Fort Walton Beach Council agenda — 11-14-2006‎(workshop)‎ — reading text

to the rent control This is not the initial appearance of a rent control administrator without prescribing sufficient ordinance before this Court. We dealt with a prior objective guidelines, as is more fully set forth in rent control ordinance of the city in * 766City of Mr. Justice Dekle' s specially concurring opinion, Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d with which ( on this point) Justices Roberts, Boyd 80 I ( Fla. 1972); there we affinned a trial court order and Overton join. invalidating that ordinance. In so doing, we stated that a municipality has no power to enact a rent Accordingly, the opinion of the trial court is control ordinance ' absent a legislative enactment reversed insofar as it holds F. S. s 166. 021 to be authorizing the exercise of such a power by a unconstitutional and holds that Ch. 73- 129 does not municipality'; that the ordinance then under authorize the city to enact a rent control ordinance; consideration contained provisions amounting to an to the extent that the trial court found the provisions unlawful delegation of the legislative authority of of the ordinance to be invalid as to guidelines and the city without appropriate guidelines, and that the standards, it is affinned. ordinance then in question conflicted with certain Q 2006 Thomson/ West. No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works. https:// web2. westlaw .comlprint/ printstream. aspx?prft= HTMLE& destination= atp& sv= Split& rs=... 11/ 14/ 2006  Page 3 of9 305 So.2d 764 Page 3 305 So.2d 764 Cite as: 305 So.2d 764) general laws regulating landlord and tenant in new F. S. s J66. 02J( 2) that grants power to the relationships. municipality to enact such an ordinance, but rather the provision of new F. S. s 166. 021(1) which First, therefore, we must consider whether the expressly empowers municipalities to ' exercise any municipality now has the power to enact such an power for municipal purposes, except when ordinance; that is, whether the enactment of Ch. expressly prohibited by law.' As we noted in In re 73- 129 after our decision in Fleetwood Hotel Apportionment Law, 281 So.2d 484 ( Fla. 1973), the necessitates a change in the result there reached. 1 intent of this chapter was largely to eliminate the ' believe that it does, and that municipalities now are local bill evil' by implementing the provisions of empowered to enact such ordinances by virtue of Art. VIII, s 2, Fla.Const. The power to enact rent new Ch. 73- 129. controJ ordinances in appropriate circumstances is contained in new F. S. s 166. 021( 1), and is not Ch. 73- 129 is a broad grant of power to dependent upon the definitional provision of new municipalities in recognition and implementation of F. S. s 166.021( 2). the provisions of Art. VIII, s 2( b), Fla. Const.( FNIJ It should be so construed as to effectuate that If we must deal with an application of ' municipal purpose where possible.( FN2] It provides, in new purposes' in F. S. 166. 021( 2) under appellee' s s F. S. s 166. 021 1), ( that municipalities shall have the challenge and detennine whether rent control governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to constitutes a proper municipal purpose, then it enable them to conduct municipal government, presents no judicial problem, for rent control under perfonn municipal functions and render municipal appropriate circumstances clearly faIls within the services; it further enables them to exercise any general category of ' municipal Such a purposes.' power for municipal services, except when finding has ample support in the authorities. The expressly prohibited by law. question apparently has never been detennined before in this state, but there is authority for the enactment of rent controlordinances in appropriate FNI. Contrary to appellee' s assertion, this circumstances as a proper municipal purpose in statute is not ' a mere delegation of the Warren v. City of Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 380, 115 police power,' which would not carry with A.2d 218 ( 1955); Inganamort v. Borough of Fort it the power to enact rent control Lee, 120 NJ. Super. 286, 293 A.2d 720 ( 1972); ordinances. McQuillen or Municipal Corporations, s 24. 563( d). FN2. Tom ill 0 v. Miami Herald Publishing The enactment of rent control ordinances, given Co., 287 So.2d 78 ( Fla.l973); State ex reI. sufficientjustifYing Conditions, *767 is a proper Shevin v. Metz Construction Co., 285 municipal purpose. It is not ' expressly prohibited So.2d 598 ( Fla. 1973); City of S1. by law' and therefore comes within the grant of Petersburg v. Siebold, 48 So. 2d 291 power contained in new F. S. s 166. 02J(1). We Fla. 1950); Florida Sugar Distributors v. need not, therefore, reach the general question of Wood, 135 Fla. 126, 184 So. 641 ( 1938). overbroadness of the definitional portion of the act at s 166. 02 J ( 2). Appellee contends that the broad definition of municipal purposes contained in Ch. 73- 129 does I] That the power to enact rent control laws was not grant the city the power to enact rent control intended to be included in the broad grant of power ordinances, since the detennination of what to municipalities in Ch. 73- 129 can be seen from constitutes a proper municipal purpose is for the the legislature' s rejection of a proposed amendment judiciary. City of Miami Beach v. Seacoast to Ch. 73-] 29 during debate which would have Towers- Miami Beach, Inc., J 56 So. 2d 528 expressly excluded the power to enact such Fla. App.3d 1963). This argument misses the mark. ordinances from the broad grant of power contained It is not the definition of municipal purposes found in that chapter. Additionally, note the conclusion of @ 2006 Thomson/ West. No Claim to Orig. U. S. Govt. Works. https:// web2. westlaw. com/print/printstream. aspx?prft= HTMLE& destination= atp& sv= Split& rs=... 11/14/ 2006  Page 4 of9 305 So. 2d 764 Page 4 305 So.2d 764 Cite as: 305 So. 2d 764) the Attorney General in his Opinion 073- 267 that may be conferred on a municipality in Dade County Ch. 73- 129 empowers a municipality to enact rent is by amendment to the municipal charter, as control ordinances. I conclude that it was the provided in s 5. 03 of the County Charter. legislative intent to include in this broad grant of powers the power to enact rent control ordinances It is true that s 5. 03 provides the only way in which in appropriate circumstances, thereby providing the a city charter may be Amended in Dade County. missing authority required by Fleetwood Hotel. Andrews v. Linden, 284 Soold 398 ( Fla. App.3d 1973). But