Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

generally to make all laws ncccffary to carry : thefe ]Hjsvers into eiiV(5t. Now, it appears to me, that tlie ereclioii of this departr.ient is expreisly v/ithin the conlli- tuticn Therefore, it icems to me, as congrefs, in their : IcgiHative capacity, have an interefl in and power over th;*  ; A. 178c). Of congress. 49?- whole tranfaclion, that they confequently appoint and dif- place their officers. But there is a provifion in the confri^ tion which takes away from us the power of appointing officers of a certain defcription ; they are to be appointed by the prefidenc, by and with the advice and confenc of the fenare ; then the conltilution limits the le'riilaturc in appointing certain officers, which would otherwife be within their power. It v/ill then become a confiderable queftion, as it has been in my miiKl, that as, in the nature of things, the power which appoints removes alfo, and as the power of appoint- ment by the conftituiion is placed in tlie prefident and fenate, whether the removal does not follow as incidental to that power ? But I am averfe to that conltruclion, as the terms of the conftitution are fufiicient to invelt the legiflature with complete power for performing its duties-; and as it has given the power of making treatias, and judging of them, to the fenate and prelident, I lliould be inclined to believe, that as they have an iumiediate concern in, and control over this bulinefs, that therefore they ought to have the power of removal. It may be faid, wirhrefpedt to foaie other officers, that, agreeable to this principle, the prelident alone ought to have the fole power of removal ; bccaufe he is interelted in it, and has the control over tiie bufiuefs thty manage : For example^ the minifter at war. I'fce prtiiuent is tlie commander m chief of the army and militia of the United States ; but the; ground is narrowed by the ienace being combined with him in making treaties though even here ag^u'n the ground ; is reduced, becaufe of tiie power combined in the whole legiflature to declare war and grant fupplies. If it is con« lidered, that congrefs have a right to appoint thefe officers^ or didate the mode by which they ihall be appointed, and I calculate in my own opinion the manner of difmilTion from the mode of appointiiient, I ihould have no doubt but we might make luch regulations as we may judge pro- per. If the conftitution had given no rule by which offi- cers were to be appointed, I Ihould fearch for one in my ovvn mind ; but as the conftiauion has laid down the rule, I coniider the mode of removal as clearly defined as by implication it can be ; it ought to be the fame with that of the apj)ointment : What quality of the human mind is ne- cefTary for the one that is not necelTary for the other ? Information, impartiality, and judgiiient in the bulinefs to be conducted, are ncccilary 10 make a good appcinimcnt R r r  ; 498 DEBATES Are not the raiiie properties requifite for a difmillion ? A. 1789, — ic appears fo to me. I cannot fubfcribe to the opinion delivered by fome gen- tlemen, that the executive in its nature imphes the power to appoint the officers of government. Why does it imply it ? The appointment of officers depend upon the quali- ties that are necelFary for forming a judgment on the merits of men ; and the difplacmg of them, inllead of including the idea of what is necefiary for an executive officer, in- cludes the idea neceflary for a judicial one ; tkerefore it cannot exilt in the nature of things, that an executive power is eirher vo appoint or dilplace the officers of govern- ment. U it a political dogma i Is it founded in experience ? If it is, 1 confefs it has been very long wrapped up iti miilerious darknei's. As a political rule, it is not common in the world, excepting monarchies, wliere this principle is elhihlilhcd, that the intereii of the (late is included in the intereit of the prince ; that Vvhatever injures the ftate is an injury to the fovereign becaufe he has a property ; in the liate and the oovernvnent, and is to take care that: nothing of that kind is to be injured or deitroyed, he be- ing fo intimately connefted with the well-being of the natiorj, it appears a point of jultice only to I'uii'er him to manage his own concerns. Our principles of government are diiFerent, and the prelident, inltead of being mafter of the people of America, is only their great fervant. But, if it arifes from a political dogma, it muft be fubjefl: to ex- ceptions, v-'hich hold good as they are applied to govern- ments which give greater or leller proportions of power to their executive. I ihall only remark that the conllitu- tion in one part of it, fo f;ir as 1 can lee, fuppofes that the prefident is the fole judge of the merits of an appointment it is very forcible to n)y niind, that the cotiftitution has euuMiied his ible appointment to the caie of inferior officers. It alio llrikes me, from the claufe that gives the prelident the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences againtl tiie United States, except in cafes ui' impeachment, that , tjie conliirution repoies a confidence in the ienate Vv'hjch in has not done in this ofiicer ; and therefore there is no good reafon for deilroying that participation of power which the fylte.m of government has given to theoi. Whether: It would be expedient to give the power of fe'nov.il 10 the prelident alone, dejvencis on this conlideva- tion ;they are both bodies ciiol'en with eqnal care and pro- priety; the people ihow as mu<h conhdence in the one as A. 1789. Of C O N G R £ S S. 49^ in the other ; the bell prefidcnt and the beft fenate, it is to be prelumed, will always be choi'eii tJiat they can get. Kfow, I would alk, in all cafes where the integrity and confidence is the lame, whether it is more likely that one man fhould do right, and exercife his power with pro- priety, than a number of men with the aid of each others, deliberations ? Is it more likely that a nur^ber of men iliould do wrong than one man ? Let us examine, lliortly, the temptations of one and the other. It would be more difficult for a majority to be obtained in a body compoi'ed of members of thirteen independent ftates, in favor of de- fpotic meafures, than might juftly be expefted from the caprice or want of judgment in a imgle individual. Is it likely the danger would be fo great? I apprehend it is not. All the difficulties and embarrairments that have been mentioned can be removed by givnig to the prelidcnt the power of fulpenlion during the recels of the lenate and ; 1 think, that an attention to the conltitution will lead us to decide, that this is the only proper power to be veil- ed in the prelident of the United States. Mr. Madison. However various the opinions which exlll upon the point now beiore u«, it feems agreed on all fides, tliat it (^mands a careful invelligation and full dilcuilion I feel the importance of the queltion, and know that our dccifion will involve the dcciiion of all iimilar cafes. The dccilioa that is at this time made will become the permanent expo- fition of the conftitution;and on a permanent expo^itit;n of the conihtution will depend the genius and character of the ?.'hole government. It will depend, perhaps, on this elc- ciiion, wiiether the government Ihall rciaiii that equili- brium v.h:ch the conltiiution intended, or take a diredion toward ariflocnuy, or anarchy among tiie members of the government, tlence how careful ought we to be to give a true diredlion to a power fo critically circmnllanccd. It is incumbent on us to weigh with particular attention the arguments which have been advanced in fuppcu't of the various opinions with cautious deliberation, i ov.ntoyou, Mr. chairman, that I feel gre-t anxiety upon thisqucflion ; I feel an anxiety, becauie I am called upon to give a deci- fion in a cafe that may affeft the i"undament.il principles c{ the gcvernmient under which we adt, and liberty iilelf. But all that I can do on fuch an occalion is to weigh well every thing advaiKcd on both fides, with the j-^ureJi dtlire to find out the true meaning of the toniUtution, and lobe ^oo jTuided by that, DEBATES A. 1789. and an attachment to the true Ipirit of liberty^ whole influence I believe llrongly predominates here. Several conftrucllons have been put upon the conftitu- tion relative to the point in quellion. The gentleman from ConnedJcut (Mr. Shermntj) has advanced a dodrine ^vilich was not touched upon before. He feems to think (if I underftood him right), that the power of difplacing from office is fubjecl to legiflative diftretion ; becaufe it ha- vinga right to create, it may limit or modify as is thought proper. I ihall not fay but at firlt view this dodrine may fee;a to have fome phufibility : But when 1 conUder, that the coniVitution clearly intended to maintain a marked dif- tiniflion between the legiflative, executive, and judicial powers of government ; and when 1 confider, that if tiie legiflature has a power, fuch as contended for, they may fubjecl, an4 transfer at difcretion, powers from one depart- ment of government to another; they may, on that prin- ciple, exclude the prelident altogether from exercihng any authority in the removal of officers ; they may give it to the fenate alone, or the prefident and fenate combined ; they may veft it in the whole congrcfs, or they may re- ierve it to be exercifed by this houfe. When I conuder the coiifequences of this doclrine, and compare them with the true principles of the coniliiution, I own that I cannot fubftribe to it. Anotber doclrine which has fouii-i very refpedable friends, has been particularly advocated by ihe gentleman from South-Carolina (Mr. Smith). It is this; when an olEcer is appointed by the prefident and fenate, he can on- ly be difplaced from malfeafance in his office by impeach* ment : I think this would give a liability to the executive department fo far as it may be deicribed by the heads of departments, wh'ch is more inccnspatible wuii the genius of republican governments in general, -and thisconititution in particular, than any dot5];riue which has yet been propo- I'ed. The danger to liberty, the danger of mal-adm:nillra- tion has not yet been found to lay fomuch in the facility of 'introducing improper perfons into office, as in the difficul- ty of difplacing thofe who are unworthy of the public truft. if it i« ia'd that an officer once appointed fintll not be d;f- placed without the formality required by impeachment, I riiali be glad 10 know what fecurity we have for the faith- ful adriiiniliration of the government. Every individual in the lou*"- chaiii wU-'ch extends froiji the hiffhcft to the low.  ; A. 1789. Of C O Nf G R E S S. 501 eft link of the executive magilhacy, would rind a fecurily in his iituation which would relax his Hdelity and prompti- tude in the dilcharge of his duty. The dodtrine, however, whicli feems to ftand moH: in oppo'ition to the principles I contend for, is that the pow- er to annul an appointment is in the nature of things inci- dental to