative and executive powers. For this reafon I (hall take the hberty of iubuiicting an aheiation, or change in the manner of , expr^^ilion, that lo the law may be nothing more than a deciaration of our ieniiraents upon the' meaning of a con- ftitutional grant ol power to the pielident. Can the she gentleman be ferious who tells us, that tliis is a cafe to be prcpofed as ian a.mendinent to the conltitiition ? does he .Cuppofe \vhenever a doubt arifes in this houfc (and it will be a doubt if an individual doubts) with refpec^ to the inean- in?Tof any part of tlie conftnution, we muit take that mode ? or does he really fuppofe that we are never to take any .part of the conlhtution by contlrucl:ion ? This I conceive to be altogether inadmiiuble ; for it is not in the tompafs cf human wildom to frame a iyltem of government lo mi- jiuteiy but that a coaiirudlion will in fonie cafe be necelTary,, This is ihch 2 cafe and we oughf- molt afi'uredly lo declare ; our fentfinerus on the uccaiion. L will not repeat what has been faid to prove that the true coiillruflion is, that the prefident alone has the power «f removal ; but will Itaie a calc to ihew the embarrailnjent \»kicii axuft arife by a combination of the fenacorial and Icr giilame. authority in, this particular. I will inltance the which the ,bill relates. tj-fficer to To him will neceflarily be corwciutted i/eaociations with the minifters of foi ei'jn coErEs. "^ iiis i^ a very dedicate trult. 1 he lupreme exe- tmove officer, in fuperintending this departuKijt, nisay be eraiLasigSed with ilii'picions of a very delicate nature, rela- iiv-eio ike tranfaclions of the officer ; aad luch as from ciroamilanees would be injurious to name ; indeed he may be fo litaaeed that he will not, cannot give the evidence of hiis tiu^icion, I'sow, thus circumitanccd, fuppofe he Ihould propose to the lenate to remove the fecretary of foreign ailkjrs, are we to expect the ienatje wiU, without any reafon ,tjfMig aSigiTCil, implicitly fubmit to his propofuion ? I'hey wiii iMi. Suppofe he ihould lay he fufpecled the man's fi- tficK'ty, they would fay we mu(i proccecl farther, and know the reafous for this fufpicion ; they would infift on a fiUl coanjniiiincation. Is it to be fnppofed that this man will jiot Jbave a ftagle friend in the fenate who will contend for a fair cnsl and full hearing ? The pielident then becomes t\ie plaintiir', and the fecrerary the defendant. The fenate are fittiafr lujudi^men!; bctwecui the chief magiftrate of tl>.e: A. 1789. Of congress. 511 United States, and a fubordinate officer. Now, I fiibmic to the catidor of the gentlemen, whether this looks like good government? yet in every inllance when the preli- dent thinks proper to have an officer removed, this ablurd fcene mu(t be difplayed. How much better, even on prin- ciples of expediency, will it be that the prelident alone have the power of removal. It has been warmly contended, that the power of removal is incidental to the power of appointment. It may be true in general; but, upon examination, we ihallfind there is a diltindlion in this cafe from what the general principle fuppofes. If the prelident and fenate are to be coniidered as one body, deliberating together on the bufinei's of ap- pointiiaents, every individual of which participates equal powers, the realbning that has been urged will hold good. But I take it for granted, that they are twodiftincll bodies, and can only give a lirnple affirmative or negative : No member of the fenate has power to offer an original .propolition. In ihort, the moment we depart from this iimple idea, that theprovifion in the confHfution isintend?d for any other purpofe, but to prevent t!ie prefident from mtrodncing improper perfons into office, e Ihall find ic 'v\ difficultto form any certain principle upon which they ought to aft and our opinions and deliberations will be ; difcordant and di drafted. Gentlemen afe, will not the power of fnfpending an of- ficer be fufficient to prevent mal-conduft? Here is fome inconliltency in their arguments. 1 hey declare, that con- grefs have no right to conftrue the conltitution in favor of the prelident, with relpeft to removal yet they ]^,ropcfe ; to give a coPiftruftion in favor of the power of iulj[.enlIoij being exercifed by him. Surely gentlemen do not pretei.d, that the prefident has the power of fufpenfion granted ex- prefsly by the conlfitution ; if they do,