Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

duties to t; I the fatisfatlion ro the executive branclt which is condi- ttfcionally authoriicd to infpecl: and eontroul his cordud : aird if it ihould happen that the oflicers connect: theujlelves vvith the fenstc, they maymntually luppoFC each other,.  A. i;89. Of CONGRESS. ^^^^ and for want t)f efficacy reduce the power of the prefiden^ to a mere vapor, in which cafe his refponfibility w ould b^ annihilated, and the expedlation of it uujuli:. The hic^ executive officers, joined in cabal with the fenate, wouid lay the foundation of difcord, and, end in an afTuniption of the executive power, only <o be removed h)r a revolu- tion in the government. 1 believe no principle is more clearly laid down in the conftitution than that of rerj)onIi- bilicy. After premiling this, I will proceed to an invefti- gation of ^the nitrits of the quelhon upon conilitutional ground. I have fince the fubjefl was lafl: before the hnnP^, ex- amined the conftitution with attention, and I acknowled're that it does not perfedly correfpond with the ideas I enter- tained of it from the firft glance. I am inclined to thinlj that a free and fyitematic interpretation ot the plan of go- vernment, will leave us lefsat liberty to abate the refp^^n- fibility than gentlemen imagine. I have already acknow- ledged, that the posversof the goverliment mult ren;ain as apportioned by the conftitution. But it may be contended, that where the conftitution is filrni it becomes a fubjed ot legiflative di:'cret.on perhaps, in. the opinion of iome, an ; argument in favor of the claufe may be fuccefsfuily brought forward on this ground 1 however leave it lor the pre- : fent untoiuhca. By a ibict examination of the conftitution on what ap- pears to be its true principles, and conlidering ihe great departments of the go\crnment i'n the relation they i)ave to each other, I have my doubts whether we are not abib- lutely tied down to the conltrucllou declared in the ni!l. In the hrft fection of the lit arucle, it is faid, that all le- giflative powers herein granted ihall be veittd ma congrcl's of the United States. In the fecond article it is affirn ed, that the executive power fliall be veftcd in a prcrident'-'ef' the United States of America. In the third article ir 'is • declared, that the judicial power of the United States fhall - be be veftcd in one I'upreme court, and in Inch interior ' courts as congrefs may from time to time ordain and cita- blilh. I fuppofe it will be readily admitted, that fo far as the conftitution has Separated the powers of thefe great de- partments, it would be improper to combine them together, and fo far as it has left any particular department in the entire pofteihon of the powers incident to thst department, I conceive we ought not to qualify thetn farther than they • re qualified by the coiiflitution. The legiflative po'.ver 460 DEBATES A. 1789, are veded in congrefs, and are to-be exercifed by them un- to!:tr<)lled by any other department, except the conftitu- I, Mi has qualified it otherwife. The conftitution has qua- I.ied the legillative power by authorifing the prefident to oojed to any aft it njay pais, requiring, in this cafe two- ti)irds ot" both houfes to concur in raakmg a lav/ ; but flill the abfouite jegiflative power is vefted m the congrefs with this qualification alone. J he conilitution affirms, that the executive power fhall be veiled in the prefident : Are there exceptions to this propoiitlon ? Yes there are. The conftitution fays that, in appointing to office, the fenate fliall be afiociaied with the jueiident, unlefs in the cafe of inferior officers, when the law liiallothcrwile direft. Have we a right to extend this exception? 1 believe not. It the conftitution has inverted all executive power in the prefident, I venture to alFert, that the leg.ilature has no right to diminifh or niodify his executive authori y. i'he qneltion now refolves itlelf into this, Is the power of difplacing" an executive power? I conceive that if any povyer wlnuk)ever is in its nature executive it is the power of appointing, overfeeir>g, and controling thofe who exe- cute the lav s. If the conftitution had not qualified the r.ijwev of the prefident in appointing to office, by afibcia- :.::y the fenate with him in that bulinefs, wou'd it rot be ,41 he A'ouid have the right by virtue of his execu- . .'er to make fucb appoinrment ? Should we be au- n df fiance of that claufe in the conftitution,— L executive power iHall be vcfted in a prefident," to u-.vAf \\ie fenate with the prefident in the appointment to ofiiie ? I conceive not. If it is admitted we Ihould not be auihorifed to do this, I think it may be difputed whether v.e ha^e a ri'^ht to afi'ociate them in removing perfons fron? office, the one power being as much of ^n executive i.aiure as the other, and the firlt only is authorifed by be- ing excepted ou' of the general rule eftabldhtd by the con» ilitutioii, in thefe words, " the executive power fijall be Vcfted in the prefident." 1 he judicial power is vcfted in a fupreme court, but will gentlemen fay the judicial power can be placed elfe. whert', nnlcfs ihf conftitution has msde an exception ? 1 he conftitution jollifies the- fenate in exercifing a judiciary pn\\er in determining on impeachments But can the judi- : cial power be farther blended with the jiowers of tliat Uody r They caniiot. I therefore fay it is incontrovert^ A. 1789. Of C O N G R E S S. 461 ible, if neither the legiflative ror judicial powers are fub- jeded to qualifications, other than thofe demanded in the conftitution, that the executive powers are equally una- bateable as either of the other ; and inafmuch as the powet of removal is of an executive nature, and not affected by ^ny conltitutional exception, it is beyond the reach of the iegiflative body. if this is the true conftruftion of this inftrument, the ckufe in the bill is nothing more than explanatory of the meaning of the conftitution, and therefore not liable to any particular objedion on tiiat account. It the conlliturion is filent, and it is a power the legiflature have a right to confer, it will appear to the world, if we ftrike out the claufe, as if we doubted the propriety of vefting it in the prefident of the United States. I tnerelore think it beft to retain it in the bill. Mr. ViNiNG. I hoped, Mr. chairman, afrrr ihe difcufllon this fubjeft had received on a former occalijn, that it would have been unneceflary to re-examine it. The arguments againft the claufe are reiterated, but i truft without a chance of fuc- cefs. They were fully anfwered before ; and i exped the impreffions made at that time are not already effaced. The houfe, as well as the committee tf the whole, have deter- mined that thofe words fliall be inferted in the bill j the fpecial committee could therefore do no lefs than place them where they are ; a dt it re nee is due to the decifion of the houfe. The houfe has determined to make a declaration of their conftruftion on the conftitution. 1 am perfectly in fenti- raent with the majority on this occallon ; and contend that if this power is not in the prelidcnt, it is not veiled in any body whatever. It cannot be witliin the legiflative pow- er of the fenate, becaufe it is of an adverfe nature ; it can- not be within the executive power of the fenate, becaufe they pofTefs none but what is exprcfsly granted by the ccnflitution. If gentlemen will point cut where the con- (litution confers this power upon the fenate, I will read my recantation, and fubfcribe to the julfnefs of their doc- • trine. 1 am not fatisfied that removability fliall be acquired on- ly by impeachment. Were the advocates of this dodrine aware of its conlequences when they advanced it ? The fenate has the fole power of trying impeachments ; the prefident is here out of the queflion. If no officer can be  #2 (.-onftlrutionally DEBATES A. 178^ removed but by impeachment, it applies to iubordinate officers as well as heads ot departments. For the conltitution only gives powe?- to congrefs to eftabliii^ offices by la-jy, and ve(1:s the appointmenr in the prefident, If tliele oliicers are not reno.'abie but by impeachment^ Yv hat is to become of oar affiiirs when any of the accidents occur vyhich were enumerated by the gentleman from Maf- iachiifetts (Mr., Sedgwick) ? Arq we to take the circuit- .OU3 rout of impeachment? The dilatory and inefficient proccfs by tl^at mode, will not apply the remedy to the evil till it is too late to be ot advantage. Experience has fixed on eternal fHgma upon the l"y(tem of impeachiuents ; witnefs the cal'e T mentioned the other daiy of Warren Haitings before the Brltilii lords ; what delays and uncer- tainty with the forms of trial, details of evidence, argu- ijients of council, and deliberate decifion ! I a(k gentle- )iien, can there be a greater evil than this in any govern- ment ? Why then wjll gentlemen advocate a dottrine fo obnoxious to the principles of the coniUtution^ when a VAoix favounjble conftruclion is at hand ? As to the principle of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. White) that he who appoints mult remove ; it may be a good one, but it is not a general one. Under this government, officers appointed by the people are removed by the reprefentatives of the Hate legiflatures. I take it that the beft principle is that he, who is refponfible for the condvicl of the officer, ought to have the power oi~ ren.ov- ing him ; by adhering to this principle we Ihall.be led to make a right deciiion on the point in debate. Perhaps it miglit he equally right that the refponfible perfon fhould have the a]>pointment qf thofe W'ho are to aid him. But this cafe is q'lalified by an exprefs ftipulation in the conlli- tulion ; and ther fore \n\\ii be fubmitted to. Yet never- thcl-r^rs, the refponiibility is kept up : the prefident takes the lead in the buiinefs ; he nominates ; wherefore he be- comes anfwerabie for the officer. But whofe officer is he i Tvot the lenate's ; for they h^vp no executive bufinefs to per.f(irni. The executive duties are all veiled in the pre- iii'lieht. Then the prefident execti,tes rhe duties of foreign aftairs;. — He is -mfwerable for his conducl to whom ? Yo 6e fure, to the fenate. But he does not appoint the offi- cer ; hcfirlt felects, without ailvice of the ienaie ; he can-. nptaj>poiMt. This is a check to an improper choice ; but dp^'s not deflfoy the refponlibility of the prefident; if he iiomin'ates a vicious or improper charafter.  A. 1789. O r C O ISi G R E S S. 45j It may be contended, oh the gentleman's principles, ihut the prefident iLall have the power of removal ; becaufe it is he who appoints. The conftitution fays he fhall nomi- nate, and under certain qualifications appoint. The fenate do not appoint ; their jndgtiient only is required to-acqui- efce in theprefident's nomiriation. Where then is, the natural refponfibility placed ? becaufe, where that is ought to be the power of removal. 'l he, conftitution contem- plates no ether principle. If