Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

judges ihali hold their offices during good behaviour. Th'b ifuplies that other officers Ihall hold their offices du- ring a liaiited time, or according to the will ot i'oine per- fon ; becaule if all pcrfons are to hold their offices during goud behaviour, an»l tc be removed only by impeachment, thv;;i ilns |. articular dec'arat'on in fav r of the judges vi'ill be uieieis We are told rha an officer mull n<iibf:have btf'jre he tan be removed This is true with re/pect to thofe offivfrs who hold thtir comMiifTions during good beha- viour ; but it cannot be true of thofe who are appointed during piealure, they may be removed for incapacity, or, if ihcir want of integriry is lulpeded ; but the queftipn is to hnd it^ here this power of removal refides. It has been argiied, that we are to find this in the cDn^ flru(5};.oij anliiig from the nature of the authority which appoints. Mere I would meet the gentlemen if it was neceflary to relt it entirely 01 that ground. Let me. alk the gentlemen, who aj)poiius ? Ihe conititution gives an fidviforypower to the feuate, but it is conlidertd that the preiident makes the appointment. The appointment and fefponlibility are adlnally his ; for it is exi»rtfsiy declared, that he fhall nominate and appoint, though their advice is reqii'red to be taken. If from the nature of the appoint- ment we are to col!e(fl: the authority of removal, then I fay the laittr power is lodged m ihe prefident ; becaufe by the conJtitntion he has tiie power of appointment ; inltantly as the it^nate have adviftci the appointment, the iift is re- quired to be executed by the prefident. The language is '^ He Ihail nominate, and by /and with the advice explicit : and confent of ihe I'enate, appoint ;" fo that if the gentle- men's general principle, that the pov/er appointing fhali — remove aUo is true, it follows that the removal is to be by tbe preijdcnt It has been (fated as an ohjeftion, that we iliould extend the powers ot the prtlideut if we give him the power of re lioval and we are not to cnnlfrue the conltitution in ; inch wav as to enlarge the executive power to the injury ot any orner ; that as he is limited in the power of ap. poiinment by the control of the lenate, he ought to be e.'qn.^lly limited in the removal. If nhere js any ''a eight in this argument it applies pj A. 1789- Of C O N G R E S S. 485 forcibly againft verting the j^ower toi joinily in the j;re- fident and lena.e ; becaule if v. e are not to extend the powers of the execunvi beyovd the exprefs detail of du- ties found in the conllitutiMi, neiilicr are we at liberty to extend the duties of the iennte r-tyond thole precife points iixed ni the fame inihuiiunt ; ot gi'urfe if we caniiot fay the prtfident alone Ihail len'jove, we cannot fay the [.refi- dent and fenate may extrvile fuch power. It is admitted that iht ioi'iiirution is {jlent on this fub- jecl ; but it is aMo lileni \vi;h rtfp^cl to the appointments ithas veiled in the Irgillaiure. I he coi;iiituticn declares, that conorefs niay by iav', veft the appointment of fuch in- ferior officers as they think proper in the prelident alone, in the courts of law, or iunds of dtp^artments, yet favs nothing wtth refpd to iht ren-oval Now, let us fop- pofe the legillatnre to ha^'e veiltd the power of appoint- ment in the prelident io cafes ot itiferior officers, can the intention of the conlhtur ;on in this, conteiispiating this mode pf appoiiitment for the fake of convenience, be ever car- ried into effect If we fny ijoih tig refpectipg the renioval, : -what would be the conf qucn»e if the legflacure fliould not make the declaration ? tould it be fuppofgd that he would jiot have the authority to difmils the (fficer lie had fo ap- pointed? To be fure he coold then of courfe, in thoi'e ; cafes in which the confiicution has given the appointii',ent to the prefident, he mufi have the power of retnova! for the fake of con'.illency. jbor no perfon will fay that if the prefident ihould appoint an inferior officer he Ihould not Jiave the power to remove hitn when he thought proper,, if no particuLir limitation v.as derermined by the law. Thus ftaiids the matter w ijh refpei^i' to tiie conftitution. There is no exprels prohibition of the power nor pofitive grant. If then we collect the power by inference iVuin the cpnftitution, we fliall hr.d it poir.rcd llrongly in favor -of the prelident, much more fo than in favor ol ihe (etatc cotnbined with him. This IS a cafe omittfd, er it is not if it is cmitte4, ard ; the power is neceflary and eilential to the govcrnmenr, and to the great interelts of the United States, w ko are lo u^akc ^he provilion and fujii)!y the deleft? Certainly the tegilk- ture is the pioper body. It is declared they fliaH eitanlifli pfficers by lav/. The e^ablilhment of in offiicr iniplies every thing relative to its formation, conltituticn, and tcr« iTiination ; coufequently the congrefs are aiithorfcd to de* .cjarc tjieir judgiuent on each of thefe points. li«t if the 486 DEBATES A. 1781,. arguments of the gentleman from South-Carolina (Mr. Smith) prevail, that as the conftitution has not meditated the removal of an officer in any other way than by im- peachment, it would be an aflumption in congrefs to veil the prefident, courts of law, or heads of departments with power to difmifs their officers in any other n^.anner. Would a regulation of this kind be efFcclual to carry into efFecl the great objects of the conftitution? I contend it would not Therefore the principle which oppofes the car- : rying, of the conftitution into effed:, muft be rejected as dan- gerous and incompatible with the general welfare. Hence all thofe fuppofitions, that becaufe the conftitution is filent the legiilaturc muft not fupply the defed;, are to be treated as chimeras and illufory inferences. I believe it is pollible that the conftitution may be mif- conftrued by the legiflature ; but will any gentleman con- tend, that it is more probable that the fenate, one branch only of the legiflature, (liould make a more upright decifion on any point than the whole legillature, efpecially on a point in which they are fuppofed by fome gentlemen to be fo im- mediately interefted, even admitting that honorable body to have more wifdom and more integrity than this houfe — JSuch an inference can hardly be admitted : But I believe it feldom or ever was contended that there was more wif- dom or fecurity in a part than in the whole. But fnppofing the power, to veft in the fenate, is it more fafe in their hands than where we contended it Ihould be? Would icbe more fatisfadory to our conftituents for us to make fuch a declaration in their favor ? I believe not. With refpeil to this and every cafe omitted, but which can be colledled from the other provifions made in the con- ftitution, the people look up to the legiflature, the concur- rent opinion of the tvv'o branches, for their conftruflion ; they conceive thole cafes proper fubjefts for legiflative vVifdvohi ; they naturally fuppofe where provifions are to be made, they ought to fpring from this fource, and this fourcfi* alone. From a view of thcfe circumftances, we may be induced to meet the queftion in force. 'Shall we now venture to fupply the defefl? For my part I have no hefitation. We ihould fupply the defeat ; we fliould place the power of removal in the great executive officer of the government. In the conlVuution the heads of departments are confi- dercd as the mere aiuftants of the prefident, in the per- ibrmance of his executive duties. He has the fuperintend- A.1789. Oy C O N G R E S S. ^iy zvce, the control and the infpcdlion of their condudl ; he has an mtiinate connedlion with them ; they muft receive from him his orders and directions j they muft anfwer his enquiries in writing, when he requires it. Shall the per- fon having thefe fuperior powers to govern, with luch ad- vantages of difcovering and defeating the bale intentions of his officers, their delinquencies, their defective abilities, or their negligence, be reftrained from applying thefe advan- tages to the moft ufeful, nay in fome cafes the only ufeful purpofe which can be anfwered by them ? It appears to me that the power can be fafely lodged. here. But it has been faid by fome gentlemen, that if it is lodged here it will be fubjedt to abufe that there may ; be a change of officers, and a complete revolution through- out the whole executive department, upon the eledtion of every new prefident. I admit this may be the cafe, and contend that it fliould be the cafe if the prefident thinks it neceflary. 1 contend that every prelident ought to have thofe men about him in whom he can place tl^e mofb conn- dence, provided the fenate approve his choice. But we are not from hence to infer that chanfjes will be made in a wanton manner, and from capricious motives ; becaufe the prefidents are checked and guarded in a very fafe manner wiih refpect to the appointment of their fucceffors ; from all which it may be fairly prefumed that changes will be made on principles of policy and propriety only. W ill the man chofen by three millions of his fellow citi- zens be fucha vvretch as to abufe them in a wanton manner ? For my part I fliould think with the gentleman from Vir- ginia (Mr. Madlfon) that a chara^fter thus feleded and ho- nored by his country, is entitled to my confidence ; and I fee noreaion why we fhould fuppofe he is more inclined to do harm than good, Eleeted as he is, I truft we are iecure. 1 do not draw thel'e obfervations from the fafety 1 conceive under the prcfent adminiftration, or becaul'e our chief ma- giitrate is poflelFed of irradiated virtues, whofe lultre brightens this weftern hemifphere, and incites the admira- tion of the world 1 but I calculate upon what our n.ode of, eleftiou is likely t-o bring forward, and the fecurity which the conltitution affords. If the prefident abufes his truli, w/jU he el'cape the popular cenfure when the period which terminates his elevation arrives ? and would he not be lia- ble to impeachment for difplncing a worthy and able man, who enjoyed the confidence of the people i We ought not to cor.llder one fide alone, wefliouldcon- fider DEBATES the benefit of fuch an arrangement as well as the A. 1789. difficulties. We ought alfo to confider the difficulties ari- ling from the exercife of the power of renio/ing by the fenate. It was well ablervect by an honorable gentleman (Mr. Sedgwick) on this p int, that the fenate mult conti- nue in fellxaa the whole year, or be haitily alTembled from the extremes and all parts of the continent uhenever the pretident tlwnks a removal neceffary, Suppofe an ambaf- iador or ininiller pieiitpotentiary negotiaiing or intriguing contrary to his inllruftions, and to the injury of the United Stales, before the feiute can be a're;nblc-d to accede to his recall, the intereft of his country iray be betrayed, and riie evil irrevocably perpetrated A griat nu nbcr of iucli inftances could be enu;nerated, but i will not take up the time of the eommittee, gft'tlemen may fuggell them to theif own minds; and I imagine they v/il} be fuffii.ienr to convince them that, with rtl'pe<^t to the expediency, the power of removal ought not to be in the fenate, I take it, Mr. chairman, that it is projier lor the legifla-