Fort Walton Beach Council agenda — 08-08-2006 ‎(executive)‎ — reading text

656, 661, note 15 ( 2d Cir. Realty Corp. v. Corp. , recited above, when ruling upon a motion for class 1978) . Second, as the court does not delve into the substantive claims. 3B certification, at 23. 46 (" The invitation to pre- try the case Moore' s Federal Practice, through the vehicle of this motion [ class certification] must be respectfully Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 726 ( N. D. Cal. declined.") Siegel v. Cbicken Delight, Dravo Corp., 130 F. R. D. 70, 76 ( S. D. Te){. 1967); Transamerican Refining Corp. v. 1990). Rather, the court' s focus on a class certification motion is strictly articulated in the class action rule. upon the requirements as II. NUMEROSITY is satisfied if the potential class is so The numerosity requirement Case No. 03- 5425 Page 4 of 16 Pagcs numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Rule 1. 220 ( a) . In determining whether the numerosity requirement is met, the court considers, inter alia, the number of potential class members and their geographic dispersion. See Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., 769 F. 2d 859, 678 ( 11th Cir. Inc., 1986) . The court properly should give serious consideration to " concerns of judicial economy ..." D. Pi. by M. J. 0:1 Behal f of S. W. . v. Poundstone, 165 F. R. D. 661, 670 ( M. D. Ala. 1996). The Plaintiffs' evidence establishes that the proposed plaintiff class is co.rr. prised of more than fifty thousand members of The Florida Bar located throughout the state of Florida. Due to the large number of potential plaintiffs and their state- wide geographic dispersion, the Court finds that the numerosity requirement has been satisfied. Testimony, affidavits, and the f Court s judicial . notice of material facts satisfy the Court that the numerosity requirement of Rule 1. 220 is also met as to the proposed defendant class. III. C<>> NALITY t<<)OF FACT OR LAW The second step of a Rule 1. 220( a) ( 2) examination calls for an inquiry into whether the claim or defense of the representative party raises questions of law or fact common to questions of law or fact raised by the claim or defense of each member of the class. In this analysis it is not necessary that identical questions be presented or that the members share all legal or factual questions in ' common. Taylor v. Flagstar Bank, 181 F. R. D. 509, 516 M. D. Ala. 1998). Rule 1. 220( a) ( 2) simply requires that " the questions( s) lJ.nking the class members [ be) substantially related to the resolution of the litigation." Perry, 180 F. R. D. at 430; Coleman v. Cannon 011 Co. 141 F. R. D. 516, 521- 22 ( M. D. Ala. 1992); Robinson v. Metro- North Commuter R. B., 267 F. 3d 147, 155 ( 2d eir .1998) ( All questions of law and fact need not be common to satisfy the rule. The existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class. J Sta ton v. Boeing Co., 327 F. 3d e No, 03. 5425 Ca.$ Page. S of t 6 Pages 938, 953 ( 9th Cir. 2003) . The common question at the h'eartof this case is whether the Defendant, as well as the defendant class members, each enacted a local ordinance pursuant to Chapter 205, E'la. Stat., that imposes an occupatior.al license on Plaintiffs and on the absent members of the plaintiff class. The conclusive question upon the merits will be whether the ordinances thus enacted constitute an unconstitutional encroachment on the separation of powers doctrine as enunciated in Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 32 ( 329.. Fla. 2004) ( nNo person belonging to either branch shall exercl$ e any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless provided herein.") ( citing the Florida Constitution, Article II, Section 3). The Defendant has challenged commonality on several innovative, yet extraneous bases, none of which cha.lenge the authoritative case law establishing the criteria by which this Court properly must determine that element of the class action rule as to both classes. Rule 1. 220 ( a) ( 2) simply requires that " the class questions linking members [ be] substantially related to the resolution of the litigation." Perry, 180 F. R. D. at 430, quoting In re Workers' Compensation, 130 F. R. D. 99, 104 ( D. Minn. 1990); Coleman v. Cannon Qil Co., 141 F. R. D. 516, 521 ( M. D. Ala. 1992). The resolution of the common questions must affect a substantial number of the class members . In re South Central State Products Anti trust Bakery Litigati.on, 86 F. iLD. 407, 415 ( H.. D. La. 1980); Diaz v. Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, 165 F. R. D. 689, 693- 94 ( M. D. Fla. 1996) ( District Judge Adams) . IV. ' TYPICALITY To establish typicality a. plaintiff must show tha.t there is a " nexus between the class representative' s claims or defenses and the common questions of fac.t or law which unite the class." Taylor, 181 F. R. D. at 517; see Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F. 2d 1332, 1337 { 11th Cir. 1984}. A sufficient nexus is established if the claims or defenses of the class and Case No. 03. 5425 e 6 of 16 Pages Adams in Diaz v. Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, 165 f. R. D. 689, 694