Amendments to the Constitution, [8 June] 1789 — reading text

prehdent the power of nomi-^ nating, and by and with advice and confent of the the liquate, appoinii'ng to office. I conceive the power of As appointing and dii'milung to be united in their natures, ancf a principle that r;ever vyas called in quciiion in any govern- ment, I am averlb to that part of tlic claufe which fnbjeds the fecrecary of foreign affairs to be removed at the will of the prelident. In the conilitution I'pecial provilioii is made tor the removal of the judges, that i acknowledge to be a deviation- from my principle ; bat as it is a conftitutional provifion-, it is to be adniitted. In all cafes, not otherwife provid'^d for in tlie conititution, I take it that the principle I'bave laid down is rlie govei'ning one. Now the conititution' has affociated the fenate with the prefidenf,. in appointing" ?he heads ot departments ; the fecretary of foreign atfalrs k the head of a departsncut j for the words of the Uw d^- A. 1789. Of C O N G 11 E S S. 451 clare, that tjiere be a department eltabliflied, at the (Ijall head of which ihall be an officer to be lb denominated. If then the fenace js aflociated with the preildent in the ap- pointment, they ought allb to be aflociated in the difniillion from office. Upon the jnilnefs of this conlh udion, I take the liberty of reviving the motion made in the committee of the whole, for (Iriking out thole words, " to be re- movable from office by the prefident of the United States.'* Mr. Smith (of South-CaroUna}. The gentleman has anticipated me in his motion I am : clearly in lentiiuent with him that the words ought to go out. it is in the recolledlion of the committee, that when the fubjeCl; was lafl: before us this power Vv'as excepted to ; and although the words were then allowed to (land, ic was generally underftood that ic ihould be farther debated. Ithen was oppofed to giving this pov.er to the prelident, and am Itill of opinion that we ought not to nuke this de- claration, even if he has the power by the conitjtution, I would premii'e, that one of thefe t\vo ideas art' jufl, either that the conftitutiou has given the preiitient the power of removal, and therefore it is nugatory to make the declaration here ; cr it has not given the pdwex* to him, and therefore it is improper to make an attempt to confer it upon him. If it is not given to him by the confUtution, but belongs conjointly to the preildent and fenate, we have no right to deprive the fenate of their conilitutional pre- rogative ; and it has beeii tlje opinion of fenlible men that the power was lodged in this manner. A. publication of r.o inconfiderable eminence, in the clafs of political writings on the conftituticn, has advanced this fcntim.ent. The author, or authors (for 1 have underftood it to be the produciion of two gentlemen of great information) of the work publilhed under the lignature of Publias, has theie words ; ^[^ ''It has been n^.eniiUPd as one of the advantages to be exp€(51:ed from the c«-operation of the fenate, in tlie bufi-. nefs of appointments, that it would contribute to the ftabi- lity of the adminilbration. The confent of that body would be neceflary to clifplace as well as appoint. /L change of the chief magiltrate therefore would not occafibn lo violent or fo general a revolution in the officers of the govermiient as might be expected if he were the Ible difpofer of offices- V/here a man in any ftatiou has given fatisiaJlury evidence of his firnefs for it, a new pi-elide:ic would be reitrainecl from utteniptijig a change^ in favor of a perfon more agree- 45? DEBATES A. i in. 5ible to him, by the apprehcnfion that the difcountenance of |;he feiiate might frultrate the attempt, and bring fome de- gree of difcredit upon himfelf. Thufe who can beft efti- jnate the vakie of a fteady adminidration will be moft difoofed to prize a provilion, which connects the official exiftence of public men with the apj)rubation or dif- cipprobation of that body, which from the greater per- manency of its own compofition, will in all probability be lefs fuhjeft to inconftancy, than any other member of the government." ' Here this author lays it down, that there can be no doubt of the power of the ienate in the bufmefs of removal. Let this be as it may, I am clear that the prehdent alone lias not the pswer. Examine the conditution the pow- ; ers of the leveral branches of government are there defi- ned ; the prefident has particular powers afljgned him ; the judicial' have in like manner powers afligned them • but you will Hud no fuch pov^'ei• as removing from office given to the prefident. 1 call upon gentlemen to Ihew me where it is faid that the prelident fliall remove from office ; I know they cannot do it. Now I infer from this, that as the conrtitution has not given the prefidenjt the power of removability, it meant that he iliould not have that power and this inference is fupported by that claufe in ; p]\<z conilituciou, which provides that all civil officers of the United States fliall be removed from office on impeach- ment for and conviclion of trcafon, bribery, or other high j:riines and mifdemeanors. Here is a particular mode pre- ieribed for removing and if there is no other mode di- ; vecl;ed, contend that the conltitutioa contemplated only 1 this mode. But let me ailc gentlemen if any other mode is necefl'ary ? lor what other caufe ihould a man be remo- ved from office ? Do gentlemen cowtead that ficknefs or ignorance would be a iufiicientJBye ? 1 believe if they Will refleft they cannot iuilauceHJj^ j^erlon who was re- moved for ignora p.ce ; I venture toCay there never was pn inl'lauce of this nature in the United States. There has ^ been inllances where a pcrfon has been removed for of- fences ; the iaiie may again occur, and are therefore jii- jiicioqfly provided for in the co-^ftitution. But in this cafe, i& he removed for his ignorance, or his error which is. t{]o confequence of his ignorance ? I fuppofe it is for |i;s error, becaufe the public are injured by it ; and not for incapacity. The prefident is i:o nominate tlie officer, and 4'i2 i'^ime tp a.!;.prqve here is p-rQvifioii lu^ide againit tl^e : A. 17S9. Of congress. 453 appointment of ignorant ofFicers. They cannot be reuio- ved for caufes which fubfiited before tlieir coniing into office ;their ignorance therefore niuU arife afrer they are appointed ; but this is an unlikely cafe, and one that can- not be contemplated as probabie. I imagine, lir, we are declaring a power in the prefi- .dent which may hereafter be greatly abufed, fur we are not always to expeft a chief niagiftrate in whom fuch entire confidence can be placed as in the prefent. Per- haps gentlemen are fo much dazzled with the fplendor of the virtues of the prefent prclident, as not to be able to fee into futurity. The-framers of the cpnftitutiou did not confine their views to the firft perfon who was looked up to, to fill the prefidential chair; if they had they might have omitted thofe checks and guards with which the powers of the executive are i'urrounded ; they knew from the courle pf human events, tJiat they could not expect to be fo high- ly favored 0/ heaven, as to have the blelTing of his adn)i- niflration more than £cver> or fourteen years — after which, they fuppoled a man might get into power, v ho it was poiFible might mifbehave. We ought to follow their exain- p.1e, and contemplate this power in the hands of an ai7ibiti- ous man, who might apply it to dangerous jmrpofes. If we give this power to the prefident, he may from caprice remove the mofl: worthy men from cffi.e ; liiswil! and plea, furc will be the flight tenure by wiiich an office is to be held, and of confequeiice you render the officer the mere liate flependent, the a!iiie(5l{lave of a perfon who may be'difpofed ro abufe the confidence his fellow citizens have placed jiib him. Another danger may refult; if you dcfire an officer to be a man of capacity and integrity, you may be dHappointed. A gentleman poflelTed of thefe qualities, knowing he n)ay be removed at the pleafure of the prelldant, will be loath to rifk his reputation on fuch infecure ground ; as the mat- ter ffands in the conflitution- he knows if he is lufpeded of doing any thing wrong, he fhall have a fair, trial, and the whole of his tranfacTiions developed by an impartial tribu- nal ; he will have confidence in himfelf when he knows lie can only be removed for improper behaviour. But if he is fubjeded to the whim of any man, it may deter him from entering into the fervice of his country ; bccaufe if he is not fubfervient to that perfons pleafure, he may be turned out, and the public may be led to {Lij)pofe i-or ini- ^iroper behaviour ; this imprcilion cannot be removed; ?,% ^54 DEBATES u public enquiry cannot be obtaineu. Befide this it ought A. !;&.>, io be coniidered, that the perfonwho is appointed will pro- l}ably quit ibme other office or buUnefs in which he is occUr pied. Ought he after making thisfacrifice in order to lerve the public, to be turned out of place without even a reafon — being aOIgned for fuch behaviour perhaps the prelident. does not do this with an ill intention ; he nia}' have been mirir.fornied ; for it is prefumable that apvefident may have round him, men envious of the honors or emcluments of perfons in office, wijo will infinuate fufpicions into his ho- Heft breaft, that m?y produce a removal be this as it may, ; the event is flill the fame to the removed officer. The — public fuppofehim guilty of mal-pradices hence his repu- tation is bl^fted, his property facrificed ; I fay his property is I'acrificed, becaufe I confider his office as his property he ; is ilript of this, and left expofed to the malevolence of the world, contrary to the principles of the conftitution, and contrary to the principles of all free governments, which are that no man lliali be defpoiled of li^s property, but by a fair and impartial trial. Thefeare ferious confiderations, and fuch I truft as will make imprelTions on the minds of gentlemen anxious tq j^romote the public welfare, and fecure diilributive jullice lo themfelves and th^ir pofterity. When this fubjed was laid before the committee, it was laid that it appeared abfurd, that an inferior officer ffiould be removed only by impeachment. There is a claufe in the conPtitution empowering congrefs to veft the appointment of inferior officers in tlie prehdent alone, courts of law or Leads of departments. Thele oflices may a'fobe eft^^bliffied on fuch terms as the legiflature ffiall judge proper ; but ijeither the appointment or removal of heads of department li can be otherv. ife performed than is directed by the confti- tution. To return to my argument, I have dated that if the power is given by the conftittition, the declaration in the law is nugatory, and I will add, if it is not given it will ^e nugatory alfo to attempt to veft the power. If the fe-