Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

will .co;nc betore the iegifla- ture, and, like every other omitted cife, uuiit be fuppiieU by law. Gentlemen have faid, v. hen tlie quefiiion was formerly before us, that all powers not intended to be given up to the general government were retained. I beg gentle- men, when they ur.dertake to argue from impJication, ^o be confiitent, and admit the force of other arguments dra\vn from the fame fource. it is a leading princi;»!e iu every free government, it is a prominent feature in ths, that the legillative and executive powers lliould be kept diftinft ; yet the attempt to blend the executive and legif- lative departments in exercifnig the power of removal, is Inch 3 mixing as ought not co be carried in:o practice cr j^y6 DEBATES A. 1789. aranments grounded on implication. And the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. H' hite's) reifoning is wholly drawn from implication. He fuppofes, as the conftitution qualifies the prelident's power of appointing to office, by fubjediiTg liis nominanon to the concurence of the fenate, that the qualification follows of courfe in the removal. if this is to be coiilidered as a queflirn undecided by the conilitution, and lubmitted on the footing of expediency, jt will be well to coniider where the power can be moft ufefuily depofued for the fecurity and benefit of the peo- ple. It has been laid by the gentleman on the other lide of the hbufc (Mr. Smith) that there is an impropriety in ;illowing the exercife of this power ; that it is a dangerous authority , and much evil may refult to the liberty and pro- jjerty of the officer, who may be turned opt of bufinefs ^vithout a mament's warning. 1 take -it the queftion is not whether fuch power ihall be given or retained ; be- caufe it is admitted on all hands, that the officer may be re- moved ; fo that it is no grant of power, it raifes no new danger. If we flrike cut the claufe, we do not keep the power, nor prevent the exercife of it fo the gentleman ; will derive none of the fecurity he contemplates by agree- ing to the motion for ftriking out. It will be found that the nature of the bufinefs requires it to be condiifted by the head of the executive ; and 1 believe it will be found even there, that more injury will arife from not removing improper officevs, than from difplacing good ones. I be- lieve experience has convinced us that it is an irkfome bu- finefs and officers are 'more fr(quently continued in place ; pfter they become unfit to peiform the duties, than turned out while their talents and integrity are ufeful. But ad- vantages may relultfrom keeping the power of removal, in lerroien;, over the heads of the officers ; they will be fti- jnulated to do their duty to the fatistaction of the principal, who is to be refpcniible for the whole executive depart- jnent. The gentleman has fuppofed there wil] be great difficul- ty in getting officers of abilities to engage in tlie I'ervice of their country upon fuch terms. 1 here has never yet been ^ny {carcity of proper officers in any department of the go« venlment of the United States, even during the war w hen ; inen rifl':ed their lives and property by engaging in fuch ;j"ervice, there were candidates enough. But why fiiould v> e conned: the fenate in the removal ? their attention is ta- 4vCj) up with ether i;i)portant buUnefs, and they have hq A.1789. Of C O N G R £ S S. 477 ^onftitutional authority to watch the condufl of the ex- ecutive officers ; and therefore cannot ufe fuch authority with advantage. If the prelident is inclined toiheker hiui- felf behind the lenate with refped to having continued an improper perfon in office, we loofe the refpor.libility which is our greatefl fecurity ; the blame among fo many will be loft. Another realon occurs to nie againit blen- ding thefe powers An officer who fuperintends the pub- : lic revenue will naturally acquire a great influence. It he obtains fupport in the fenate, upon an attenjpt oi the pre- fident to remove him, it will be out of the power of the houfc, when applied to by the firft magiltraie, to impeach him with fuccels for the very means of proving charges ; of mal-conducl agamft him will be under the power of the .officer ; all the papers necefl'ary to convift him may be withheld while the perfon continues in his office Pro- : tection may be rendered for protection ; and as this officer has luch extenfive influence it may be exerted to procure the re election ot his friends. Thefe circumftances, in ad- dition to thofe itated by the gentleman from Jerley, (Mr. Boudinot) mull clearly evince to every gentleman the im- pi-opriety of connedlmg the fenate with the prefidcnt in removing from office. I do net fay thele things v/ill take efFedlnow, and if the queftion only related to what might take place in a few years, I iliould not be uneafy on this point, becaufe I am lenfible the gendemen vvho forui the prefent fenate are above cojTuption, but in future ages, (and I hope this go- vernment may be perpetuated to the end of time), luch things may take place, and it is our duty to provide againft evils which may be forefeen, but if now negle(ftcd will be irremediable. I beg to obferve further, that there are three opinions entertained by gentlemen on this fubje<R:. One is, that the power of removal is prohibited by the conftitution ; the next is, that jt requires it by the prcfident ; and the other is, that the conftitution is totally filent. It there- fore appears to me proper for the houfe to declare what is their fenfe of the conflitution. If we declare jnftly on this point it will ferve for a rule of conduct to the executive uiagiflrate ; if v.e declare improperly the judiciary will re- vife oMr decifion ; fo that at all events I think we ought to make the declaration. Nir. LlVERMORE. am for flriking out this claufe, Mr. chairman, upon I ^he principles of the conititution; from which we are not 478 DEBATES at liberty to deviate. A=i789. The honorable gentleman from Maf- fachufetts (Mr. Sedgwick), calls the miniller of foreign affairs the creature of the law, and that very properly ; betaufe the law eltabliflies the office, and has the po\\er of creating him in \vhat Ihape the legiflaiure pleaies. This beino; the cale, we have a rin-ht to create the office under fuch. limitations and reftriftions we think proper, provided we can obtained the confent of the fenace ; but it is very improper to draw as a conclulion from having the power of giviiig birth to a creature, that we liiould therefore bring forth a moniier, merely to lliew we had Inch power. I call that creature a montler that has not the jiroper limbs and features of its fpecies ;I think the creature we are forming is unnatural in its propartions. It has been often faid, that the conltitution declares the prehdent, by and wiUi the advice and confent of ihe fenace, Ihall appoint this officer. .This, to be lure, is very true, and lb is the con- clulion which an honorable gentleman (Mr. While) frotn Virginia drew from it, that an officer mult be difcharged in the way he was appointed. I believe, Mr. chairnian, this question depends upon a juft conttru61ion of a ffiort claule in the conltitution, •' The prelident Ihail have power, by and with the advice and confent of the Sena'e, to appoint acubafladors, other pub- lic jniniliers, and confuis, judges of the fuprcme court, and all other officers of the Unued States." Hei-e is no diifcrence wiih rtfpedl to the power of the prciident to make treaties aiid appoint officeis, only i^ requires in the one cale a larger majority to concur than in the other.' I \\'\\\ noi by any means fiippofe ihat geiiileii;en mean, when they argue in favour of removal by the prefident aUuie, to con.temj-late. the extenlum of the power to the repeal of treaties ;becaufe if ihey do, there will be little occafion for us to lit here. But let me afk thefe gtn lemen, as there is I'.o real or imagir.arv dilfin.'^ion between the ap- pointment of ambailador* and minifters, or fecreiaries of fo- reign affairs, whether they mean that the prelident Ihould have the power of recalling or difcardmg amballadors and military oiiicers, for the words in the conltitution are " all other ofH^ers"'---tis well as he can remove your fecretar)' of foreign affairs. To be lure they cannot extend it to the judges ;' becaufc they j^re fecurcd under a fubfequent arti- cle,, vihich declares they ihall hold their offices during good behavior ; tiiey have an inheritance wliich they cannot be «i':vclLed of, but on convidion of feme crime. But T pr.t^  - A. 1789. Of C O N G R ESS. 479 lume gentlemen mean 10 apply it to all ihofe who have noc an inheritance in their offices. In this cafe, it takes the whole power of the prtfident and feiiare to create an offi- cer but haif,Lhe power can uncreate him. ; iLurtly a law pafled by the whole le-giflaiure, caniiot be repealed by one branch of it fo I conceive in the cafe of appointment's it ; requires the.Jaai^Jprcc.tp.fupercede an officer as t^ put nil in omce., :,...,:*-+,, ,,.. ,,, ,,„fj .,,:. . i m;,| I acknowledge "that tlie claufe r'eli^ti've to impeach'iiienr, is for the bencBt of the people ; it is intended to enable their reprefentatives to bring a bad officer to juftice, who is fcreened by the prefidcnt ; but I do i;!ot conceive with, the honorable gentleman from Sonth-Carplink (Mr. Smith), -that It by any means excludes the ulual ways of fupeirceding .officers. It is laid in the conllitution, that the Houfe ffiall .iiave tiic po.ver of chufing their own officers, vyj; .have chofen a clerk, and I am lati^iied a very capable one ; but: will any gentleman contend that we may not difcharge him ,and chufe another and another as often as we fee caufe ? ,And fo it is in every other ini.tance, where they have the power to make they have likewife the power to unmake. It will be faid by gentlemen, that the power to make does not imply the power of unmaking ; but I beheve they'-will find very few exceptions in the United States. '? . Were I to fpeak.of tlie expediency, every one of niy obfervations would be againft it. When an important, and contidential titirt is placed in a man, it is wor(e than death to him to be difplaced without caufe ; his reputation .de- pends upon the fingle will of the prefident, who may rum him on bare fuipicion Nay, awew prelident may tur'nhiin : out on mere caprice, or in order to niake room for a favp- „rite. This contradicts.all my notion's. of propriety, every thing'of this fort fiiould be done' with due deliberation; every, peri'on ought to have a hearing before they are pn- nifhed. It is on thefe conlidcrations that I wiili the gene- ral principle" laitl down by the gentleman 'from. Virginia (^4r..Whlte) may be adhered to. 1 will add one word more and have done. This feems I^lr. chairman, altogether to be .'aimed at the fe'jate