Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

w'e were to infert the con* trary one, the government tnuft go to deftrudlion. Mr. White. Mention has'been made of impeachments, as the onlv mode of removing an officer I will explain my ideas on : this point in order that the cbfnmittee iisay be mafltrs cf niy particular objedicns to the claufe : 1 confider impeach- ments neceflbry to be.employed in cafes refpc(fling an officer who is appointed during good behaviour ; thus the jud<_t.s. can only be reiuoved by impeachment :the preiident and vice prefufeut hold their offices for the terms mentioned in the conltiiiition, not hable to be removed from cffice iii any other way thcfe circuniftancesare a deviation from n>y ; general pririciple, but have neverthelefs a proper ground to be fijpportcd on ; the elcdors who appoint the preiident, cannot allemble to exercife the authority which would naturally be in them. With refpecl to the judges, it is found neceflary for the proper and uncorrnpt adniinilfration of juftice and the ftcunty of freedom, to have them indepen- deiit in their flations fo that they be not removable at pleafure • to them therefore the doclrine of impeachmeiic is peculiarly applicable ; it n^ay properly be extended far- ther, in cafes where the prefident is delirous of retaining an officer v\ ho ought not to be retained ; this houfe has the power of conirohng him, and may impeach the officer before thefenafe in either of thefe three caies impeach- ; ments are necelTary. i have no doubt in my mind but an officer can be remo- ved without a public trial. I think there are cafes in which it would be improper that his mifdcmeanors ihould be publ'cly kno^n f thii tranquility and harmony of the union might be endangered, if his guilt was no: fecreted from the world. 1 have therefore no hcfitation in declaring as n'ly fentiment, that the preiident and fenate may dilmifi him. Tl^^e condituiion ccntcmplates a removal in fome other way befides that by impeachment, er ^^hy is it declared in  464 DEBATES A. 178^. favor of the judges only, that they fiiall hold their offices during good behaviour ? does not this llrongly imply that without fuch 311 exception there would have been a difcre- tionary power in fume brancJi of the government to dif- mifs even thein ? My colleague (Mr. Madifon) has acknowledged the claufe to be unneceiTary, if the conititurioa is allowed its free operation : Now it is my wilh that it fhould have fuch an operation, and not be wreitcd by a declaration in a law contrary to what I take to be the true conllruftion ; if we are lileat on this point, it will probably be allowed a fair interpretation when the power is required to be exercifed ; but if k could not be adjulted eafily in that place, 1 would rather the judiciary ihould decide the point than us, be- caufe it is more properly within their department. 1 differ alfo with my colleague in the principle that he has laid down, that this is in its nature ati executive pow- er. The couliiiuiion fuppofes power incident to govern- ment, and arranges it into diilincl; branches with or with- out checks ; but it enumerates under each department the powers it may exercife the legifiature may exert its au. ; ihority in pailing laws relating to any of its particular pow- eH The executive power is vefted in the prefident ; but : the executive powers fo veiled, arc thofe enumerated in the conilituiion ; he may nominate and by and with the advice an I confent of the fcnate appoint all officers, be- caule the conftituiion gives this power, and not becaufe the pov.'er is in its nature a power incident t-o his depart- ment my idea ot the legiflaiive and executive powers are ; precifely the fame ; the legillature u"5ay do certain acts be- caui'e the conltitution fays, they Ihail have power to do the.n, and the executive maaillrate is authorifed to exer- ciie powers becaufe they are vetted in him by the fame inllru- ment : Ic has given him the power of appointment under certain qualifications, the power of renioval is incident to the power of appointment, and both equally dependant upon the ai'rangernent made in the conltitution, confequently adif- inilii,jn lro)n office muilbe brought about by the fame mo* dification as the appointment. Several objeftions have arifen from the inconvenience with which the power uiult be exercifed, if. the fenate is blended with the executive, and therefore it is inferred thac the preiident ought cxcluhvfly to have this power: - Ir" we were framing a conltitution, thefe arguments would have their proper weight and [ might approve fuch an ar^ ^. 178(> Of C d N G R E § S. 46$ rangement. But at prefent, I do not coftfidef we are at li- berty to deliberate on that fubjed ; the conltitution is al- ready formed, and we can go no farther in diftribucifig the powers than the conltitution warrants. It was objected that the prelident could not remove an officer tiiilers the f'enate was in leflion, but yet the emer- gency of the cafe might demand an inftant difiuiflion. I Jhould imagifie that no inconvenience \vould refuit on this account ; becaufe on my principle, the fame power which can make a temporary appouunient can make an equal luf- penfion ; the powers are appolite to each other. The genilema'n fays, we ought not to blend the execu- tive and legifiative powers farther than they arc blended in the conltitution. 1 contend we do not. There is no ex- prefllon in the conftitutibn which fays that the prefidenc fliall have the power of removal from offi;e ; but the con- trary is flrongly implied ; for it is faid, that congrefs may eftabliili offices by law, and veft the appointment, and con- feqiientiy the removal, in the preiiucnt alone, in the courts of law, or heads of departments. Now, this ffiews that congrels are not at liberty to make any alteration by law in the mode of appointing fuperior officers ; and con- fequently tha[t they are not at liberty to alter the manner of removal. Let us then leave the conftitutioft to a free operation, and let the prelident, with or without the fenate, carry ic into execution : Then, if any one fuppofes himfelf injured by their determination, let ihe;''i have recourle to the law, and its deciiion will ettablilh the true conitrUction of the conltitution. Mr. BoUDiNoT. . . This is a queftion, Mr; fpeaker, that requires full confl- deration, and ought only to be fettled on the moit candid difculhon ; it certainly involves the right of the lenate to a very important power. At prefent I am fo impreJled with the importance of the fubjeil, that 1 dare not abfolure- }y decide on any principle, although I am hrmly perfuaded we ought to retain the claufe in the bill and, fo 'ar as ic ; has been examined, I agree that it is a legiflative conltruc- tion of the conftitution neceflary to be fettled fur the direc" tion of your officers. But if it iia deviation from the con- ltitution, or in the Jeaft degree an infriiigen.ent upon the auihority of the other branch of the legiflature, I Ihall mofl: decidedly be againft it. But I think it will appeiir, on a fall conlidergtion of this bufinefs, that we can da na other--; N nu 466 v.ife DEBATES A. 1789, than agree to tliis cnnftr'ud'on, in order to preferve to each department the full exercife ot its powers, and to give this houfe fecarity for the proper condud of the offi- cers who are to execute the laws. The arguments adJuced are to fbevv, that tlie power of removal lieseii'Iier in the prefident and fenate, or the pre- lident alone, except in cafes of rtmoval by impeachment. There is no.hiiig I take it in the conltiturion, or the rcafon of the thing, that officers Ihould be only removable by im- peachnenc : Such a provifron would be derogatory to the pHJwers of government, and fubverlive of the rights of tne people. W hat fays the ccmllitution on the point ? (I fear, fir, it has i.ot been rightly apprehended ;) That the huufe bf reprefentatives Ihall have the fole power of impeachment j that the fenate ihall have tlK: fole power to try all impeach- ments ; aixl judgineivt- Ihall not extend further than to removai from office, and difqualification to hold :hem in future ; then comes the claufe declaring ablolutely, that he ihall be removed from office on impeachment for and eouviclion of treafon, bribery, or other high crimes or mif- demeanors. It is this claufe which guards the rights of the houfe, and enables them to pull doan an improper officer, alThottgh he Ihould be lupported by a-U the power of the executive. I'h.s then is a neceifary fecurity to- the people, and one that is wifely provided in the conititution. But 1 beiievd it is nO' where laid, that officers fhall never be re- inoved but by invpeachineut ; but it fays they Ihall be removed on impeAchmenr. Soppofe the fecreiary of fo- reign affairs lliall imibchave, and we.i )ipeach him ; not- witiiiKiiKlmg the cleared proof of guilt the fenate might only impole fume triiimg punilhment and retain him iu office, if it was not for this declararion m the conititution. Neitiier this claufe nor any oti>er goes fo far as to fay it fiiall be the only mode of removal ; therefore we may pro- ceed to enqu/re what the t-ther is. Let us examine whe- ther i'{ belongs to the fenate and pr<.(idcut. Certainty, iir; tHgrc is uoihing that gives the fenate this right in exprefs terms ; but they are authorifefi in exprefs words to be conceri>ed in the appoi'mment And does this uecef- ,- far^Iy include the ])ower of removal i"If the prelident coPiplains to ths fenate of the mfcondud of an officer, and de-iires their advice and confent to the removal, what are the fenate ti» do ? Aloft certainly they will enquire if the compl:;int is well founded. To do this they mull call the officer berorc them to aiifwer : Wh»  t A. 1789. Of congress. 467 then are the parties ? The fupreme executive officer againft his affiftant, and the ftnate are to let judges to determine whether fufficient caufe of removal exnts. Does not this fet the fenate over the head of the prefident ? But fuppol'e they Ihall decide in favor of the officer, what a fuuation is the prefident then in, furrounded by officers with whom by his fituatioa he is compelled to ad, but in whom he can have no confiJence, r^verfing the privilege given him by the coijitirnrion, to prevent his having officers nnpoied upon h.m who do Ji'^t m- t liis approla'.ion? But I have another more fohd objedion, which places the queltion in a more important point of view. The couftirution has placed the fenate as the only fecurity and barrier betAeen the houl'e of reprefentatives and the prelident. Supppfe the prefident has dclired the fenate to concur in removing an (jfficer, and they have declined ; or fuppofe the houfe have applied to the prelident and I'e- nate to remove aa tfficer obnoxiovis to them, and they determine agaiiiit the meafure, the houfe can haverecourfe to noth'ng but an