Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

ture to Ipeak their fenle upon thule poiius on which the' conltitution is filent. 1 believe the judges will never de- cide that we ar'e guilty of a breach of the conltitution, by declaring- a iep-iOative opinion in cafes where the conltitu- tion is iitent. If the laws IliaU be in violation of any part of the conltitution, the tudges will not helnate to decide ^galiill them j where the power is incident to the govern- ment, and the conlfitution is {Uent^ it can be no impedi- iirent to a legillative grant ; 1 held it necefiary in Inch cafes to ujake provilion. In the cafe of removal the con- ftitution is filent ; the wifdom ot the legiflature Ihould therefore declare in what place the power relides, Mr. J ACKSON. rvltich time, Mr. chairman, has been taken np in difcnf- fing this quellion ; but conlidering its importance, I truft no complaint will be made on this account. Although 1 am ai ail times unwilling to trefpafs on the committee, I cannot fit ilill and pals this fubjed with a lilent vote. As a conftitntional quelnon, it is of great moment, and wortliy of fwii diicuinon. I am, lir, a friend to the full exercife of al; the powers of government, and deeply iiDprtfitd with the nectility there exiits of having an energetic exe- cutive. Bur, friend as I am to an efficient govtrnmtnt, I value tJre liberties of my fellow citizens beyond every oth^r conridetacion ; and where 1 find them endangeicd, lam vviL:ng ta iore^o every other blefiing to fecure them. I  f4. i;89. Of C b N G R E S S. 485? I hold it as good a maxim as it is an old one, of two evils fo chufe the lead. It has been mentioned, that in all governments the exe- cutive matriftrate had the power of diimilling officers under him. This may hold good in Europe where monarchs claim their powers jure divine, but it never can be admit- ted in America under a confUfution delegating only enu- merated powers. It requires more than a mere ipli dixit to demonftratc that any power is in its nature executive, and confeqnently given to theprelident of the United States by the prefent conltitution ; but if this power is incident to the executive branch of government, it does not follow that it vefis in the prefident alone, becaufe he alone does no*: pcflTefs a!! execntive powers. The conftitution has lodged the power of forming treaties, and all executive bufinefs, I prefume, conneded therewith in the prefident, but it is qualified by and with the advice and confent of the fenate, provided two- thirds of the fcnate agree therein ; the fame has taken place with refpeft to appointing officers. From this I infer, that thole arguments are done away which the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Madifon) ufed to prove, that it was contrary to the principles of the conlti- tution that we fhould blend the executive and legiflative powers in the faiTje body. It may be wrong that the great powers of government fhould be blended in this manner, but we cannot feparate them, the error is adopted in the conrtituiion, and can only be eradicated by weeding it out of that inftrument ; it may therefore be a proper fubjeft for amendment when we com© to coniider that bufinefs again. It has been obf erved, that the prefident ought to have this power to remove a man when he becomes obnoxious to the people or difagretable to himfelf ; are we then to have all the officers the mere creatures of the prefident ? Ihis thirft of power will introduce a treafury bench into the houfe, and we fhall have miniftcrs obtrude upon us to govern and direft the meafures of the legiflature, and to fnpport the influence of their malier : And Ihall v\e efta- bliih a different influence between the people and the pre- fident ? fuppcfe thefe circumfiances muit take place, be- 1 caufe they have taken place in other countries. 1 he exe- cutive power falls to the ground in England if it cannot be Supported by the parliament ; therefore a high game of cor- ruption is played, and a majorit}' fccured to the miniflry by ^he i;trodui5tion of nlacemen avid penlioncrs. 490 DEBATES The gentlemen have brought forward arguments drawn A. 1789* from poifibiruy. It is faid, that our fecretary of foreign may become unfit for his office by a fit of lunacy, raid, aft'dirs therefore a filent remedy (liould be ajjplied. It is true foch a cafe may happen, but it may alfo happen in cales where there is no power of removing. Suppofe the prefidenc ihould be taken with a fit of lunacy, would it be poffible by fuch arguments to remove him? 1 apprehend he mull remain in ofHce during his four years. Suppofe the fenate fliuuld be feized with a fit of lunacy, and it was to extend to the houfe of reprefentatives, what could the people do but endure this mad congrefs till the term of their election expired ? We have feen a king of Great Britain in an ab- folute of lunacy, v\ hich produced an interregnum in the fit government The lame may happen here v/ith refpeft to : our prcfident ; and although it is improbable that the ma- jority of both houfesof congrefs may be in that fituation, yetit is by no means impoifible. But gentlemen have brought forward ancther argument with refped to the judges ; it is fliid they are to hold their offices dr.ring good behaviour: lagree th.it ought to be the cafe. But is not a judge liable to the act of God as well as any other officer of govern:nent ? However great his legal knovv^^Iedge, his judgment and integrity, may be taken from him at a ic (troke, and he rendered the mod unfit of all men to fill fuch an important office. But can you remove him? Not for this caufe, it is impoffiblc ; becaufe madnefs is no treafon, crime, or mifdemeanor. If he does not chufe to refign, like lord Mansfield he n)ay continue in office for 90 or 100 years, for fo long have fome men retained their faculties. B»t let me a(k gentlemen if it is pollible to place their officers infuch a lituation as to deprive them of their inde- pendency andfirujuefs ; for I apprehend it is not intended to flop with the fecretary of foreign affairs. Let it be re- membered that the coniiitution gives the prefident the command of the military. If you give him comj)lete power over the man wilh.thtt itrong box, he v.'ill have the liber- ties of America under his thumb. It is eafy to fee the evil which may refult. If he wants to eftablilh an arbitrary authority, and finds the fecretary of finance not inclined to fecond his endeavors, he has nothing more to do than to remove him, and get one appointed of principles more congenial with liis own. Then, fays he, 1 have got the army, let me have but the money, and I will eftablifii my throne upon the ruins of your vifion:;ry republic. Ltt A. 1789. Of congress. 491 no gentleman fay I am contemplating imaginary dangers, the mere chimeras of a heated brain. Behold the baleful influence of the royal prerogative ! all officers till lately held their commiffions during the pleafure of the crown. At this moment fee the king of Sweden, aiming at arbi- trary power, (hutting up the doors of hisfenate, and com- pelling by the force of arms his ihuddering councillors to acquiefce in his defpotic mandates. I agree that this is the hour in which we ought to eftablifli our government ; but it is an hour in which we fliould be weary and cautious, efpecially in what refpedls the executive magiftrate ; with him eveiy power may be fafely lodged. Black indeed is the heart of that man who even lufpeds him to be capable of abufing them. But alas he cannot be with us forever ; ! he is liable to the vifciflitudes of life ; he is but mortal, and though 1 contemplate it with great regret, yet I know the period nuifi; come which will feparate him from his country ; and can we know the virtues or vices of his fuc- ceflbr in a very few years ? may not a man with a Pandora's box in hisbreafl come into power, and give us fenlible caufe to lament our prefent conifidence and want of forefight ? A gentleman has declared, that as the conftirution has given the povvcr of appointment, it hasconfcquently given the power of removal. I agree with him in all that the conftitution exprefsly grants, but I mull differ in the con- flructive realouing. It was faid by the advocates of tliis conllitution, that the pcv.'ers not giver, up in that inilru- jnenf, were referved to the people : Under this im- jireflion it has been propofed as a favorite amendment to the conftitution, that it Ihouki be declared that all powers not exprefsly given fliouki be retained. As to what gen- tlemen have faid of its giving fati>:faction to the people, I deny it : they never can be pleafed that we ihould give new and extraordinary powers to the executive ; we nmft confine curfelves to the pdwers dcicrihed in the conftlt'i- ti-on,and the moment we pal's it we take an arbitary ilride toward a defpotic government. The gentleman from. New-York (Mr. Lav.i-ance) con- tends that the prcfident appoints, ai-d therefore he ought to remove. I Ihall agree to give him the fame j)ovver in cafes of removal, as he has in ajjpointing ; but liothing more. Upon this principle, I would agree to give him the power of fufpenfion during the recefs ot the fenate. This in my opinion would efTcdlually provide againfl thofe in- conveniencies which have been apprehended ; avid not ex-  492 DEBATES pofe the government to the abufes we have to dread from A. i7'6.j. the wanton and uncontrolled authority of removing officers at pieafare. 1 am the friend of an energetic governmenc ; but while we are giving vigour to the executive arm, we ought to be careful not to lay the foundation of future ty- ranny. For my part 1 mult declare, that I think this power too great to he fafely truiied in the hands of a ftngle man ; efpecially in the hands of a man who has fo much conftitutional power. I believe if thofe powers hati been more contradted, the fyltem of government Vt^ould have been more generally agreeable to our conliituents that is, -; at prefent it v/ould conformmore to the popular opinion at lead. For my part, though I came from a iiate where the energy of government can be ufeful, and where it is at this moment wantins:, I cannot a^ree to extend this power ; becaufe I conceive it may at fome future period be exercifed in fuch a way as to fubvert the liberties of n;y country, and no coujideration Ihall ever induce me to put. them in jsopardy. Jt is under this imprellion that I liiail \X)ic d:cidc:d!y againlt the claufe. , Mr. Clymer, If I was to give my vote merely on coi;i{{;itutional ground, Ihonld De totally indiiFereut whether the words 1 were flr.uck out or not; becaufe I am dear that the exe-, rutive has the power of removal as incident to his depart- rient, an4 it the confticution had been fiieiu with refped: to the appointment he would have had that pov/cr alio ; The realbn, perhaps, why it was mentioned in the conltitution, was to give lome further fecurity agaiiift the intro(iucT:ion of improper men iiito office. But in cafes ot removal there is nor luch neceiTity for this check. V/hat great danger V oa'd arile fronj the removal of a worthy tiian, when the f ;n>ue mti't be confuked in the appomtnient of his fuc>