Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

'What : have they done to chagrine us ? or why Ihould wc attempt io abridge their powers becaufe we can reach them by opr regulations in tlie' fliape of a bill ? I think we had better 'jet it alone. If iheconftitution has' given them this power, ' ^t'hey will reject this part of the bill, and they will exercife that one privilege judicioufly, however they may the poW- 4^0 DEBATES er of removal : If the conftitutionhas not given it to them A. 1789, it has not vefted it any where elfe ; confeqaently this houfc would have no right to confer it. On motion, the committee rofe and reported progrefs. Adjourned. June 17. The houfe went into a committee of the whole on the bill for eftablifhing the department of foreign affairs, and refumed the confideration of the claufe " to be removable by the prelident." Mr. Hartley. I was not prefent when this quelVion was firft brought before the houfe but I heard the arguments which were ; yellerday urged againll the prefident's exercifing the power of removal ; and am by no means fatisfied that they are well founded ; if no better are brought forward, I fliall be agaiift (Iriking out. It was contended by one gentleman, that the appomtment to this office was to be during good behaviour. and afl'erted by others, that the prefident had ; not the power of removal without the advice and conlent of the fenate. I mean to oiffr a few remarks on thefe pofi- tions. But firit, I would obferve, that tiiis is an office of coniiderable importance, if we are to judge by the duties .affigned in the body of the bill. In all comnrercial coun- ;tries it will require men of high talents to fill fuch an office, and great refponlibility. It is neceifary to connect the bu- linefs in fuch manner as to give the prefident of the Uni- ted States a complete command over it ; fo in whatever hands it is placed, or however modulated, it muft be fub- je6ted to his infpedion and control. This certainly is the fair conitrudion of the conilitutiou, and a practical recog- nition of the principles upon which republican goverimjentsf are founded in general, and ihis in particular. I apprehend, Mr. chairman, that this officer cannot be confidered as appointed durmg good behaviour even in point of policy but with rei'petl to the conflitutionality, ; I am pretty confidence he cannot be viewed in that light. The condiiation declares the tenure of the officers it re- cognizes, and fays one clafs of them Ihall hold their offices duriiig good behaviour, they are the judges of your fupreme and other courts but as to any other officer be- ; ing ellablifiicd on this firm tenure the conftitution islilent. It then neccflarily foHoas, that we mui\ conlider every other according to it nature, and i-egulate it in a corre- fpouding manner. The bulinefs of the fecretary of foreign i A. 17^. Of C O M Ox H E S S. 482 affairs of an executive nature, and niuft confequently bs is attached to the executive dep.irtnient. I think the genrleman from South-Carolina goes too fai* in laying, that the claul'e rtlpecting impeachii«eiits iiiiplies, that there is no other mode of reniovmg an officer. I think It does not follow, that btcaufe one mode is pointed out by the conlticuticn there is no other, efpecialJy it tliat provilion is intended for nothing more ihaii a puiiiihaitnt for a crime. The 4th fedion of the 2d article, lays, tjutt all civil officers liiall be lemoved on tonviclion of cenaia crimes. But it cannot be ihc intention oi ihc conliituiion to prevent by this a removal in every other way :Such a pr:nci;<le if once admitted, v\'Ould be attended with very in- convenient and mifchievous conlcquences The gentleman farther contends, that ev^ery man has a property in his office, and ought not to be removed but for criminal condnci ; he oiight not to be removed for in- ability. I hope this dottrine will never be admitted in this country* A man hen in office ought to have abilities to v\ difcharge the duties of it 5 il he is difcovered to be unfit, he ought to be immediately removed, bui not on principles like V. ha: that gentleman contends for. It l>e has an eitate in his office his right mult be purchalVd, and a practiie like what obtains in England will be adopted iiere 5 we fhall be unable to difmils an officer wniioUt allowing him a pen- iion for the interett he is deprived of. £>uch doctrine may fuit a nation which is (trong in proportion to the number"" ,i;f dependants upon the crown, but will be very pernicious in a republic like ours. When we have eitabiiihed an office, let the provilion for the fupport of the officer be equal to compenfate his fervices ; but never let it be fa'.d, that he has an eftate in his office when he is found unfit to perform his duties. If offices are to be held during good behaviour, it is eafy to forefee that we Ihall liave as 1; any faftions as heads of departments; the coni'equtnce \\ould be corruption in one of the great departnieni.s of govern- ment ; and if the balance is once deltroyed the conituution muft fall amidft the ruins. From this view of the fuhjed, i have no difficulty to declare, that the ieeretaiy of foitign affairs is an officer during plcafure, and not during good behaviour as contended for. One gentleman (Mr. White) holds the fame principles, but differs with relpeft to the pov\fcr v\hich ought to ex- ercife the privilege of removal. On this point ue are- seduced to a matter of conltrudlion ; but it is oi high iisw.- ^ P P 4«2 DEBATES A. 1789. porrance to the United States that a conftru6lion /hould be rightly made. But gentlemen lay it is inconfiftent with the confiirution to make this declaration ; that as the con- ftitntion is (il^nt we ought not to be explicit. The confti- turion has exprei'sly poiiiced out feveral matters which we can do, and Tome which we cannot ; but in other matters it is and leaves thcin to the difcretion of the legif- (ilcnt, latLire'. why was the laft claufe cf If this is not the cafe, the 8ch fection of the id article inferted ? It gives power rocbiigrefs to inake all laws neceflary and proper to carry the govcrn;iient inio efl'ecT:. I look upon it that the Icgiflature have therefore a right to exercife their difcretion on fuch qucflions ; and how- ever attentivery gentlemen may have exaniined the con- flitution on tlxis point, i trult they have difcovered no cjauie which forbids this houie interfering in bufinefs ne- ceflary and proper to carry the government into effect. The conltitution grants exprefsly to the prefident the power of filling all vacancies duiing the recefs of the fe- nate. This is a temporary power like that of renjoval, and liable to very few of the objections which have been made. W lien the prefident has removed an officer, ano- tlier niuil be appointed ; but this cannot be done without iii6 advice and confent of the fenate Where then is the : danger of a fyllem of favoritifm ? The president, not- wiihiianding the fuppofed depravity of mankind, will hard- ly remove a worthy ofiker, to make way for a pcrfoa whom the fenate may reject. Another reafon why the power of ren^.ovai fhould be lodged with the prefident rather tiian the. fenate, arifes from their connexion with the peojjls. The prefident is the reprefentative of the people in a near and equal manner, he is the guardian of his country. I'he fenate are the reprefentatives of the itate iegiflatures ; but they are very unequal in that repre- fentation; each Ifate fends two members to that houfe, although their proportions are as ten to one. Hence arifes a degree of infecurity to an impartial adminiflration ; bat if they pofTefTcd every advantage of equahty, they can- not be the proper body to infpcci: into the behaviour of officers, becaule they have no conftitutional powers for thi* parpofe. It does not always iinply criminality to be re- moved froai office, becauf'e it may be proper to remove for other caufes ; nciiher do I fee any danger which can refultr from the exercife of this power by the prefident, becaufe the fcr.ate is to be confuiied in the appointment whiclj? A. 1789. Of C O N G R E S S. 483 is afterwards to take place. Under thefe circumftances, I repeat it, that I have no doubt in nvy own mind tbar this office is during pleafure, and that the power of removal, vi'hich is a mere temporary one, ought to be in the prcfi- dent, whofe powers, taken together, are not very numer- ous, and the fuccefs of this government depends upon tjjeir being unimpaired. Mr. Lawrance. was pretty fully dirtuded I was in hopes, as this queltion before, the houfe would not have been troubled again witli it. But as much has again been faid in oppofition, I i])ould not feel a confcious difcharge of my duty, nnleis I offered thofe feutiraents which have forcibly inipreffed my :i;ii:d with their weight, and induced me to vote in favoui of the claufe. It has been objefted againfl this claufe, that the grar;fina of this power is unconliitutional ; it was alfo ohjedred, if it is not unconftitutional it is unnecefT^ry ; that the conlli- fution mull contain in itfelf the power of removal, and have given it to fome body or perfon of the government to be exercifed ; that therefore the law could make no difpofition of it, and the attempt to grant it vn-y unconfti- tutional ; or the law is unneceflary — for if the power .is granted in the way the claufe fuppofes, the !eg;{larurc can neither add to nor diminiih the pov/er by making the de- claration. With refpecl to the unconilitutionality of the meafure, I obferve, that if it is fo the conftitution njuu have given the power exprefsly to fome perfon or body other than the preudent ; otherwife it cannot be faid with certainty' that it is unconftitutional in us to declare that he fnail have the power of removal- I believe it is not contended th.at the conftitution exprefsly gives this power to any other perlon .; but it is contended that the cbjecftion is coiledtd from the nature of the body which has the appointment, and ihe particular claufe in the conftitution which declares that all officers ihall be removed on convidion. It will be necefRiry to examine the expreihons of that ck.ufc ; but I believe it v.'ill be found not to comprehend the cafe we have under coniideration. I fuppofe the conftitution contemplates fomewhere the power of reujoval for other caules befide thofe expreffed as caufes of impeachment. I take it that the claufe in the conftitution relpecling impeachments, is making a provifion for removal agalnft the will of the pre- lident ^ becaufc the houfe can carry the offender before % 484 DEBATES A. 1789. tr luina] which Ihall remove him notwithftandhig the de;rire o' ihc chief ina^iitrace tc keep hiin in oifice. It this is not to be ihe contiru(''tu)ii, rhen a particular claufe in the con- fticuiiou will be migarory. 1 he conftitution declares that the