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Maelzel's Chess-Player — Edgar Allan Poe (reading text) — reading text
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Of late years however, an anonymous writer, by a course of
reasoning exceedingly unphilosophical, has contrived to blunder upon a
plausible solution—although we cannot consider it altogether the
true one. His Essay was first published in a Baltimore weekly paper, was
illustrated by cuts, and was entitled “An attempt to analyze the Automaton
Chess-Player of M. Maelzel.” This Essay we suppose to have been the
original of the pamphlet to which Sir David Brewster alludes in his
letters on Natural Magic, and which he has no hesitation in declaring a
thorough and satisfactory explanation. The results of the analysis
are undoubtedly, in the main, just; but we can only account for Brewster’s
pronouncing the Essay a thorough and satisfactory explanation, by
supposing him to have bestowed upon it a very cursory and inattentive
perusal. In the compendium of the Essay, made use of in the Letters on
Natural Magic, it is quite impossible to arrive at any distinct conclusion
in regard to the adequacy or inadequacy of the analysis, on account of the
gross misarrangement and deficiency of the letters of reference employed.
The same fault is to be found in the “Attempt &c.,” as we originally
saw it. The solution consists in a series of minute explanations,
(accompanied by wood-cuts, the whole occupying many pages) in which the
object is to show the possibility of so shifting the partitions
of the box, as to allow a human being, concealed in the interior, to
move portions of his body from one part of the box to another, during the
exhibition of the mechanism—thus eluding the scrutiny of the
spectators. There can be no doubt, as we have before observed, and as we
will presently endeavor to show, that the principle, or rather the result,
of this solution is the true one. Some person is concealed in the box
during the whole time of exhibiting the interior. We object, however, to
the whole verbose description of the manner in which the partitions
are shifted, to accommodate the movements of the person concealed. We
object to it as a mere theory assumed in the first place, and to which
circumstances are afterwards made to adapt themselves. It was not, and
could not have been, arrived at by any inductive reasoning. In whatever
way the shifting is managed, it is of course concealed at every step from
observation. To show that certain movements might possibly be effected in
a certain way, is very far from showing that they are actually so
effected. There may be an infinity of other methods by which the same
results may be obtained. The probability of the one assumed proving the
correct one is then as unity to infinity. But, in reality, this particular
point, the shifting of the partitions, is of no consequence whatever. It
was altogether unnecessary to devote seven or eight pages for the purpose
of proving what no one in his senses would deny—viz: that the
wonderful mechanical genius of Baron Kempelen could invent the necessary
means for shutting a door or slipping aside a pannel, with a human agent
too at his service in actual contact with the pannel or the door, and the
whole operations carried on, as the author of the Essay himself shows, and
as we shall attempt to show more fully hereafter, entirely out of reach of
the observation of the spectators.
In attempting ourselves an explanation of the Automaton, we will, in the
first place, endeavor to show how its operations are effected, and
afterwards describe, as briefly as possible, the nature of the observations
from which we have deduced our result.
It will be necessary for a proper understanding of the subject, that we
repeat here in a few words, the routine adopted by the exhibiter in
disclosing the interior of the box—a routine from which he never
deviates in any material particular. In the first place he opens the
door No. I. Leaving this open, he goes round to the rear of the box, and
opens a door precisely at the back of door No. I. To this back door he
holds a lighted candle. He then closes the back door, locks it,
and, coming round to the front, opens the drawer to its full extent. This
done, he opens the doors No. 2 and No. 3, (the folding doors) and displays
the interior of the main compartment. Leaving open the main compartment,
the drawer, and the front door of cupboard No. I, he now goes to the rear
again, and throws open the back door of the main compartment. In shutting
up the box no particular order is observed, except that the folding doors
are always closed before the drawer.
Now, let us suppose that when the machine is first rolled into the
presence of the spectators, a man is already within it. His body is
situated behind the dense machinery in cupboard No. T. (the rear portion
of which machinery is so contrived as to slip en masse, from the
main compartment to the cupboard No. I, as occasion may require,) and his
legs lie at full length in the main compartment. When Maelzel opens the
door No. I, the man within is not in any danger of discovery, for the
keenest eye cannot penetrate more than about two inches into the darkness
within. But the case is otherwise when the back door of the cupboard No.
I, is opened. A bright light then pervades the cupboard, and the body of
the man would be discovered if it were there. But it is not. The putting
the key in the lock of the back door was a signal on hearing which the
person concealed brought his body forward to an angle as acute as possible—throwing
it altogether, or nearly so, into the main compartment. This, however, is
a painful position, and cannot be long maintained. Accordingly we find
that Maelzel closes the back door. This being done, there is no
reason why the body of the man may not resume its former situation—for
the cupboard is again so dark as to defy scrutiny. The drawer is now
opened, and the legs of the person within drop down behind it in the space
it formerly occupied. {*4} There is, consequently, now no longer any part
of the man in the main compartment—his body being behind the
machinery in cupboard No. 1, and his legs in the space occupied by the
drawer. The exhibiter, therefore, finds himself at liberty to display the
main compartment. This he does—opening both its back and front doors—and
no person Is discovered. The spectators are now satisfied that the whole
of the box is exposed to view—and exposed too, all portions of it at
one and the same time. But of course this is not the case. They neither
see the space behind the drawer, nor the interior of cupboard No. 1—the
front door of which latter the exhibiter virtually shuts in shutting its
back door. Maelzel, having now rolled the machine around, lifted up the
drapery of the Turk, opened the doors in his back and thigh, and shown his
trunk to be full of machinery, brings the whole back into its original
position, and closes the doors. The man within is now at liberty to move
about. He gets up into the body of the Turk just so high as to bring his
eyes above the level of the chess-board. It is very probable that he seats
himself upon the little square block or protuberance which is seen in a
corner of the main compartment when the doors are open. In this position
he sees the chess-board through the bosom of the Turk which is of gauze.
Bringing his right arm across his breast he actuates the little machinery
necessary to guide the left arm and the fingers of the figure. This
machinery is situated just beneath the left shoulder of the Turk, and is
consequently easily reached by the right hand of the man concealed, if we
suppose his right arm brought across the breast. The motions of the head
and eyes, and of the right arm of the figure, as well as the sound echec
are produced by other mechanism in the interior, and actuated at will
by the man within. The whole of this mechanism—that is to say all
the mechanism essential to the machine—is most probably contained
within the little cupboard (of about six inches in breadth) partitioned
off at the right (the spectators’ right) of the main compartment.
In this analysis of the operations of the Automaton, we have purposely
avoided any allusion to the manner in which the partitions are shifted,
and it will now be readily comprehended that this point is a matter of no
importance, since, by mechanism within the ability of any common
carpenter, it might be effected in an infinity of different ways, and
since we have shown that, however performed, it is performed out of the
view of the spectators. Our result is founded upon the following observations
taken during frequent visits to the exhibition of Maelzel. {*5}
I. The moves of the Turk are not made at regular intervals of time, but
accommodate themselves to the moves of the antagonist—although this
point (of regularity) so important in all kinds of mechanical contrivance,
might have been readily brought about by limiting the time allowed for the
moves of the antagonist. For example, if this limit were three minutes,
the moves of the Automaton might be made at any given intervals longer
than three minutes. The fact then of irregularity, when regularity might
have been so easily attained, goes to prove that regularity is unimportant
to the action of the Automaton—in other words, that the Automaton is
not a pure machine.
2. When the Automaton is about to move a piece, a distinct motion is
observable just beneath the left shoulder, and which motion agitates in a
slight degree, the drapery covering the front of the left shoulder. This
motion invariably precedes, by about two seconds, the movement of the arm
itself—and the arm never, in any instance, moves without this
preparatory motion in the shoulder. Now let the antagonist move a piece,
and let the corresponding move be made by Maelzel, as usual, upon the
board of the Automaton. Then let the antagonist narrowly watch the
Automaton, until he detect the preparatory motion in the shoulder.
Immediately upon detecting this motion, and before the arm itself begins
to move, let him withdraw his piece, as if perceiving an error in his
manœuvre. It will then be seen that the movement of the arm, which, in
all other cases, immediately succeeds the motion in the shoulder, is
withheld—is not made—although Maelzel has not yet performed,
on the board of the Automaton, any move corresponding to the withdrawal of
the antagonist. In this case, that the Automaton was about to move is
evident—and that he did not move, was an effect plainly produced by
the withdrawal of the antagonist, and without any intervention of Maelzel.
This fact fully proves, 1—that the intervention of Maelzel, in
performing the moves of the antagonist on the board of the Automaton, is
not essential to the movements of the Automaton, 2—that its
movements are regulated by mind—by some person who sees the
board of the antagonist, 3—that its movements are not regulated by
the mind of Maelzel, whose back was turned towards the antagonist at the
withdrawal of his move.
3. The Automaton does not invariably win the game. Were the machine a pure
machine this would not be the case—it would always win. The principle
being discovered by which a machine can be made to play a game
of chess, an extension of the same principle would enable it to win a game—a
farther extension would enable it to win all games—that is,
to beat any possible game of an antagonist. A little consideration will
convince any one that the difficulty of making a machine beat all games,
Is not in the least degree greater, as regards the principle of the
operations necessary, than that of making it beat a single game. If then
we regard the Chess-Player as a machine, we must suppose, (what is highly
improbable,) that its inventor preferred leaving it incomplete to
perfecting it—a supposition rendered still more absurd, when we
reflect that the leaving it incomplete would afford an argument against
the possibility of its being a pure machine—the very argument we now
adduce.
4. When the situation of the game is difficult or complex, we never
perceive
