Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

* iiate participate on any principle whatever in the removal,, they will never confent to transfer their power to anq- tuer branch of the government therefore they will not pafj^ ; a lav/ with fuch a declaration in it. Upon this confideration alone, if there was no other, the words ftiould be itruck out, and the qucftion of right, if it li one^ kf: to the deciliou of the judiciary. It will b? tim^ A. 1739. Of C N G R E S S. 4^§ enough to determine the queftion when the prefident fhall remove an officer in this way. I conceive it can properly be brought before that tribunal; the officer will have a fight to a niatida-nus to be reflored to his office, and the }udoi;es wo'iid dtterniire whether the prtlident exercifed a- coniiirutional authority or not. Somp genHeinen think the conftitutron takes no notice of this officer, as the head of a department they fuppofs ; hjm an ii ferior officer in aid of the executive.. This I think is going too far ; becaufe the condicution, in the .'•orns ajthorifing the prefident to call on the heads of de- • "•fvnents for thtir opinions in writing, contemplates fe- al dep3rtinents ; it fays " the principal officer in each the executive departnients." I have feriouf}}.' rtflecled on this fubjct^ ; and am corr- vinced that the prefident has not this power by the confti- tution and that if we had the right to invert him with ity ; !t would 6s dangerous to do fo. Mr, Huntington. I thit k the claufc ought net to {land. It was well ob- ferved, that the conititiition was filent rcfpefting the re- moval, otherwife than by iuipeachment. I v/ould likewife add, that it mentions no other caule of removal, than trea- fon., bribery or other high crimes and mifdemeanors. It does , not, I apprehend, extend to cafes of infirmity or incapacity. Indeed it appears hard to me, that after an officer has be- come old in an»honorable fervice he fhould be impeached for this infirmity. The conititution I think ninft be the only rule ro guide us on this occafion, as it is filent with' refpecl to the removal, congrefs ought to fay nothing about it becaufe ii implies that we have a right to beftow ; it, and 1 believe this power is not to be found among the enuT^:erated powers' delegated by the conftitution to con- grefs. h was faid, if the prefident liad this authority, it would- HKike him more refponlible for the conduct of the officer : But it we have a vicious prefident who inclines to abufe I ' thispower, which Gcd forbid, his refponiibility will ftand T^s in little flead ; therefore that idea does not fatisfy me, that it is proper the prelident Ihould have this power. Mr. Sedgwick. I \vi[h the words be itruck out ; becaufe I con- to ceive then"! to be unncccfTaVy in this place. I do conceive, Mr. fpeaker, that this officer, will be the mere creature of *hc hv7 ; and that very little need be faid to prove to you  4s4 DEBATES that of neceffity this ought to be the cafe. A.i;89V 1 apprehend 4ike\vife that it requires but a fmall fhare of abilities to point out certain cauies for which a perfon ought to be removed from office, without being guilty of trealbn, bri- bery, or inalfeai'auce and the nature of things demands ; that it Ihould be fo. Suppole, fir, a man becomes infane by ihe vifitaticn of God, and is likely to ruin cur affairs, are the hands of government to be confined- from v\Tirding oif the evil ? Suppofe a perfon in office, not poficffing the tslents hewas judged to have at the time of the appoint- ment, is the errcV not to be correded ? Suppole he ac- quires vicious habits, an incurable indolence, or total ne. gled of the duties of his office, which forebode mifchief to the public welfare, is there no way to arreii the threatened danger ? Suppole he becomes odious and unpopular by realbn of the uieai'ures which he purines, and iliis he may do without comniitring any pofitive oiFeiice againflthe 'aw, muil he preferve his office in dcfpite of the public will ? Suppole hii)i grafping at his own aggrandizement, and the eievation of bis connecTiions, by every means fhort of the trealon defined by the conltitution, hurrying your affairs tO" the precipice of dellruiflion, endangering your domeftic tranquility, plundering you of the means of defence, by alienating the afleftions of your allies, and promoting th.e fpirit of difcord, is there no 'way fuddenly to feize the worthlefs wretch, and hurl him from the pinnacle of power ? Mud the tardy, tedious, defultory road, by way of im- peachment, be travelled to overtake the man who, barely coiitiding hirnfelf within the letter cf the law, is employed in drawing ofi' the viral principle of the government ? Sir, the natm-e of things, the great objects oJ' focicty, the e:c- prefs objcds of this conilitutiou require that this thing ihould beothervvile. Well, fir, this is admitted by gentle- men ; but ihey fay the fenate is to be united with the pre- Udent in the exercife of this power. I hope, fir, this is not the cafe ; becaufe it would involve us in the mcft feri. pus diBioiUy. Suppofe a difcovery of any of thofe events . which 1 iiave juii enuinerated were to take place when the fenate is not in fefiion, hov/ is the remedy to be applied ? This is a ierious conilderation, and the evil could be avoided no other way than by the fenate's fitting always. Surely no gentleman of this'iioufe contemplates the nccef- fity of incurring fucli an e^pente, 1 am fure it will be very objecfionable to our cbnitituents and yet this mull be ; dot;e, or the public intcreil be endangered by keeping an A.1789. Of , CONGRESS. 45;. unworthy ofRcer in place until that body lliall be aiTembled from the extremes of the union. It has been laid that there is a danger of this power be- ing abufed if exercifed by one wzn Certainly the danger : is as great with refped to the fenate, who are alleuibled from various parts of the continent, with different impref- fions and opinions. It appears to me that fuch a boJy is more likely to mifufe this power than the man whom the united voice of America calls to the prefidential chair. As the nature of the government requires the power of re- moval, I think it is to be exerciled in this way by a hand capable of exerting itfelf with eifedl, and the power ri^uifc be conferred upon the prefident by the conlliiution, as the executive officer of the government. I believe fome difficulty will refult from deterniining this quellion by a mandamus. Amandamus is uied to re-place an officer who has been removed contrary to law ; now, this officer being the creature of the law, we may de- clare that he fhall be removed for incapacity, and if fo de* clared, the removal will be according to law. Mr. Madison. If the conftruction of the conlHtution is to be left to its natural courfe with refpect to the executive powers of this government, 1 own that the infertion of this fentiinent in law may not be of material importance, though if it is nothing more than a mere declaration of a clear grant made by the conlfitution, it can do no harm j but if it re- lates to a doubtful part of the conftitation, I fuppofe an ' expQfition of the conftitution may come with as much propriety from the legiilature as any other department of government. If the power naturally belongs to the go- verntnent, and the conllitution is undecided as to the body which is to exercife it, it is likely that it is fubmitted to •lie difcretion of the legiflature, and the quellion will de- pend upon its own merits. 1 am clearly cf opinion with the gentleman from South- Carolina (Mr. Smith,) that we ought in this and every oilier cafe to adhere to the conllit'ution, lo far as it will f'^i'-Ji: as a guide *io us, and that Vv'e ought not to be fv/ay- L-d in our deciiions by the fplendor of the character of the prefent cliief magiftraie, but to conhder it with refpecl to '.he merit of men who, in the ordinary courfe of things, uay be fuppofcd to fill the chair. 1 believe the power i"t;rie declared i*.a high one, and in fome reijiefls a danger* eus one : btit in order to come to a right decilion en this M lii m  458 DEBATES point, we muft confide'r both fides A- 1789, of the queftion. The poJibleabufes which may fpringfrbm thefingle will of the ilrit inagiltrare, and the abufe which may fpring fronj the co'Tibined will of the executive and the feiiatorial qualifi- cation. When v/e confider that the firft magiftrate is to be ap- pointed at prei'ent by the fuffrages of three millions of people, and in all human probability in a few years time by do-uble rhnt number, it is not to be prefumed that a vicious or bad character will be feleded. If the govern- ment of any country on the face of the earth was ever efFc'c]:ually guarded againli the election of ambitious or de- fi-gning characters to the firlt office of the (late, I think it ni'ay with truth be faid to b^ the cafe under the conftitution of the United States. With all the infirmities incident to a popular eleftiorj, corrected by the particular mode of coadufting ir, as directed under the prefent fyftem, I think we mr.y fairly caicuUtre, tiiac the initances will be very rare in which an umv'orthy* man will receive thst mark of the ptrblic confrif lice which is- required to defignate the preli- deiit of the 'Jmted States. Where the people are difpofed . to give lo u-reat an elet^tioh to on«' of their ieljow citizens^ J 6Wn that 5 am 'not afraid to place my confidence in him j efpecially -iv'hen 1 know he. is impeachable for any crime or mifde-neanor-, before the fenate, at all times • and that at aU events' he is impeachable before the comniunity at large every four y^ars, and'Mi-able to be di (placed if his condnci; Ihall have given umbrage during the time he has been in office. Under thefe circtrmilaiices, although the truli is a high one, and in fOnie degree perhaps a dangerous one, i am not fare but it will be fafer here than placed where foiue gentlemen fuppofe it ought to he, It isevidjutly the intention of the conltitution that the firll" ' niagiltrate ihould be vcrpouliljle for the executive dcpart- iiie.Tt ; {'o far th.erefore as^ we do not make the officers vv ho are to aid hi"?) in the duties of that departmei-.t refpcniibis tty him, he is not refponfibid' to his country. Again, is tiverc no dar.ger that an oificer when he is appointed 'by the c 'icurrcnce of the fenate, and has friends in that body, lijay chuie rather to rdk his cftabiirmnent on tiie favor of thit branch, than rei\ it upon the dil'charge of his