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a moral
position against war of any kind.
The question in this instance, however, does not arise in a vacuum but in
a setting flowing from the black box of Shariah. That black box, once pried
open, exposes a hostile and even violent doctrine targeting non -Muslims in
the West for conversion, subjugation, or war. There literally are armies of
Shariah- driven combatants at war with the West based upon that doctrine. It
is in this context that the question about the motives for the prohibition be-
comes material to a post -9/ 11 U. S. investor and applicable disclosure laws.
The question hardens into an indictment when juxtaposed against the
published legal edicts of the classical and contemporary Shariah authorities.
To suggest that Shariah is opposed to the defense industry is absurd on its
face, given the history of Shariah -based empires waging war against their
enemies. The evidence is more than historical, however, as the contempo-
rary evidence of Shariah -based regimes illustrates.
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and the Taliban all have acquired massive
weapons arsenals and, at least in the case of Iran, have developed an
Islamic defense industry." The adoption of such a military posture on the
part of these Muslim countries is not simply grounded in a geo- strategic pol-
icy. It is also demanded by Shariah, at least according to the leading
Shariah authorities of our day.
For example, in Usmani' s book, Islam and Modernism, he makes the
careful point that Shariah has no objections to science and technology per
se. In fact, he opines that Shariah requires Muslims to invest in and to utilize
all of modern warfare technology for its mandatory jihad:
The Grand Mufti of Pakistan, Mufti Muhammad Shafi, President, Darul
Ulum, Karachi, has written in his treatise `Jihad" as under, Indeed, the
Patience, the fear of Allah and total belief in and submission to Allah is the
real and unconquerable strength of Muslims. Along with it, however, it is
also essential that equipment of war and ammunition proper to the time
and place should be acquired and stored. The Prophet (SA) always
arranged for war exercises, and issued instructions to collect and acquire
all those weapons that were in vogue anywhere in those days. [ Usmani
goes on to cite the case where two companions of Muhammad were
excused from fighting because they were studying how to manufacture
modern war weapons.]
This incidence (sic) also proves that it is obligatory for the Muslims to
make their countries self-sufficient in war weapons and technology and
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Shariah, Law and ` Financial Jihad': How Should America Respond?
should not depend on others.... We are bound to think it seriously how
much our country is in need of all the equipment and weapons of war
used in modern warfare so that we may not be lagging behind. We must
put all our energy and resources to fulfill the aim that we become self -suffi-
cient in the nearest possible future.
Moulana Zafar Ahmad Usmani, Sheikh- ul- Hadith, Darul -Ulum- al- Islamiya,
Tando Allah Yar, writes in one of his recent articles:
War weapons and technology against the enemy should be raised to the
extent that the enemy is overawed with them ...our earlier Caliphs and
Sultans religiously followed this rule ....The Muslim nations should join
together to build up factories for ammunition and other weapons, and a
continued process of research and inventions must be carried out. All
these efforts are in conformity with Quranic injunction.
Investors are of course free to exclude defense industries from their port-
folios. Muslim nations are also free to purchase or manufacture armaments.
There is, however, a threshold disclosure issue for a U. S. company that is
promoting SCF, which forbids investment in the defense industry. If that pro-
hibition is due to the fact that Shariah considers Islam at war with the West,
the promotion of Shariah and its " opposition" to defense industries is hardly
full disclosure.
The aforementioned acknowledgement by Dow Jones that there is " no
consensus" on the question of whether the defense sector is a forbidden
industry suggests that someone in the inner circle at Dow Jones under-
stands an unstated fact: DJII' s Shariah authorities are using SCF to weaken
their enemies ( i. e., the non -Muslim West), while mandating through their
legal rulings (applied selectively) that Shariah- adherent subscribers should
embrace the weapons industry in the Muslim world in the service of jihad.
This rather patent implication suggests more than a reckless disregard for
the duty to disclose material facts to the investing public.
It is simply untenable to argue that these omissions of purpose ( i. e.;
Shariah hegemony) and methodology ( i. e., jihad) in the disclosures and rep-
resentations by Dow Jones as a U. S. public company are not material to the
reasonable U. S. investor. There are two possible explanations for such omis-
sions: 1) There has been a wholesale failure to conduct even a minimally
acceptable due diligence by legal counsel on this issue. Or 2) legal counsel
knows full well the purposes for such prohibitions —and, indeed, of Shariah
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Case Studies: Dow Jones, Shariah -Compliant Finance and Wall Street
and its methodologies —and has consciously opted to bury this political -mili-
tary agenda deep inside the black box.
The Dow Jones Islamic Fund
The Dow Jones Islamic Fund ( DJIF) was the name given to an open -
ended mutual fund marketed publicly mostly to the Muslim- American
community. Recently, though, the fund' s name was changed to the Iman
Fund and the original licensing arrangement with Dow Jones was termi-
nated. The official explanation for this termination was provided by Dow
Jones Indexes in a letter from its president Michael A. Petronella to Frank
Gaffney and David Yerushalmi at the Center for Security Policy dated May
28, 2008. In that letter, Mr. Petronella explained that Dow Jones learned
only in late February 2008 for the first time that DJIF' s principal sharehold-
er ( with 69.8 %), the North American Islamic Trust ( "NAIT "), had been iden-
tified by the Department of Justice as an un- indicted co- conspirator in a
terrorism -financing case.
Here again, serious questions abound concerning Dow Jones' due dili-
gence in connection with this and other Shariah -compliant finance initiatives.
For example, on its Internet site, NAIT represents itself as follows:
The North American Islamic Trust ( NAIT) is a waqf, the historical Islamic
equivalent of an American trust or endowment, serving Muslims in the
United States and their institutions. NAIT facilitates the realization of
American Muslims' desire for a virtuous and happy life in a Shariah
compliant way.
NAIT is a not -for -profit entity that qualifies as a tax-exempt organization
under Section 501( c) ( 3) of the Internal Revenue Code. NAIT was estab-
lished in 1973 in Indiana by the Muslim Students Association of U. S. and
Canada ( MSA), the predecessor of the Islamic Society of North America
ISNA). NAIT supports and provides services to ISNA, MSA, their affiliates,
and other Islamic centers and institutions. The President of ISNA is an ex-
officio member of the Board of Trustees of NAIT.
The trouble with Dow Jones' post hoc explanation, still not made public
by Dow Jones, is that, long before February 2008, it was well -known that
NAIT and its associated organizations —i. e., the Muslim Students
Association and the Islamic Society of North America —have all been linked
to organizations involved in the material support of terrorism. For example,
prior to the start of the 2007 terror -financing trial of the Holy Land
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Sharjah, Law and `Financial Jihad': How Should America Respond?
Foundation ( "HLF "), the U. S. government submitted a trial brief with a list of
unindicted co- conspirators (the " List of Co- Conspirators ") who had allegedly
participated in some way in the conspiracy to fund Hamas' terror -related
activities against Israel. Hamas was at the time a designated foreign terrorist
organization ( FTO). In its trial brief, the government characterized Hamas as
follows:
Hamas' founding charter makes clear that Hamas is, in fact, the
Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and calls for the annihila-
tion of Israel through " jihad" ( holy war), and the creation of an Islamic
state in its place. Hamas defines jihad as including violent activities,
with such violent activities being carried out by Hamas' military wing,
commonly known as the Izz AI -Din AI- Qassam Brigades ( "AI- Qassam
Brigades "). The charter also calls for charity as [ a] means of securing the
population' s loyalty. Through charitable support, the charter explains,
congeniality will deepen, cooperation and compassion will prevail, unity
will firm up, and the ranks will be strengthened in the confrontation with
the enemy.
As evidenced by documents seized in 2004 from the Virginia home of
un- indicted co- conspirator and fellow Palestinian Committee member
Ismail Elbarrasse, as well as other evidence, the Muslim Brotherhood
directed its Palestinian Committees throughout the world, including the
United States, to carry out the mandate of assisting Sheik Yassin' s newly
formed Hamas.
NAIT and ISNA were both identified on the List of Co- Conspirators as
individuals /entities who are and /or were members of the U.S. Muslim
Brotherhood." Evidence at the trial linked these organizations to Hamas.
Although the trial ended in a mistrial, the Government is preparing to retry its
main case.
How, it might be asked, did the legal advisors to Dow Jones navigate the
due diligence and disclosure issues associated with such a problematic
principal licensee? The short answer is that they seem to have been willing,
until publicly embarrassed by an editorial that was published on February
27, 2008 in Investors Business Daily, to ignore the implications of the intrin-
sic elements of Shariah ( i. e., jihad) described above that the Fund inherited
from the DJII. But even more troublesome is that the Dow Jones' lawyers
also appear to have looked- the -other -way on the record of organizational
connections between NAIT and material support for terror.
65
Case Studies: Dow Jones, Shariah -Compliant Finance and Wall Street
Other disturbing connections to the funding of terrorism arise. The Dow
Jones Islamic Fund' s portfolio manager is Dr. Bassam Osman. As noted
above, he has also been the President and Chairman of the DJIF Fund
Advisor for the past six years. He was also director to another suspect
Muslim charity, the Quranic Literary Institute, an Oak Lawn, Illinois, organiza-
tion that had $ 1. 4 million in assets seized by the Justice Department in June
1998 on the grounds it was used to support Hamas activities.
Finally, NAIT's well -known ownership of the mortgages of a majority of
Shariah- adherent mosques in the United States —including a number that
have been reamed as suspected centers of terrorist activity— raises further
questions about its fitness to be a licensee on a Dow Jones -branded mutual
fund. For example, in April 2004, the founder of a NAITowned mosque in
Albany and the imam he had recruited to serve as its spiritual leader were
arrested for participating in " a plot to import a shoulder -fired missile and
assassinate a Pakistani diplomat in New York City."
In light of these ties, the standard representation of compliance with the
Patriot Act's anti -money laundering provisions contained in the DJIF' s
prospectus rings not just hollow, but
