Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

the power which makes the appointment. I agree that if nothing niore was faid in tlis conftituiion than that the prefident, by and with the advice and confent of the fenace, fl:iOuld appoint to office, there would be great force in faying that the power of removal refuited by a natural implication from the power of appointing. But there isano- ther part of the conltitution no lefs explicit than the one on which the gentleman's dodrine isfounded. it isthatpart which declares, that the executive pov.er fnall be veiled in a prehdent of the United Stare*. The aflbciation of the fenate with the prelident in exercifing that particular func- tion, is an exception to this general rule ; and exceptions to general rules, I conceive, are ever to be taken ihictly. But there is another part of the conftitution which inclines in my judgment, to favor the conltruClion I pur upon it the prefident is required to take care that the laws be faith- fully executed, if the duty to fee the lav.-s faithfully ex- ecuted be required at the liands of the executive magiftrate, it would feem that it was generally intended he Ihouldhave that Ipecies of pov/er which is neceifary to accompliih that end. Now if the officer when once appointed, is not to de- pend upon the prefident for his official exiftence, but upon adiftinct body (for where there are two negatives required either can prevent the removal), I confefs I do not fee bow the prelident can take care that the laws be faithfully executed. It is true by a circuitous operation, he may ob- tain an in)peachment, and even without this it is pofhble he may obtain the concurrence of the fenate for the pur- pofe of difphcjng an officer; but would this give that fpe- cies of control to the executive magiltrate which ieems to be required by the conltitution ? I own if my opinion was not contraiy to that entertained by \vhat 1 fuppole to be the minority on this queftlon, I Ihould be doubtful of being miftaken, when I difcovered how inconijltent that con- fcruction would make the conilitution with itfelf. I can liardly bring myfelf to isnagine the wifdoin of the conven- tion v.'ho framed the conituution, contemplated fuch in- congruity. .'i here i^ another, jpwxim ^yhith ought to dired us in ex- 502 DEBATES A.iyBxj. pounding the tonrcitinion, and is of great importance. It is laid tlown in molt of the conltitutions or bills of rights in the republics of Aincrica, it is to be found in the politi- cal writings of the moil celebrated civilians, and is every- where held as eflisntia! to the prefervaricn of liberty. That the three great departments of government be kept fepa. rate and diitinft ; and if in any cafe they are blended, it is in order to admit a partial qualification in order more ef- fectually to guard againfl an entire confolidation. I think, therefore, when we review the feveral parts of thisconfli. tution, when it fays that the legiflative powers ihall be veiled in a Congrefs of the United States under certain ex- ceptions, and the executive power vefted in the prefident V ith certain exceptions, we mufl fuppofc they were in- tended to be kept feparate in all cafes in which they are not blended, and ought confequently to expound the con- flitution fo as to blend them as little as poffiole. Every thing relative to the merits of the queflion as dif- tinguiflied from a conllitutional queilion, feems to turn on the danger of fuch a power vefted in the preiident alone. But when I confider the checks under which he lies in the exerciie of this power, i own to you I feel no apprehen- fiqns but what arife from the dangers incidental to the power itfelf ; for dangers will be incidental to it, veft it where you pleafe. I will not reiterate what was faid be- i'ore with refped to the mode of eledion, and the extreme iniprobability that any citizen will be felecTiftd from the mafs of citizens who is not highly diflinguiHied by his abilities and worth ; in this alone we have no fniall lecurity for the taithful exercife of this power. But, throwing that out of the qOellion, let.us conlider the rellraints he will feel after lie is placed in that elevated llaiion. It is to be remarked, that the power. in this cafe will not confift fo much in con- tinuing a bad man in office, as in the danger of dil'placing a good one. Perljaps the great danger, as has been obferv- ed, ofabufe in the executive power, lies in the improper foniinuance oi bad men hi offi.e. But the power we con- tend for will not enable him to do this ; for if an unwor- thy man be continued in office by an unworthy preiident, the hotife of reprefentatives can at any time impeach hini, and the ftnate can remove him, whether the prehdcnt chufes or not. The danger then conllits merely in this, the preiident can difplace from office a man whole merits require that he ihoulu he continued in it. What will be the iiiotives which tfce prefident c^n ieeliot inch abufe of hi<( II. 1789. Of congress; 50J power, and the reilraints that operate to prevent it ? In the firft place, he will be impeachable by this houfc, before the lenate, for fuch an act of mal-adniiuiltration ; for I contend that the wanton removal ot meritorious cfHcers would fubjedl him to impeachment and retrtoval from his own high truft. But whac can be his motives for difnlacing a worthy man ? It mutt be that he may fill the place with an unworthy creature of his own. Can he acco^nplifii this end ? No ; he can place no man in the vacancy whom the fenate fliall not approve ; and if he could fill the vacancy with the man he might chufe, I am lure he would have little inducement to make an improper removal. Let v.s confider the confequences. The injured man will be fup- ported by the popular opinion ; the community will take fide with him againft the prefident ; it will facilitate thole combinations, snd give fuccefs to thofe exertions which will be purfued to prevent his re-eleclion. To difplace a man of high merit, and who from his ftation may be fuppofed a man of extenlive influence, are confiderations which will excite ferious refietflions before "hand in the mind of any man who may fill the prefidential chair, the friends of thofe individuals, and the public fympathy will be againft him. If this ihould not produce his impeachment before the fenate, it will amount to an impeachment before the community, who will have the power of puniilunent by refufing to re- eled hi;n. But fuppofe this pcrfecuted individual, cannot obtain revenge in this mode, there are other modes in which he could make the iituation of the prefident very in- convenient, if you fuppofe him refolutely bent on executing the dictates of refentnient. If he had not influence enough to direct the vengeance of the whole community, he may probably be able to obtain an appointment in one or other branch of the legiflature and beinga man of weight, talents ; and iiifiiieTice in either cafe, he may prove to the prefident troublefome indeed. We have I'een examples rn the hif- tory of other nations, which jullifies the remark I now liave made, though the prerogatives of the Britiih king arc great as his rank, and it is unc]ueltionably known that he has a poficive influence over both branches of the legifla- tive body, yet there have been examples in which the ap- pciiument and removal of minilters has been found to be diclated by one or other cf thole branches. Now if this is the cafe with an hereditary monarch, poflelled of thofe liigh prerogatives and furnilhed with lo many means of in- fiiience ; can we fuppofe a prefident ekclcd for four years 504 DEBATES only dependent upon the A. i78y. popular voice impeachable by the legillaturef litcleifat all diitinguilhed for wealth, per- fonal talents, or influence from the head of the department himielf ; I fay, will he bid defiance to all thefe confiderations,. and wontonly difmifsa meritorious and virtuous officer? Such abuie of power exceeds my conception : If any thing takes place in the ordinary courie of buiuiefs of this kind, my ima- gination cannot extend to it on any rational principle. But jet us not coniider the quedion on one tide only, there are dangers to be contemplated on the other. Veit this power in the lenate jointly with the prelident, and you aboiilh at once that great principle of unity and refponfibility in the executive department, which was intended for the fecurity of liberty and the public good, li' the prefident Ihould poUefs alone the pov\er of reiuoval from office, thofe who are employed in the execution of the law will be in their proper lituation, and the chain of dependence be preferved j the lowelt officers, the middle grade, and the highell, will depend, as they ought, on the prefident, and the prefideiiE on the community. The chain of dependence therefore terminates in the fupreme body, namely, in the people 5 'who wiil poffefs beiides, in aid of their original power, liie deciilve engine of impeachment. Take the other iup- politjon, that the power Ihould be veiled in the fcnate, on the principle that the power to difpUce is neceffarily con- nected with the power to appoint. It is declared by the conilitution, that we may by law veil the appointment of inferior officers, in the heads of departments, the power of removal being incidental, as itated by fome gentlemen. VVJiere does this terminate ? If you begin with the fubor- dinate officers, they are dependent on their fuperior, he on the next fuperior, and he on whom ? — on the ienate, a permanent body ; a body, by its particular mode of election, ju reality cxilting for ever ; a body pofTeflmg that pro- portion of ariiiocratic power which the conltitution no doubt thought wife 10 be ellablilhed in the fyltem, but which lome have jftrongly excepted again ff And let tne : alk gentlemen, is there equal lecurity m this cafe as in tlio other i bhall we trull the fena.e, refponfible to individual le'Tiflatures, rather than the pcrlbn who is refponllble to tiie whole community j' It is true the i'cnate do not hold their cliices for life, like arif^ocracies recorded in the hifto- ric paoc ; yet the facT: is theyWill not poifefs that refpon- libllity for the exercife of executive powers which would render it. fafe for us to vcli; fuch powers in them. But i. 1789. O F C O N (^ R E S S. 505 what an afped will this give to the executive InfteacJ of ? keeping the departments of govennuent di(tin6l, you make an executive out of one branch of the legillature you ; make the executive a two headed nionlter, to ule the ex= prelTioa of the gentleman from New-Hamplhire (Mr. Li- vermore) you dellroy the great principle of rcrponfibility, ; and perhaps have the creature divided in its will, clefeating. the very purpofesfor which an unity in me executive was inflituted. rhcfe oiijections do not lie againlt Inch an ar-. rangenient as the bill eltabliihes. conceive that tlie pre- I lident is fufficieiuly accountable to the commuiiity and if ; this power is veiled in him, it uill be yelled where its nature requires it Ihould be velted if any thing in its na- ; ture is executive it muit be that power which is employed jn fuperintendi.ng and feeing that the laws are faithfully