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factors are:
1) the name given to the charge; ( 2)
the relationship between the amount of the
fee and the value of the service or benefit; ( 3) whether the fee is charged only to
users of the service or is charged to all residents of a given area; ( 4) whether the
fee is voluntary-that is, whether a property owner may avoid the fee by refusing
the service; ( 5) whether the fee is a monthly charge or a one -time charge; ( 6)
whether the fee is charged to recover the costs of improvements to a defined area
of infrastructure or for the routine provision of a service; ( 7) whether the fee is for
a traditional utility service; and ( 8) whether the fee is statutorily authorized as a
fee. 863 So. 2d at 145. The supreme court further instructs us that none of these
factors is controlling, nor are they necessarily exclusive. Each factor is to be
considered in the light of all the circumstances in each case. Id. Therefore, to
consider the School Board' s argument that the circuit court reached the right
result notwithstanding its incorrect finding that the City's stormwater fee was a
user fee instead of a special assessment, we would need to analyze the City' s
ordinance establishing its stormwater management program in light of the eight
factors listed by the supreme court, plus any other pertinent factors.
C. The Record Is Insufficient to Apply the " Tipsy Coachman" Doctrine
d The School Board' s argument that the circuit court was right for
the wrong reason in effect invokes the rule sometimes referred to as the " tipsy
coachman doctrine. This rule allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court
decision that " reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons" so long as
there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record." Dade_
Sc h. Bd. v. Radio Station WnBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644 ( Fla 1999; see also
Robertson v. State; 829 So. 2d 901, 906 -07 ( Fla 20021.
Upon reviewing our record,
we find that it is insufficient for us to apply this rule of appellate efficiency to
consider affirming the circuit court' s ruling as the School Board suggests. We have
before us -as did the circuit court -only fragments of the City's stormwater
management ordinance. Section 32. 244 of the ordinance refers the reader to
appendix A of the Code. Appendix A apparently contains the critical information
concerning how the City levies, calculates, and bills its stormwater utility fee.
Absent this information, we are unable to consider at least three -if not four -of the
factors listed by our supreme court as * 1058 necessary to determine if the City's
stormwater fee is a user fee or a special assessment. Therefore, we are unable to
go behind the circuit court' s finding that the City's stormwater fee is a user fee to
search for a basis to sustain the judgment.
CONCLUSION
The circuit court' s ruling that the School Board was exempt from the payment of
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6/ 16/ 2010 905 So. 2d 1051
a user fee for the City's stormwater management program was in error. We
decline to consider whether the stormwater utility fee was actually a special
assessment to affirm the circuit court' s ruling because our record is inadequate for
that purpose.We: halve considered the other arguments advanced by the School
Board in support of affirmance of the circuit court' s ruling and find them to be
without merit. Accordingly, we reverse the summary final judgment, and we
remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Fla. App. 2 Dist., 2005.
City of Clearwater v. School Bd. of Pinellas County
905 So. 2d 1051, 200 Ed. Law Rep. 429, 30 Fla. L. Weekly D1726
Briefs and Other Related Documents ( Back to ton)
2D04 -3260 ( Docket) ( Jul. 14, 2004)
Judges and Attorneys ( Back to top)
Judges
Canady, Hon. Charles T.
State of Florida Supreme Court
Florida
Litigation History Belo# I Judicial Reversal Report I Judicial Expert Challen=
Repmt I Profiler
Northcutt, Hon.. Stevan T.
State of Florida District Court of Appeal, 2nd District
Florida
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Report I Profile
Penick, Hon. Thomas E. Jr.
State of Florida Circuit C; ourt,, 6th Judicial Circuit
Florida
Litigation History 82ort I Judicial Reversal Report
Walker, Hon. Davidl Seth
State of Florida Circuit Court,, 6th Judicial Circuit
Florida
Litigation History ort
I Judicial Reversal Report I Profiler
Wallace, Hon. Doucllas A.
State of Florida District Court of Appeal, 2nd District
Florida
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6/ 16/ 2010 Advisory Legal Opinion - Stormwater Ut...
Florida Attorney General
Advisory Legal Opinion
Number: AGO 91 -27
Date: April 25, 1991
Subject: Stormwater Utility Services User's Fee
Mr. Michael S. Davis
City Attorney
City of St. Petersburg
RE: MUNICIPALITIES- STORMWATER UTILITIES - SCHOOL DISTRICTS -
municipality may charge stormwater utility user' s fee to school
district based upon estimated use of the system. s. 403. 0893, F. S.
QUESTION:
May the City of St. Petersburg pursuant to s. 403. 0893, F. S.,
impose a stormwater utility services user' s fee on a district
school board based upon estimated use?
SUMMARY:
The city may impose stormwater utility user fees adopted pursuant
to s. 403. 0893( 1), F. S., upon a school board based upon the board' s
use of the system.
Section 403. 0893( 1), F. S., authorizes a to "
municipality
c] reate one or more stormwater utilities and adopt stormwater
utility fees sufficient to plan, construct, operate, and maintain
stormwater management systems set out in the local program required
pursuant to s. 403. 0891( 3)."
In AGO 90 - 47, this office considered whether stormwater fees
imposed by the City of Orlando pursuant to s. 403. 0893( 1), F. S.,
could be charged against property owned by the State of Florida.
The fees in AGO 90 - 47 were imposed upon property within the city
regardless of use and were based upon the particular property
having received some particular benefit from the stormwater system.
Furthermore, the provisions of s. 197. 363, F. S.,[ 1] were used by
the city to collect the fees. These factors led to the conclusion
that the fees were special assessments which in the absence of
legislation subjecting the state to liability could not be assessed
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6/ 16/ 2010 Advisory Legal Opinion - Stormwater Ut...
against state property.
It was noted in AGO 90 - 47 that to the extent the sought to
city
impose the fees as service charges, however, the state could be
liable for such charges. While state property used for public
purposes is not
generally subject to taxes or special assessments,
the state may be liable for charges for services it uses.[ 2] The
opinion stated further that there appears to be no judicial
decision which has directly considered the of a
authority
municipality to compel the state or another governmental to
agency
use the services it offers in the absence of a provision
statutory
or contractual agreement to that effect. Accordingly, it was
suggested that legislative or judicial clarification might be
sought on this issue.
Similarly, property owned by school districts which is used for
educational purposes is constitutionally and statutorily exempt
from taxation and special assessments.[ 3] There is no analogous
exemption for school districts from service charges or fees for the
use of utilities and like services.[ 4] To the extent a school board
uses a service, charges may be imposed. This office, however, may
not comment upon
