Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

formed on a renovating principle w liich gives them a falutary (lability : This is not the caie either with the prefident or houfe of reprelentacivei ; nor is the judiciary equally laiting, be- 472 DEBATES A. 1789. caufe the officers are fubjeft to natural diflblution. It ap. pears to me that a permanency was expeded in the ma- girtracy ; and therefore the fenate were combined in the ap- pointment to office. But if the prefident alone has the po-.v- er of removal, it is in his power at any time to deftroy al? that has been done. It appears to me that fuch a principle would be deltrudive of the intention of the conftitution ex- prefTed by giving the power of appointment to the fenate. It alfo fubverts the claufe which gives the fenate the fole power of trying impeachments, becaufe the prefident may remove the officer in order to fcreen him from the efFeds' of their judgment on an impeachment. Why ihould we conftrue any part of the conftitution in fuch a manner as to dellroy its eflential principles, when a more confonant eonftrudlion can be obtained ? It appears very clear to me that however tliis power may be diftributed by the conllitution, the houfe of reprefentatives have nothing to do with it. Why their Ihould we interfere in the bulinefs ? Are we afraid' that the prefident and fenate are not fufficiently informed to know their refpe^live duties ? Our interpofition argues that they want judgment, and are not able to adjult their powers without the wifdom of this houfe to affift them; to fay the lealt on this point, it mu(l be deemed indelicate for us to intermeddle with them. If the fadl is as we feem to fufpecl, that they do not underltand the conftitu- tion, iet n go before the proper tribunal ; the judges arc the conftitutional umpires on fuch queftions. Why, let me afk gentlemen, ihall we commit an infrad^ion of the conftitution for fear the fenate or prefident fhould not comply with its diredions ? It has been faid by my colleague, that thefe officers arc the creatures ot the law ; but it feems as if we were not content with that ; we are making them the mere creatures of the preiident ; they dare not exercife the privilege of their creation, if the prefident fhall order fheni to forbear ; becaufe he holds their thread of life, his power will be fovereign over them, and will fjon fwallow up the fmali fecurity we have in the fenate's concurrence to the appoint- ment, and we fhall fhortly need no other than the autho- rity of the fupreme executive officer to nominate, appoint, continue or remove. Mr. Ames. When this queftion was agitated at a former period, I took no part m the debate. 1 bciieve it was then propofed A. 1789. Or CONGRESS. 473 without any idea cr intention of drawing on a lenghty dtfcullion, and to me it appeared to be well underftooj and fettled by the houfe ; but fince it has been reiterated and contefted again, I feel it my bound^^n duty to deliver the reafons for voting in the manner I then did and Ihall now do. Mr. chairman, I laok upon every queftioil which touches the conilitution as ferious and important, and there- fore worthy of the fullell difculiion, and the molt foleuin decifion. I believe on the preleiu occalion we may come to foniething near certainty, by attending to the leadinjr principles of the conftitution. In ordered that the good purpofes of a federal government Hvould be anfwcred it was neceflTafy to delegate contiderable powers, and the prin- ciple upon which the grant was made intended to give: fufficient power to do all poifible good, but to retrain the rulers from doing mifchicf. The conlbtution places all executive power in the hands of the preftdent, and could he perfonally execute all ths laws, there would be no occafion for eltablifhiug auxilia- ries ; but the eirciimfcribed powers of human nature 'in one mati, demands the aid of others. When the objecfts are widely itretched out, or greatly diverlified, meander- incr throu'Th luch an extent of territory as what the United States pollefs, a minifter cannot fee with his own eyes every trdnfadion, or feel with his hands the minutiae that paiTts through his department ; he niull therefore have alliftaiits : But in order that he may be rei'} onfible to his country, he fntift have a choice in feledling I'is afliitants, a control over theni, With power to remove them when he finds the qua- lifications which induced their appointment ceafe to exift. There are officers under the conltitution who hold their office by a different tenure — your jutlges are appointed during good behaviour ; and from the delicacy and peculiar nature of their trull it is right it Ihould 6e fo, in order that they mav be independent and impartial in adminilter- ing jullice between the government and its citizens. Buc the removability of the one clafs, or immovability of the other are founcled on the fame principle, the lecurity of the people againft the abufe of power. Does any gentle- man imagine that an officer is entitled to his office as to an eftate ? or, does the legiflature eftablifh them for the con- venience of an individual ? For my part I conceive it intended to carry into effeiH: the purpofes for which the conftitution was intended. The executive powers are delegated to the prefidenf, O o o  - 474 ^ E ^ A E, S A. 1789. T • with a view to have a refpoulible officer to: Superintend, cpii:rol, infpect and check the officers neceiTarily employed iji adininhtering the laws. The only, b^)nd between hini ;viui th>ie he etnploys is the confidence he has in their iu- re';rriry.;i;nd lalonrs.j when that c.onfidence ceafes the prin- cipa,! ought 10 have power to remove thole whom he can i,u) jonjter triu^ with iafety. If an officer fhall be guilty, of neglect; or inftjelity, tljere can be no doubt but heought to be. removed j yet there may b^ numerous caufes for re- moval which do I'lOt amount to a, crime. He may propole to do a 'mifchief, but I believe the mere intention would not be cauie of impc="achinej3t,; die may loofc, the confidence gfiT,li,e;people _upoa,J.ulpicJQn, in wliich cafe it,: would be , , yiip.rbpvr, to -retain h/i.in.in fervice ; he,oxight to bp removed ati^T^yit-jme, when, inltead' of doing the greatest ppflible good, lie is likely to do an injury ,t,Q.. the public intereft by ,b;«r:iujg-coa:.biae4:iw jb?: adm'-niib'atiou.r, :>..! PPi.*^ '*yi'?>-2 gei-i-^leq^e.mwjll generally admit, that officer.s Qj-Vght/ui^jip^ .re)ri.-)v'p4,)^'^^^n,ji??y< becQ,me obnoxious ; but t-j)ec,c.pi^-g^jo^i i^, l^,Ovy,.Jl)aU .thjs powerbe ex.ercLled i It will no.t ;|:. j^iaj?ji-.eh<^/)dybe poiitei^ded, ^jihat, ;gill. officers _ hold their ciicei t^rin;g igp/;d,!i^ei>a,vipur... If ,thi6,.i,g tb,e cafe it is a jn.)jt,\ji;iguiar- goy'cr/i,;,j,)/.;nt,.' I; believe. .there is .not another hy_,tli»3jun.i/e; fc tha,I5^1-)^;^r,s thed(;al^^ feuiblance to it in this 4i^fEk\4afi;.d\}c/;i^^ iDj7nyiplf;,i 1 take.^it-,,.)^ contrary to the u^^p;;e. pf _;hi,aa;i.,i vBuj:. fh;?,jnaiinqr,-l>,PrW to rem.ove is the _%i:;i.ti<'»f>,j^, I^";,^he. remoi-ed by QJ^<:er ^niijbehave? lie :can be j^i^vi^.:^(-^:ji,ii?;;\tj^ ^^.^'i .iunpeachmeuL .the only ;^9iHMI .C(aJe i?' ,U:}iKJe.,vif|'^f^i5>av9l-^.f|Ijt (f\'^9!uljd, ,b,e..foijnd. very inconvenient JfiiA''*^? i^>*man cp,u^ipifjyj. .ill offi,ce after being impeached, -^;>i{l! , o/vn^75 all! courtdsriRe. ,in .jl>im..Avas lul'peudLd or loft: 'VV-tU^'fi.:''!''^ the Cisd .pf-.ijnpeachment,,be defeated by this •Hiq^ASifj!':. If.-i\li'; y'*'V^''S;'^tiy^'''^ jwas mentioned by the gen- 4li^;!^>ji;>,ifri>:n'. Vi);g.ii>ia ;(iVIj-..-Vin!Mg)^^ preferved his com- j4>si''!)dn,H; India, .Gouiii),;,hf5,-jnot,defea,t ;the impeachment now ^:).';si'Jing.;iu'GKeat ^Q\.sii\,\,l^^if.t,h3,i dod:riiie .obtains in Ame- i,mp<facbm^ 4>:-.a';«'e._ilaAn-find too late ; while we ^are pr^jMfJng.the' pKOcels the juifthief will be perpetrated, a-nd .cb^jPfr.Mider efcapeU^ \,J...i\.ppvd\eud it will be as fre- Kj;i3ntTy ^tece'Ku'y to- pre-ye-nt crimes as .to punifli them ; , j,)d it :;niv/. happen that the only pretention is by re- pirien Kiii'x'.ii. The fuperiiuendirig pQw,er jpoljeffed by the pre iid;-nt will pqrliaps enablejijim to diifOfveK a bale intcndoii before it is ripe for execution-. .It .may, happen that the treaibrei; may be dirpalcd toJbetray .t^' public chell to the A. 1789. Of C O N G K E S S. , 475 enemy, and fo injure the government beyond the poflibili^y- of reparation ihoii'd the prefident be reftiahied from ; removing fo dangerous an officer, until th^ flow formality of an impeachment was complied with, when the nature'of the cale rendered the applii.ation of a fuddcn and dccilive remedy indifpenfible? But it win, I fay, be admitted, that an oificer may he re- moved ;the queftion then is, by whom ? Some geritlemen fay by the prefident alone ; and others, by the p-refideiit, by and with the advice of the fenate. By the advocates of the latter mode it is alledged, that the conliitutjoa is in the way of the power of 'removal being by the preridtnc alone. If this is abfolutely the cafe there is an end to all further enquiry. But before we Inffer this to he cmfider- ed aii infuperable ^impediment we ought to be clear, (hat the conllitution prohibits him the exercife of what, on a firft view, appears to be a power incident to the executive branch of the government. The gentleman from \^irgi- nia (Mr MadifonJ, has made io many obfervations to evince the coniliiutionality of the claufe, that it is linnecef- fary to go over the ground again ;I iijall therefore co'.ifine myf^lf to a!Tf\\er only fome remarks made by the gentleman from South-Carolina (Mr. Smith), "i he powers of the prefident are dctined in the conilitution ; but it is faid, that he is not exprefsly authorifed to remove,) trom .cfFice ; If the conlfituilon is lilent alio with rcfpeci to the fenate, the argument may be retorted. If this lilence proves that the power cannot be exercifed by the prciident, it certainly proves that it cannot be exercifed by the prclident, by and with the advice and content of the -(enate. 1 he power of renioval is incident to o-overnment :but not bemo- dillrir buted by the conltitutiun, it