Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

cefl'or ? Js it likely tliac they will confent to advance an improper charader ? The prcfumption therefore is, that he would not abufe this power ; or if he did, only one v>,ood man would be chaijged for another. If the prelident is divelted of this power, his refponii- bility is deilroyed ; you prevent his efficiency, arid difable him from alfording that fecurity to the people which the conftitu.tion contemplates. What ufe will ii be of, to cail the citizens of the union together every four years to ob- tain a purified choice of a reprefentaiive, if he is to be ^ jinere cypher in the government ? The executive muit acl by bijhers'; \ijxi you reduce him to a mers iiiadqw,^ wh?.u yoLy  , ^.1789- Of C O i\ G R E S S. 493 .controul both the power of appointment and removal ; if you take away the latterpower, he oughc to refigii the power of fuperhitending and diredtuig the executive parts of government into the hands of the icnaie at once, and then we become a dangerous ariitocracy, or ihail be more deftitute of energy than any government on earth. Thefe being my fentiments I wifli the claule to Hand as a 'legidative declaration, that the power of removal lb tonlii- tutionally veited in the prefident. Mr. Page. After fo much has been faid, 1 Ihould not prefume to trouble the houfe with my fentiments, but tliat i feconded the motion. I do contend it muft appear 10 every perfon who reads the conftitution, without hearing the ingenious explanations that have been made, that the claufe in the bill is unconftitutional. How is it to be reconciled to the claufe which relates to impeachments, or the claufe veiling the appointn)ent in the prelident, by and with the advice and content of the fenate ? But independent of thefe confiderations it muft appear improper. 1 venture to aflert, that this claufe of the bill contains in it the feeds of royal prerogative. If gentlemen lay fuch ftrefs on the energy of the government, I beg them to conlider how far this doclrine may go. Every thing which has been iaid in favor of energy in the executive may go to the de- ilruclion of freedoiii, jind eftablilh dcfpotifm. This very energy fo much talked of, has led many patriots to the Ba- ifile, to the block,' and to the halter. If the chief magi- ilrate can take a man away from the head of a department vviihout afligning any reafon, he may as well be invelted with power, on certain occaiions, to take away his exilteiue. But will you contend, that this idea is conionant with the principles of a free government, where no nun ought to be condemned unheard, nor till after a folemn conviction of guilt on a fair and impartial trial. It would, in my opinion, be better to fufFer for a time the mifchief ariling from the conduct of a bad officer, thanadmit principles which ^youId lead to the elfabliihment of del'potic prerogatives. Gentlemen may be, and no doubt are, actuated by honell motives in fupporting this claui'e ; but 1 lament them as laboring under a fatal error which may ruin their country. There can be little occafion for the prefident to exercife this power unlefs you fuppofe that the appointments v.-iil be made in a carelefs manner, which by no means is likely to be the cafe ; if then you have a good officer why IhoukI he 494 DEBATES be inaJc dependent upon the will of a (ingle man ? A. 1789. Sup- pofe a colonel in your army flioalci difobey his orders, or cowardly flee before tlje enemy, what would the general do ? would he be at liiierty to difmifs the officer ? no, he would fufpend him until a court martial was held to decide the decree of guilt. If gentlemen had been content to fay th3t the prciident might fuCpend, I ihould fecond their motion^ and afterward the officer might be removed by and with the advice and confeut of the fenate ; but to make every officer of the government dependent on the will and pleafure of one man, will be vetting fuch arbitrary power in him as to occalion every friend to liberty to tremble for his country. 1 confefs it Teems to me a matter of infinite concern, and I fliould feel very unhappy if I fuppofed the ciaule would remain in the bill. Mr. Sherman. I confider this as a very important fu^je*^ in every point of view, and therefore worthy of full difcullion. In my luind it involves three queftions. Firft, whether the pre- fidenfhas by the confiitution the right to remove an officer appointed by and with the advice and confeut of the fenate ? I\o gentleman contends but the advice and confent of the lenate is neceflary to make the appointment in all cafes, un- lefs in inferior offices where the contrary is eftablilhed by law, but then they alledge that although the confent of the lenate is neceffary to the appointment, the prefident alone by the nature of his ofiice has the povv-er of removal. Now it appears to me,' that this opinion h ill founded, be- caufc this provilion was intended for fome ufeful purpofe, •jnd by that conftrudlion would anfwer none at all. 1 think the concurrence of the fenate as neceflary to appoint an officer as the nomination of the prefident ; they are confli- tuted as mutual checks, each iiaving'a negative upon the otlicr. I confider it as an eriabliflicd principle, that the power which appoints can alio remove, unlefs there are exprefs exceptions made. Now the power which appoints the judges cannot difplace them, becaufe there is a conftitu- nional reffrittion in their favor ; otherwife the prefident, by and wiih the advice and confent of tlie fenate, being the }X)wer which appointed them, would be fufncient to re- move them. This is the conftruflion in England, where the king had the power of appointing judges it was de- ; clared to be during pleafure, and they might be removed \vhen the u)oiiarch thought proper. It is a general priiici-  — A. 1789. O F C O N G R E S S. 495 pie in la\v as well as reafon, that there fhould be the fame authority to remove as to eftablifh. It is ib in legiflation ; where the feveral branches whofe concurrence was necef- fary to pafs a law, mull concur in repealing it. Juft i'o I lake it to be in cafes of appointment ; and the prelident alone may remove when he alone appoints^ as in the cafe of inferior offices to be eftabliflied by law. Here another queftion arifes, whether this officer comes within the defcription of inferior officers ? Some gentle- men think not ; becaufe he is the head of the department of foreign affairs. Others may perhaps think that as he is employed in the executive department in aid of the preli- dent, he is not fuch an officer as is underftood by the term heads of departments ; becaufe the prelident is the head of the executive department, in which the fecretary ol^ fo- reign affairs ferves. If this is the conftruclion which gen- tlemen put upon the buHnefs, they may veil the appoint- ment in the prefidenc alone, and the removal will be in him of confequence. But if this reafoning is not admitted, we can by no means veil the appointment or removal either in the chief magiilrate alone. As the officer is the mere creature of the legiflature, we may form it under fuch re- gulations as we pleafc, with fuch powers and duration as we think good policy requires ; we may fay he Ihall hold his office during good behaviour, or that he ihall be annu- ally elecled ; we may fay he Ihall be difplaced for neglecl of duty, and point out how he fliould be convided of it without calling upon the president or fenate. The third queltion is, if the legiflature has the power to authorife the prefident alone to remove this officer, whe- ther it is expedient to invert hiui with it ? I do not believe it is ablolutely neceffary that he ihould have fuch power ; becaule the power of fufpending vvould anfwer all the pur- pofes which gentlemen have in view by giving the power of removal. 1 do not think that the officer is only to be re- moved by impeachment, as is argued by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Smith) ; becaufe he is the mere creature of the law, and we can d-recl him to be removed on ccnvic^tioii of mifmanagenjer.t or inability, without calhng upon the fenate lor their concurrence But I believe if we : make no fuch proviiion, he n)ay conftitutionally be remo- ved by the prelident, by and with the advice and confenc of the fenate, and I believe it would be moft expedient for Lis to fay nothing in theclaufe gn this fubject.  4(>5 DEBATES Mr; Stone. A. i/Sf;. 1 think ic necefTary, Mr.\ chiiirman, to determine the qucfhon before us : I do not think it would do to leave ic the determination of courts of law hereafter. It fholild be our duly in cafes like the prefeut to give our opinion on the confbuclion of rhe conftitution. Wlien the qdeOion was bronght forward I felt unhappy, becaufe my mind was in doubt hut (ince then I have de- ; lilxrrarely reflected upon it, and have made up an opinion perfeftly fatisfadory to myfelf. I confider that in general every officer w ho is appointed be removed by the llionld power that appoints him It is (bin the nature of things. : The power of appointing an officer arifes from the power over the lubjeft on which the officer is to aiSl It arifes : from the principal wlio appoints having an intereft in and a right to conduct the bulinefs, which he does by means of an agent therefore this officer appears to be nothing more ; than an agent appointerl for the convenient difpatch of bu- finefs. i'his is my opinion on this fubjecl, and the prin- ciple will operate from a minilter of ftare down to a tide waiter. 1 he conftitotion, it is adr.iitted by every gentle- man, recognizes the principle Becaufe it lias not been de- : nied, whenever general appointments are in<ide under the conltitntion, that they are to be at will and pleafnre ; that where an appointment is made during good behaviour, it is an exception to the general rule, there you limit the exercife of the power wliich appoints ; it is thus in the cafe of the judges. Let us examine then, whence originates the power of congrefs with refpeft to the officer under confideration. 1 preiume it is exprefsly contained in the conftitution, or clearly deducible from that inllrument, that we have a right to ered the department of foreign affiiirs. No gentle- man will confent to a redudion or relinquifhment of that power. The conltitution has given us the power of laying and collef^ing taxes, duties, impoils and excifes ; this in- cludes the power of organizing a revenue board. It ^ives us power to regulate commerce ; this includes the power of ellablifuing a board of trade. To make war, and orga- nize the miiitia this enables us to edablilh a minilter at ; war And