Fort Walton Beach Council agenda — 11-14-2006‎(workshop)‎ — reading text

amendment to the city charter is not the The trial court also ruled that Ch. 73- 129 is invalid only means by which Additional powers may be in that it attempts unlawfully to delegate the State' s Conferred Dade on a County municipality. The legislative power to deal in matters reserved to the Metro County Charter 5. 02 provides that each s State, including landlord- tenant relationships and municipality shall have the authority to exercise all the regulation of decedents' estates. In so doing, the powers relating to its local affairs not Inconsistent trial court failed to apply the rule that statutes will with the charter. Section 5. 0 I reserves the right of be so construed as to uphold their constitutional municipal self-determination except as otherwise validity whenever possible. [FN3] And here the provided by the charter. So long as the additional statute may be upheld, for F. S. s 166. 021( 3)( c) power does not conflict with the provisions of the expressly excludes from the grant of power to charter- and the power to enact rent control municipalities ' any subject expressly preempted to ordinances does not so conflict- there is no reason state or county government by the constitution or by why the Legislature may not confer such additional general law.' Thus, even if a rent control ordinance power on a Dade County municipality. Nor has the which was passed under the authority of Ch. 73- 129 power to control* 768 rents been preempted by should seek to regulate such a matter preempted by Dade County pursuant to its charter, so as to bring the State, it would be invalid to that extent under the into play the exemption provision of new F. S. s 166 terms of the authorizing statute itself. While a 02 I ( 3)( d). Accordingly, I conclude that Ch. provision of that nature would require the 73- 129, at least insofar as it allows municipalities to invalidating of such a provision of the statute, it enact rent control ordinances, is applicable to does not necessitate or even justify a finding that municipalities in Dade County. the total statute is invalid. Having determined that Ch. 73- 129 is not an improper delegation of the State' s legislative FN3. Id. authority, that it provides the legislative authorization to enact rent control ordinances It has alsobeen contended that Ch. 73- 129 is lacking in Fleetwood Hotel, and that its provisions inapplicable to Miami Beach due to the provisions are applicable, insofar as they authorize enactment of Art. VIII, s 6( e), Fla. Const., and F. S., s of rent control ordinances to municipalities in Dade 166. 021( 3)( d), which exempt from the broad grant County, despite the provisions of new F. S. s 166 of powers any subject preempted to a county 02 I ( 3)( d), now let us turn to the validity of the pursuant to a county charter adopted under authority ordinance itself. The trial court found the ordinance of Art. VIII, s 6( e). That constitutional provision invalid both for unlawful delegation of the city' s states that all provisions of the Metropolitan Dade legislative authority without sufficient objective County Home Rule Charter shall be valid if guidelines and for conflict with the Florida authorized under Art. VIII, s II of our constitution Residential Landlord and Tenant Act ( specifically, of 1885, and that Art. VIII, s II, of the former F. S. ss 83.46, 83. 57, 83. 58, and 83. 59) and F. S. Ch. constitution ( the Dade County Home Rule Charter 731 ( Florida Probate Law). provision), shall remain in full force and effect as it Art. VIII of the new constitution had not been 3] I too find difficulty with the guidelines set forth adopted. It is contended that the only method by in the ordinance, both on the question of whether it which the power to enact rent control ordinances is by its fixed terms confiscatory and therefore 02006 Thomson/ West. No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works. https:// web2. westlaw .comlprintlprintstream. aspx?prft=HTMLE& destination= atp& sv= Split& rs=... 11/ 14/ 2006  Page 5 of9 305 So.2d 764 Page 5 305 So.2d 764 Cite as: 305 So. 2d 764) unconstitutional in its results, and also on the charge leeway in specified instances. Perhaps the city that the ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable and council has been overly conscientious in its efforts therefore unconstitutional. [ FN4] Each aspect of to spell out everything but in so doing it has run the ordinance in question must be reviewed to afoul of the buoys in the constitutional channel. determine whether or not it rationally attempts to relieve the critical shortage of residential housing The various guidelines and standards have been and accommodations which justify rent control in closely evaluated to bring them into harmony with order to promote a return to a more nearly normal constitutional requirements but I am simply unable basis.[ FN5] The purpose of rent control legislation to do so, short of a virtual judicial rewrite of these has always been to stabilize rentals in emergency provisions of the ordinance. This we are not areas and under emergency conditions in order to authorized to do within our judicial limitations. prevent extortionate increases in rent resulting from a ' freeze' date is set as of October I, housing shortages, and at the same time to allow For example, landlords a fair and equitable return upon their 1973, and despite limited authorizations in specified investments. Foti Heller, 48 v. N.J. Super. 57, 137 cases for some latitude to be granted, these A. 2d 10 (N.J.App. 1957). provisions remain so restrictive that the continuing spiraling costs since that date, of which we must 769 take judicial notice, would preclude an FN4. Nebbia v. People of State of New administrator from allowing, even if he wanted, a York, 291 U. S. 502, 539, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 rate of return that would be less than confiscatory at L.Ed. 940 ( 1934); Nashville, C. & S1. L. least in part. Needed in such an ordinance is a Ry. v. Walters, 294 U. S. 405, 415, 55 greater flexibility to take such matters into account S. Ct. 486, 79 L.Ed. 949 (1935); Rivera v. so that the ultimate goals earlier expressed in the R. Cobian Chinea & Co., 181 F. 2d 974, authorities of a fair rate of return and yet an Cir. 1950); Mora 978 ( 1st v. Mejias, 223 avoidance of unfair rents would be more likely to be F. 2d 814, 816 ( 1st Cir. 1955); Kress, attained. They cannot be erached with provisions in Dunlap & Lane, Ltd. v. Downing, 193 the ordinance like Section 4( c)( 4Xv) which a110ws F. Supp. 874 ( D. V. I. I96 I). an adjustment in rent where, ' it is established that the earned income from the property does not result FN5. Russell v. Treasurer & Receiver in a net annual return of 6% Of the assessed General, 331 Mass. 501, 509, 120 N. E.2d evaluation of the property in effect as of October I, 388 (1954); Nayor v. Rent Board of Town 1973.' The same provision then states: of Brookline, 334 Mass. 132, 134 N. E.2d for the purposes of this paragraph, net annual 419 ( SJud. Ct. 1956). return shall be the amount by which the earned income exceeds the operating expenses of the If the guidelines in our ordinance here were property, excluding mortgage interest, amortization, predicated on the criteria of the authorities depreciation and debt service.' mentioned above, such guidelines would probably meet with approval on the constitutional grounds For one thing, the assessed valuation of property is raised. I am impelled by these precedents, however, notnecessarily the proper basis for a fair return. to find that the standards and guidelines for the rent Despite the requirement for 100% Assessed administrator are so fixed and arbitrary in this valuation for purposes of taxation in Florida, this is not always current and such values do not coincide particular ordinance and in such exact percentages and amounts and terms as to prevent the with the anniversary tax date. For example, the administrator, even if he desired, from allowing a expert testimony in this cause is